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Performance Metrics for Network Intrusion Systems 
Christopher John Tucker MSc 
Intrusion systems have been the subject of considerable research during the 
past 33 years, since the original work of Anderson. Much has been published 
attempting to improve their performance using advanced data processing 
techniques including neural nets, statistical pattern recognition and genetic 
algorithms. Whilst some significant improvements have been achieved they are 
often the result of assumptions that are difficult to justify and comparing 
performance between different research groups is difficult. The thesis develops 
a new approach to defining performance focussed on comparing intrusion 
systems and technologies. 
A new taxonomy is proposed in which the type of output and the data scale 
over which an intrusion system operates is used for classification. The 
inconsistencies and inadequacies of existing definitions of detection are 
examined and five new intrusion levels are proposed from analogy with other 
detection-based technologies. These levels are known as detection, recognition, 
identification, confirmation and prosecution, each representing an increase in 
the information output from, and functionality of, the intrusion system. These 
levels are contrasted over four physical data scales, from application/host 
through to enterprise networks, introducing and developing the concept of a 
footprint as a pictorial representation of the scope of an intrusion system. An 
intrusion is now defined as “an activity that leads to the violation of the security 
policy of a computer system”. Five different intrusion technologies are 
illustrated using the footprint with current challenges also shown to stimulate 
further research. Integrity in the presence of mixed trust data streams at the 
highest intrusion level is identified as particularly challenging. 
Two metrics new to intrusion systems are defined to quantify performance and 
further aid comparison. Sensitivity is introduced to define basic detectability of 
an attack in terms of a single parameter, rather than the usual four currently in 
use. Selectivity is used to describe the ability of an intrusion system to 
discriminate between attack types. These metrics are quantified experimentally 
for network intrusion using the DARPA 1999 dataset and SNORT. Only nine of 
the 58 attack types present were detected with sensitivities in excess of 12dB 
indicating that detection performance of the attack types present in this dataset 
remains a challenge. The measured selectivity was also poor indicting that only 
three of the attack types could be confidently distinguished.  The highest value 
of selectivity was 3.52, significantly lower than the theoretical limit of 5.83 for 
the evaluated system. Options for improving selectivity and sensitivity through 
additional measurements are examined.  
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 2 
1. Introduction 
At the outset of this research there was a perceived performance shortfall in 
practical systems, in particular that the number of false alarms was 
unacceptably high. Over thirty years of research into new data processing 
techniques and systems approaches has failed to identify a method or collection 
of techniques for correct declaration of all intrusions, with an arbitrary low false 
alarm rate. A key aspect of understanding the applicability of a new technique 
is the ability to compare it with the performance of others. The motivation for 
this thesis was based in the observation that detection theory, as a framework 
for performance assessment, had been applied successfully to many 
technologies, including radar and sonar, but had only limited application to 
computer intrusion systems. The desire was to use analogy from these other 
technologies to identify how performance could be better measured, specifically 
addressing the research question of how can performance of an intrusion 
system be defined more clearly to aid comparison of differing approaches and 
focus new research. 
This research has defined a new taxonomy for intrusion systems, specifically 
aimed at comparing the performance of differing approaches. Five levels of 
intrusion performance have been defined from “Detection”, which is the ability 
of a system to declare that an intrusion is underway but provide no further 
information, through to “Prosecution”, where evidential quality information is 
gathered on the attacker and the methods and targets they have exploited. 
These five levels are examined over four data scales from application to 
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enterprise to create a footprint for each intrusion system type. Meaningful 
comparison of intrusion systems can only be undertaken where they overlap on 
this footprint. 
In addition, this research has defined two new performance metrics, designated 
as sensitivity and selectivity, using analogy from other technologies in which 
detection is an important element. Sensitivity is concerned with the ability to 
detect a given attack, at a known detection probability and false alarm rate. It 
replaces the usual four metrics of false positive, false negative, true positive 
and true negative rates with a single number, making comparison easier. 
Selectivity is concerned with the ability of an intrusion system to differentiate 
different attack types. This is important when considering the higher levels of 
intrusion performance in the new taxonomy. Selectivity consists of a square 
matrix, the dimension of which is the number of different attack types that are 
to be differentiated.  
This first section of this chapter commences by describing the need for effective 
intrusion systems in terms of the quantity, type and growth of network attacks. 
The aims and objectives of the research are then described more fully before 
an overview of the layout of the thesis is presented.  
1.1. The Need for Effective Intrusion Systems 
The growing availability of Internet access has increased the variety of online 
services offered to business and private users. The number of online financial 
transactions is continuing to increase to the point that Internet purchases and 
the management of personal finances online are commonplace. Businesses 
Chapter 1 Introduction   
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have also identified significant benefits in interconnecting their company 
networks over the Internet or private networks, either to reduce infrastructure 
costs, improve employee-work flexibility or to collaborate with partners. 
However, as these opportunities have been identified and exploited, there has 
been an expansion of the number and sophistication of attacks on online users.  
 
Figure 1-1 Annual Increase in the Number of New Virus Signatures 
One indication of the growing threat is the number of new virus signatures 
created each year to combat malware. This is shown in Figure 1-1, as reported 
by Symantec (Rossi 2010), where the almost exponential annual increase in 
new virus signatures is shown. Despite publishing numerous statistics in their 
regular security reports, 2010 was the last time annual increases in virus 
signatures statistics were reported by Symantec. However, in a press release in 
2011 (Symantec 2011), Symantec did report: 
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“The sheer volume of sophisticated attacks targeting organizations of all sizes 
poses a daunting challenge for traditional signature-based security solutions 
that can't keep up”.  
Also the number of new vulnerabilities discovered within security related 
software, as recorded in the US National Vulnerability Database (National 
Vulnerability Database 2011), is shown in Figure 1-2. The exponential growth in 
their discovery to 2006 seems to be abated, with a steady decline in the 
number since then. However in 2010 there were still over 4500 new 
vulnerabilities discovered, with each one presenting a potential attack vector for 
an intruder.  
 
Figure 1-2 Annual Increase in New Vulnerabilities Discovered 
The results of the latest UK bi-annual information security breaches survey are 
shown in Figure 1-3 (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2012).  This survey shows that 
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the incidence of UK companies experiencing premeditated or malicious security 
incidents has increased from 18% overall in 1998 to 91% in 2012 for large 
companies.  Interestingly, the 2006 incidents are lower than in 2004 where 
they reached 68% overall.  The reduction is believed to be due to the increased 
awareness of security issues within UK companies and the deployment of 
improved security controls. However the reduction in incidents was abated in 
2010, with 2012 representing the highest recorded level from this series of 
surveys. 
 
Figure 1-3 Results of a UK Security Survey (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2012) 
Figure 1-4 shows a much more insidious problem in which the sophistication of 
attacks is increasing, but the technical skills required by would-be attackers is 
decreasing (Hansman and Hunt 2005). This is mainly due to the proliferation of 
scripts on the Internet that allow the automation of attacks. If these trends 
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continue, the importance of effective intrusion systems will also grow. Of 
particular relevance to the proposed research is the growth in the performance 
required from an intrusion system, to meet the growing threat and remain 
effective. Using Figure 1-4 as an example, an intrusion system in 1980 would 
have needed to detect password guessing attacks, whilst in 2000 it would need 
to detect sophisticated command and control attacks, as well as all the attack 
techniques developed since 1980.  
More recently advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks have appeared, 
originally targeted at military and political targets, but now being used 
increasingly against large enterprises (Giura and Wei 2012). APTs are 
sophisticated attacks undertaken by highly skilled and resourced individuals, 
potentially attacking over many years for a given target. 
 
Figure 1-4 Increasing Attack Sophistication (Hansman and Hunt 2005)  
As attack sophistication has increased so has the development of technologies 
aimed at defending network systems. Routers, which have formed the central 
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element of the Internet, have been enhanced to include packet filtering, 
stateful-inspection and authentication technologies. Specialist security devices 
have been developed, such as firewalls and intrusion systems and prevention 
systems, to thwart the would-be attacker. The deployment of such devices has 
made it increasingly difficult to penetrate protected networks, but not 
impossible. Configuration errors, technology weaknesses or security policy 
limitations can still result in networks being penetrated and information being 
stolen or otherwise compromised. In many cases legitimate system users 
access information that they are not authorised to see, either because no 
controls are in-place for “insiders” or through the use of simple hacking tools 
available on the Internet.  
Clearly, the threat to computer networks is real, sophisticated and growing. 
New technologies may exacerbate the threat by providing opportunities for 
more configuration errors, new inherent weaknesses, or to reveal policy 
limitations. A key requirement in defending against intruder attacks is to know 
when they are underway. Intrusion systems are one way of providing this 
information, along with analysis of operating system, application and network 
device logs.  
Despite this clear need for intrusion systems their deployment has not been 
universal. The 2008 BERR (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008) survey1 reported 
that only 46% of the UK companies surveyed had deployed an intrusion 
detection system, up from 43% in 2006. Yet 98% of companies use anti-virus 
                                        
1 This was the last survey in this series to record deployment statistics for intrusion detection 
systems. 
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software on email and web downloads, up from 95% in 2006. Given that there 
are quality open source intrusion systems available (for example SNORT or 
BRO), it is difficult to understand why a wider deployment of intrusion systems 
has not occurred. 
One reason may be the perception that intrusion systems produce a large 
number of false alarms. An analysis by Tjhai (Tjhai, Papadaki et al. 2008) 
confirms that recent versions of SNORT (Roesch 1999) can still produce a large 
number of false positives. Also in the corporate environment Gartner (Young 
and Pescatore 2010) reports: 
“False positive (false alarm) rates remain low in most deployments because 
most use cases deploy high confidence signatures only.” 
In the same study Gartner reports that 25% of intrusion prevention system 
(IPS) deployments have their blocking capabilities disabled until “businesses are 
confident that there will be no business interruption”.  This suggests that false 
alarm rates continue to remain a concern.  
1.2. Aims and Objectives of the Thesis 
The aim of this thesis is to identify better ways of measuring the performance 
of intrusion systems, so that meaningful comparison can be undertaken to 
focus future research on performance improvement.  
In order to achieve this the programme of work wasdivided into four distinct 
objectives, namely to: 
a) Review the techniques and performance measures that have been 
applied to intrusion systems, to identify the most promising techniques 
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for further evaluation; 
b) Re-evaluate the meaning of “detection” in the context of Network 
Intrusion Systems (NIS2); 
c) Assess the application of detection theory to NIS and propose metrics 
that can be used to characterise their performance; and 
d) Demonstrate experimentally the use of the performance metrics and 
the potential for false alarm rejection using a representative NIS and 
practical data. 
A programme of research has been undertaken to achieve these objectives and 
is reported fully in this thesis. A literature review was undertaken to determine 
the state of the art in intrusion systems, with emphasis on the detection of 
network intrusions, achieving the first objective of this research. The outcome 
from this review identified specific limitations of intrusion systems and their 
performance comparison, which were used to examine more closely the 
definition of “detection”. From this research the new taxonomy was created and 
the need for specific performance metrics was identified, achieving the second 
research objective. These metrics were defined in a systems analysis based on 
detection theory, achieving the third research goal. The final research goal was 
achieved by designing and implementing a practical assessment in which these 
metrics were measured for the SNORT intrusion system on one specific dataset, 
namely DARPA 1999. Although this dataset is now somewhat dated it does 
                                        
2 The usual acronym of NIDS, Network Intrusion Detection System, has been replaced with NIS, 
Network Intrusion System, to indicate a more general applicability to other intrusion levels such 
as recognition and identification, as discussed in Chapter 3. In this thesis, detection is only used 
to describe the lowest level of intrusion, or when referencing the work of others which use it to 
describe their work. 
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demonstrate the application of these metrics and the resulting information that 
can be inferred. The proposed metrics are applicable to more modern intrusion 
threats and systems other than NIS. 
1.3. Thesis Structure 
The structure of this thesis mirrors the objectives of the research as defined in 
the previous section. Chapter 2 provides the literature review focusing on data 
processing techniques, as this is a focus of considerable interest in the research 
community. A short description of research and commercial systems is 
provided, before some security issues are described. The chapter ends with a 
description of the current methods for evaluating performance of intrusion 
systems. It is concluded that although there has been considerable data 
processing research it is difficult to compare intrusion systems directly in 
meaningful ways. 
Chapter 3 uses the results of the literature review to develop in detail the new 
taxonomy that focusses on performance comparison of intrusion systems. It is 
not limited to network deployment, but covers scales of protection from files, to 
hosts, to networks and ultimately to the enterprise.  The taxonomy also focuses 
on the use of the output from the intrusion system, defining five different levels 
of performance. When these levels are combined with the protection scale, a 
two-dimensional map is created, and the capabilities of different approaches to 
intrusion can be plotted. This represents a qualitative comparison of intrusion 
systems.  
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Chapter 4 describes a systems view of network intrusion using results based on 
detection theory. Some fundamental results are derived in terms of set theory, 
before the properties of an ideal NIS are defined. The two new performance 
metrics of sensitivity and selectivity are developed to quantify the ability of an 
NIS to detect intrusion events and to classify them by type of attack. This 
chapter builds on the qualitative comparison made possible by the taxonomy 
described in chapter 3, to provide a quantitative determination of performance. 
Chapter 5 describes an experimental study that quantifies the performance of 
SNORT against the DARPA 1999 dataset, using the two new performance 
metrics. Poor performance was measured and used to indicate potential 
improvements to NIS processing. 
Finally, Chapter 6 provides a summary of the research and conclusions, stating 
the contribution that this research has made to the corpus of intrusion systems. 
The potential for further work is also described.   
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2. Literature Review 
This chapter describes the current research in intrusion systems.  During the 
last 33 years, since the original work of Anderson (Anderson 1980), there has 
been considerable research undertaken and therefore it is not possible to cover 
all aspects in such a short review.  As a result this chapter concentrates on 
network intrusion research, relevant to the research objectives described in 
section 1.2. It is divided into five major sections, as follows: 
 Frameworks for intrusion detection - in which basic types of intrusion 
systems are established; 
 Data processing -  describing the focus on algorithms that has occurred 
in trying to improve the discrimination performance; 
 Intrusion systems - in which a systems level approach rather than a data 
processing centric view is undertaken; 
 Intrusion evasion - describing the security problems introduced by 
deployment of an intrusion system and the techniques used by intruders 
to avoid detection of their activities; and 
 Evaluating intrusion detection systems – in which the techniques and 
data available for quantifying intrusion system performance are 
described. 
2.1. Frameworks for Intrusion Detection 
The classification of different intrusion detection methodologies can be 
considered as frameworks from which their basic properties can be compared. 
There have been a number of attempts to define a generic architecture for 
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intrusion systems. DARPA initiated the Common Intrusion Detection Framework 
(CIDF) (Ning, Wang et al. 2000). In this framework, they are described in terms 
of event generators, event analysers, event databases and response units. The 
Common Intrusion Specification Language was created to operate with the 
CIDF so that event records, results and countermeasures could be shared 
(Tung 2000).  
The Internet Engineering Task Force defined the Intrusion Alert Protocol (IAP) 
to allow the exchange of alert information between intrusion system elements. 
This was later improved in the Intrusion Detection Exchange Protocol 
(Buchheim, Erlinger et al. 2001) and published as a Request For Comments 
(RFC) (Debar, Curry et al. 2007). 
NATO proposed a generic architecture for intrusion systems connecting trusted 
and untrusted network systems (North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Research 
and Technology Organization. 2002). This architecture included a similar 
number of elements as the CIDF, however they included visualisation and 
deception units.  
For this thesis we have chosen to use an algorithmic framework. As such there 
are four generic models of intrusion systems, namely: 
 Misuse Detection – where signatures are used to examine the available 
data. For host-based intrusion systems the signature can identify a 
specific virus or attack method, whilst for network-based systems they 
can detect the exploitation of application or operating system 
vulnerabilities; 
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 Anomaly Detection – in which resources are monitored to establish a 
norm for the systems under surveillance and the deviation from this 
norm is used to indicate an intrusion; 
 Specification-based detection – where key processes or network 
protocols are monitored and specifications for correct behaviour of these 
processes are developed. For example in host-based intrusion systems, 
system call sequences could be monitored and any deviation from 
previously seen sequences is flagged as an intrusion; and 
 User-based detection – In which normal user behaviour is determined 
and deviation from this behaviour is flagged as an intrusion. The 
behaviours that could be monitored include keystroke characteristics, 
application use and website access. 
Specification-based and user-based detection can be considered as specific 
cases of anomaly detection. However they present different issues for algorithm 
designers and hence they have been separated here. 
2.2. Data Processing 
The focus of much academic research into improving intrusion system 
performance has been aimed at the selection of data processing algorithms. 
This section describes the most important data processing techniques that have 
been designed to improve discrimination between intrusion-like and non-
intrusion-like activities. 
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2.2.1. Basic Techniques 
A number of data processing techniques have been applied to the problem of 
detecting intrusions. They each attempt to address some of the fundamental 
issues, which include: 
 Achieving high system confidence – to detect most (all) intrusions, with 
an acceptably low false alarm rate; 
 Allowing performance optimisation – to select an arbitrarily high 
detection rate or an arbitrarily low false alarm rate, depending on the 
business impact of compromise of the information being protected or the 
ability to investigate false alarms; 
 Adapting to changing system operating environments – to evolve in the 
presence of new, potentially uncharacterized intrusions, and in changing 
authorized user behaviour so as to maintain system assurance levels; 
and 
 Surviving direct attack or evasion techniques – to maintain system 
assurance in the presence of attacks directed at the intrusion system or 
countermeasures aimed at evasion. 
Intrusion systems operate as part of a set of system security tools whose aim is 
to achieve a defined level of assurance for the protection of the information 
assets accessed by the authorised system users. At one level, if each security 
element of a system were to operate correctly and effectively, then the need for 
high performance intrusion systems would be significantly reduced. For 
example, if network authentication systems were completely effective and not 
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subject to buffer overrun attacks, then the problem of intrusion detection would 
reduce to automated log analysis.  
There are also network design approaches that can improve the ability of an 
intrusion system to operate effectively. For example in networks that 
incorporate darknet techniques (Qin, Dagon et al. 2004), in which IP addresses 
remain unassigned, it is trivial to detect intrusions that are attempting to access 
these addresses. Confident alarms can be generated with a detection 
probability of 1 for certain types of attack such as port or IP scanning. 
However, false negative performance can be poor if the intruder does not 
undertake reconnaissance or attacks on the darknet IP addresses. Intruders 
with detailed system knowledge, such as network support staff, could easily 
avoid these addresses. Also an intruder that has been passively monitoring 
network traffic using a network sniffer would not see activity on these 
addresses and therefore may not choose to attack using them.  
From the preceding argument it is clear that intrusion system techniques should 
be able to alert to intrusion-like behaviours in the presence of normal 
behaviour, whilst making effective use of a priori network, user and threat 
information. It is in this context that the review of basic intrusion system 
techniques should be considered. 
2.2.2. Support Vector Machines (SVM) 
Support Vector Machines (SVM) have gained popularity as effective classifiers in 
a range of pattern recognition problems (Burges 1998; Muller, Mika et al. 
2001). They are a generalised linear classifier, in which the input dataset is 
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partitioned into two classes using supervised training.  They can be applied to 
N-class problems by combining SVMs in one of two ways. In one approach each 
SVM is trained to detect a particular class and reject all other classes.  Such 
implementations are known as one-against-all SVMs.  An alternative approach 
has SVMs trained to distinguish pairs of classes, where the total number of 
SVMs is the number of possible pairs of classes or N(N-1)/2. This is known as 
the one-versus-one approach and clearly the number of SVM classifiers can 
become very large for a large number N of classes. 
SVMs have been applied to the problem of intrusion detection by a number of 
researchers (Burges 1998; Mukkamala, Janoski et al. 2002a; Quang, Zhang et 
al. 2002; Ambwani 2003; Fugate and Gattiker 2003; Hu and Heywood 2003; 
Hu, Liao et al. 2003; Ma and Perkins 2003; Mukkamala and Sung 2003d; 
Mukkamala and Sung 2003a; Mukkamala and Sung 2003c; Mukkamala and 
Sung 2003b; Quang, Zhang et al. 2003; Sung and Mukkamala 2003; Kim, 
Nguyen et al. 2005). Ambwani studied the use of one-versus-one method for 
multi-class SVMs applied to the KDD ’99 dataset and to both problems of 
anomalous and misuse detection (Ambwani 2003). The detection performance 
was considered comparable to the winners of the KDD ’99 competition. 
Mukkamala (Mukkamala and Sung 2002; Mukkamala and Sung 2003d; Sung 
and Mukkamala 2003) systematically assessed the significance of the input 
features from the KDD ’99 dataset, both for SVM and neural network based 
intrusion systems.  They implemented a 5-class SVM using the one-against-all 
approach to classify the data into one of Normal; Denial of service; Remote 
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Access; Privilege Elevation; and Probing. High detection probabilities (>99.7%) 
were achieved for some classifications when the number of input features had 
been reduced to six from the original 41.  Interestingly, Ambwani (Ambwani 
2003) claims that the one-versus-one approach should provide better class 
discrimination that the one-against-all approach.  
Chan studied the application of a hybrid SVM and rule-based approach to the 
detection of denial-of-service network attacks (Chan, Ng et al. 2004).  An SVM 
was used to select important features within the data and to generate the rules.  
The rule-based sub-system was used to detect the denial-of-service attack.  
This work built on the work of Mukkamala (Mukkamala and Sung 2003c) and 
was able to demonstrate improved performance over systems where human 
experts had selected the ruleset, when applied to the KDD ’99 dataset.  
Nguyen used one-class SVMs as anomaly intrusion detectors (Nguyen 2002).  
One-class SVMs are unsupervised classifiers in which outliers (that is, 
anomalies) can be extracted. Connection-based features were extracted using 
TCPTRACE and applied to one-class SVMs trained to respond to each network 
service.  High detection rate were achieved (100%) with false positive rates in 
the range 0.018-2.02% when trained and applied against the DARPA 1999 
TCPDUMP dataset. Fugate (Fugate and Gattiker 2003) studied one-class SVMs 
as anomaly detectors, using the KDD ’99 dataset. 
Tran (Tran 2004) also studied one-class SVMs applied to the 1999 DARPA 
dataset. TCPSTAT was used to extract network statistics (features) over a 
defined time period, for input to the one-class SVM classifier.  Only five of the 
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TCPSTAT parameters were used in this study.  Despite this, detection rates of 
71% were achieved with 20 false alarms per day.  
Mill (Mill and Inoue 2004) extended the SVM architecture to include two new 
implementations. The training datasets were partitioned and used to train 
SVMs. In the TreeSVM implementation the results of the training on the first 
subset are used to train the next subset. A single set of SVMs result from this 
partitioning. In the ArraySVM implementation the SVMs that were trained on 
each partition were not combined, but instead placed in an array and applied to 
all the input data. The SVM which produced the greatest response to the input 
data-point was used to classify it. 
Hu (Hu, Liao et al. 2003) applied SVM techniques to the detection of anomalies 
in host system calls and recognised that SVM performance is sensitive to the 
noise in the training data. Since it can be difficult to extract perfectly labelled 
data he proposed the use of Robust SVMs (RSVM) to overcome this limitation. 
Experimental results using the 1998 DARPA database demonstrated an 
improvement in detection performance compared with SVMs or K-nearest 
neighbour algorithms. 
Kim (Kim and Cha 2004) applied SVMs to the difficult problem of masquerade 
detection in a host-based intrusion detection system. Sequences of user 
commands were used as the feature set and the results were compared with a 
naïve Bayes method. Detection rates of up to 87% were achieved with false 
alarm rates of 6.4%. Despite this poor performance the authors concluded that 
“SVM is the most effective masquerade detection method available to date”. 
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Kim has applied this same approach to network masquerade detection in a web 
environment (Kim, Cho et al. 2004). 
Kim (Kim, Nguyen et al. 2005) has used a genetic algorithm (GA) to improve 
further the performance of SVM intrusion classifiers.  The GA subsystem was 
used to search for the optimal detection model, which was then evaluated by 
the SVM classifier. Results better than the KDD ’99 competition winner were 
achieved. 
SVM techniques remain a current topic of research due to their discrimination 
performance. Recent efforts have focussed on addressing implementation 
issues, such as the coarse-to-refined grid search techniques used during 
training SVMs by Lei (Lei and Zhou 2012). 
2.2.3. Agents 
The use of mobile agents to gather, process and take action using data 
distributed within a network has been extensively studied.  Mobile agents (MA) 
would appear to offer many advantages over centralised models (Jansen, Mell 
et al. 1999) including: 
 Reducing network load by processing data locally; 
 Overcoming network latency by taking action at the infected host; 
 Autonomous operation allows the intrusion system to continue operation 
as other parts of its implementation are attacked or destroyed; 
 Platform independence, by allowing agents to interface to a variety of 
operating systems; 
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 Dynamic adaptation, using the mobility of agents to reconfigure an 
intrusion system in response to intruder activity; 
 Static adaptation, by adding more agents as new threats or a priori data 
becomes available; and 
 Scalability, as the computational load is spread rather than centralised. 
Jansen (Jansen, Mell et al. 1999) also identified some limitations of mobile 
agents, including: 
 Security – there are a large number of security concerns, including 
malicious MAs, attack by the MA host and eavesdropping attacks in 
transit; 
 Performance – MA runtime environments are slow and can hinder the 
ability of intrusion systems to process events and detect attacks; 
 Code size – The complexity of intrusion system tasks and the need to 
integrate with many different operating systems is likely to make the size 
of MAs large. This will increase the use of network resources; 
 Lack of a priori knowledge – in large networks it is difficult to provide the 
MA with sufficient a priori knowledge of the network and its operating 
policies as to enable it to make accurate decisions; 
 Limited exposure – MAs are not encountered frequently in operational 
networks and therefore there is a limited understanding of the issues 
posed; and 
 Coding and deployment difficulties – there is a lack of design, 
development and management tools necessary to create and deploy 
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secure MAs. 
Despite these limitations the mobile agent approach remains compelling as it 
has the ability to address the host and network intrusion domains 
simultaneously within a single paradigm. 
A number of distributed intrusion system architectures have been studied, 
including GrIDS (Staniford-Chen, Cheung et al. 1996), NADIR (Hochberg, 
Jackson et al. 1993) and EMERALD (Neuman and Porras 1999). An early 
implementation of autonomous agents was studied by Balasubramaniyan 
(Balasubramaniyan, Garcia-Fernandez et al. 1998). Their approach, known as 
AAFID, uses agents as the lowest level of data collection and analysis and also 
includes a hierarchical structure to allow scalability.  
Jansen studied the use of agents both for intrusion detection and response, 
recommending that further research is undertaken in three areas, namely: 
 Intrusion system performance enhancement, through exploitation of the 
mobility of agents; 
 New intrusion system design improvements, such as simultaneous 
detection; and 
 Response improvements. 
Mobile agents have been studied in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETS), in 
particular wireless networks (Hijazi and Nasser 2005; Xiao, Li et al. 2005; 
Sasikumar and Manjula 2012).  
A recent survey by Kolias (Kolias, Kambourakis et al. 2011) on the application of 
swarm intelligence to intrusion detection evaluated 14 algorithms, 
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demonstrating detection performance comparable with the KDD ‘99 winner (see 
section 2.6.3.3).    
2.2.4. Data Mining 
Data mining has been defined as the process for the automatic extraction of 
models from large stores of data (Fayyad, Piatetsky-Shapiro et al. 1996). Lee 
(Lee and Stolfo 1998) studied its application to intrusion detection. SENDMAIL 
call sequences were mined to investigate host-based intrusion and network 
frames were mined for network intrusion application. An architecture for real-
time model generation was developed demonstrating promising results. 
Manganaris (Manganaris, Christensen et al. 2000) investigated the mining of 
alarms generated from real-time intrusion detection sensors embedded in 
different networks. They were able to develop algorithms to associate false 
alarms and reject them depending on the underlying context of the alert 
characteristics of the network originating the alarm. 
Julisch (Julisch and Dacier 2002) built on the mining of alarms, to develop 
insights into their root causes. In prior work he was able to show that alarm 
clustering was effective, demonstrating significant false alarm reduction when 
applied to alarms from real networks. Xiang (Xiang, Dong et al. 2005) have also 
developed algorithms to cluster alarms. 
Data mining has also been used to augment the performance of discrimination 
systems. Lui (Lui, Fu et al. 2005) used three data mining techniques to provide 
features to an adaptive NIS consisting of five detection engines operating in an 
integrated manner. Jin (Jin, Sun et al. 2004) applied fuzzy data mining 
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techniques to network data, building on the work of Bridges (Bridges and 
Vaughn 2000). 
In his recent review, Moorthy (Moorthy and Sathiyabama 2012) ascribes the 
principal application of data mining to anomaly rather than misuse detection. 
This was based on the inability of misuse detection to detect new, previously 
unseen attacks. Moorthy assessed the applicability of nine different 
classification techniques. Kaur has also surveyed data mining applied to 
intrusion detection (Kaur 2013) contrasting the relative merits of different 
techniques. 
2.2.5. Artificial Neural Networks 
The application of artificial neural networks (ANN) to intrusion detection is 
compelling and has been extensively studied. A recent review by Shah (Shah 
and Trivedi 2012) has compared five different network types applied to network 
anomaly detection. ANNs offer the ability to learn patterns in both a supervised 
and unsupervised manner, as well as to generalise from the exemplar patterns 
used during training. 
Early research was based on their application within the IDEA intrusion system 
(Fox, Henning et al. 1990; Lunt 1990). Debar (Debar, Becker et al. 1992) used 
ANNs to model user behaviour from audit data. He linked a recurrent network 
with an expert system and was able to detect changes in user behaviour. 
A number of ANN paradigms have been assessed in this application, including 
multi-layer perceptron  (MLP) (Pan, Chen et al. 2003; Botha and Solms 2004; 
Cha, Vaidya et al. 2005) , radial basis functions (RBF) (Horeis 2003; Zhang and 
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Zhu 2004), self-organising maps (SOM) (Lei and Ghorbani 2004) and adaptive 
resonance theory (Di, Ji et al. 2005).  Liu (Liu, Florez et al. 2002) studied the 
input representations for UNIX call sequence data, applied to back propagation, 
RBF and SOM networks. 
Of particular interest is the work of Zhang (Zhang and Manikopoulos 2003) 
using the HIDE NIS (Zhang, Li et al. 2001). They have directly compared five 
ANN paradigms concluding that for denial of service attacks, the back 
propagation-hybrid and the back propagation networks outperform the others. 
ANNs continue to be the subject of intense research for intrusion systems. 
Jahanbani has proposed the use of ANNs based on principal component 
analysis (PCA) as an anomaly intrusion system (Jahanbani and Karimi 2012). 
Gaikwad et al have combined fuzzy clustering with ANN using feed-forward 
networks (Gaikwad, Jagtap et al. 2012). Mamood et al have studied the 
application of ANN to cloud-based intrusion systems (Mahmood, Agrawal et al. 
2012), using the back propagation algorithm and PCA pre-processing. 
2.2.6. Fuzzy Systems 
Intrusion systems are inherently quantitative, often relying on measurements of 
user, process, host or network activity. However the exact value of the 
measurements is often not important and this observation has stimulated the 
application of Zadeh’s work (Zadeh 1988) on fuzzy systems, in this application. 
The application of fuzzy techniques to data mining for intrusion detection has 
been the subject of considerable work with a number of researchers. Bridges 
(Bridges and Vaughn 2000) developed a prototype Intelligent Intrusion 
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Detection System (IIDS) to investigate the combination of fuzzy and genetic 
techniques. Fuzzy data mining was used to create membership functions for an 
anomaly detection system. Later Florez (Florez, Bridges et al. 2002), in 
collaboration with Bridges, extended this work to the creation of fuzzy 
association rules to compare recent audit data with previously mined “normal” 
behaviour. Tian (Tian, Fu et al. 2005) used fuzzy systems theory to combine 
decision trees applied to sub-sets of the complete mined database. They were 
able to show that this approach was superior to mining the complete database. 
Dickerson (Dickerson and Dickerson 2000; Dickerson, Juslin et al. 2001) 
developed the Fuzzy Intrusion Recognition Engine (FIRE) to investigate the 
application of fuzzy systems to intrusion systems. Multiple agents were used 
independently to assess the situation and their outputs were combined via a 
fuzzy fusion algorithm. Each agent also applied fuzzy techniques to their input 
sources. 
Gomez (Gomez and Dasgupta 2002) studied the use of fuzzy rule-sets to 
classify intrusions. The KDD ‘99 dataset was used to evaluate rules generated 
from a genetic algorithm. The results obtained were comparable to other 
techniques reported in the literature. Yao (Yao, Zhao et al. 2005) has 
investigated the use of fuzzy systems in the placing of decision boundaries, 
using an SVM as a classifier, also applied to the KDD ’99 dataset. 
Recent research has concentrated on the use of fuzzy methods in conjunction 
with other data processing techniques. Lei (Lei and Ke-nan 2011) investigated 
the application of fuzzy techniques in conjunction with SVMs and rough sets. 
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Experimental evaluation using a reduced set of parameters from the KDD ‘99 
dataset indicated improved performance over the use of SVM alone. Ghadiri 
(Ghadiri and Ghadiri 2011) contrasted an improved version of fuzzy C-means 
with GK clustering as an input to radial basis function ANNs, again using the 
KDD ’99 dataset. Ming-Yang (Ming-Yang, Chun-Yuen et al. 2011) studied the 
application of fuzzy association rules to anomaly-based network intrusion 
detection. Genetic optimisation of membership functions, yielded good 
detection performance for DoS attacks in synthetically generated network data. 
2.2.7. Genetic Algorithms 
The application of genetic algorithms to intrusion detection can be traced to 
Crosbie (Crosbie and Spafford 1995). They studied their use to create 
autonomous agents monitoring connections with a host. Me (Me 1998) 
extended this work applying genetic algorithms to misuse detection in host 
audit trails. Although good detection performance was achieved the technique 
was not able to locate the intrusion within the audit log. Gong (Gong, 
Zulkernine et al. 2005) studied the application of genetic algorithms using the 
1998 DARPA dataset. He used only seven features of the network data to 
achieve effective discrimination. 
Song (Song, Heywood et al. 2003) applied genetic algorithms to the KDD ‘99 
dataset to create an anomaly based intrusion detector. He was able to show 
that the discriminator created after the evolution of the genetic algorithm was 
better than could be achieved when experts hand coded solutions.  In later 
work (Song, Heywood et al. 2005) he showed that the approach was able to 
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create successful discrimination when the 41 parameters within the dataset 
were reduced to only eight. 
Lu (Lu and Traore 2004) used genetic algorithms to adapt the discrimination 
rules for a network intrusion detection system. The DARPA dataset was used to 
evaluate the resulting performance. High detection probability and low false 
alarm rates were achieved even against attacks unseen in the training data. 
Genetic algorithms continue to be an active research area for intrusion 
detection. Andhare has studied their use in denial of service detection (Andhare 
and Patil 2012). Boughaci uses genetic algorithms to update fuzzy “if-then” 
rules to enhance intrusion performance (Boughaci, Herkat et al. 2012). 
2.2.8. Expert Systems and Probabilistic Reasoning 
The application of expert systems to intrusion detection has a long history. The 
work of Denning (Denning 1987) created the Intrusion Detection Expert System 
(IDES) to process host audit files for anomalies. Later Anderson (Anderson, 
Frivold et al. 1995) extended this work to hybrid anomaly-misuse detection in 
the Next-generation Intrusion Detection Expert System (NIDES). EMERALD also 
used a hybrid detector, this time to process host and network data (Neuman 
and Porras 1999). Lindqvist (Lindqvist and Porras 1999) developed the expert 
system engine known as P-BEST, a key component of the EMERALD system. 
Many researchers have taken a probabilistic approach to intrusion detection. 
Seleznyov (Seleznyov, Terziyan et al. 2000) used probabilistic trees to encode 
the temporal behaviour of users and then detect anomalies. Ye (Ye, Li et al. 
2001) studied the probabilistic properties of audit host data, concluding that 
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multiple events were necessary before intrusion could be declared with 
confidence. Leckie (Leckie and Kotagiri 2002) studied the application of 
probabilistic techniques to the processing of network data to detect port scans. 
Gowandia (Gowadia, Farkas et al. 2005) has studied the application of 
probability theory to agents, developing a means for them to share their beliefs.  
The majority of workers have taken a Bayesian approach to the application of 
probability theory. Alternatives based on the theory of evidence have been 
applied by Chen (Chen and Venkataramanan 2005) who studied the application 
of Dempster-Schafer (D-S) theory to intrusion detection. D-S theory appears to 
offer the advantage of combining data from sources with differing levels of 
trust. This is particularly important when the sensors providing data to the 
intrusion system are distributed within the network and may have been 
compromised by an intruder. Interestingly the application of possibility theory 
(see (Borotschnig, Paletta et al. 1999), for example) does not appear to have 
been applied to problems in intrusion detection, except within the context of 
fuzzy systems.  
2.2.9. Digital Signal Processing (DSP) 
The application of DSP techniques to network intrusion systems has been 
extensively studied. Whilst the frame data on networks is asynchronous, it is 
easy to generate time-series data by, for example, deriving statistics over fixed 
time periods. Thottan (Thottan and Ji 2003) used MIB data accessed via SNMP, 
and applied time-series processing. They were able to predict network 
equipment failure before complete failure had occurred. The use of non-uniform 
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sampling algorithms from DSP does not seem to have been applied to intrusion 
systems. 
Axelsson (Axelsson 2000b) attempted to apply classical detection theory to 
intrusions. He was able to assert that different attack methods mapped on to 
different classes of problems from classical detection theory. For example, 
masquerading was thought to be equivalent to “detection of random signals in 
random noise”. Unfortunately, he was unable to apply this observation to aid 
the detection of intruders. 
Barford (Barford, Kline et al. 2002a) generated time-series data from SNMP and 
from IP flow data. He applied a number of time-frequency analysis techniques 
and found that wavelets were able to isolate both short and long duration 
traffic anomalies. Zhou (Zhou and Lang 2003) created time-series data from the 
number of frames arriving in unit time and then studied the use of frequency 
based techniques using the discrete fourier transform.  
AsSadhan created time series data by aggregating data over selected time 
periods (AsSadhan 2009). He aggregated frames, bytes, distinct addresses and 
distinct ports and was able to show that by analysing the control and data 
planes for TCP-IP connections anomalous behaviour could be detected. The 
cross-correlation function was used to measure the similarity between these 
planes and low similarity was used to indicate malicious behaviour. In addition 
he was able to detect period characteristics using frequency domain techniques, 
which could be related to botnet command and control communications. 
Digital signal processing techniques remain an open area for research into 
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intrusion detection. 
2.2.10. Miscellaneous Techniques 
Game theory has been applied to the problem of detecting intrusions by a 
number or workers. Alpcan (Alpcan and Basar 2003) assessed the activities of 
intruders and intrusion system control strategies as a two-person non-zero sum, 
non-cooperative game. Kodialam (Kodialam and Lakshman 2003) studied the 
use of game theory to detect intruders in sampled network data. Agah (Agah, 
Das et al. 2004) also used two-person, nonzero-sum, non-cooperative game 
between the intrusion system network and the attacker. They showed this 
approach significantly improved the chances of intrusion detection. Patcha 
(Patcha and Park 2004) extended Alpcan’s work to MANETS defended by host 
intrusion systems. Rafsanjani has studied the application of game theory to 
intrusion systems for MANETS (Rafsanjani, Aliahmadipour et al. 2012). 
Aickelin (Aickelin, Bentley et al. 2003) studied the application of danger theory 
to immunological intrusion system. Danger theory is emerging as an alternative 
to self– non-self determination as a model of the human immune system. 
Aickelin proposed the use of danger theory to associate low-level detection as 
an alternative to probabilistic or expert system correlation. Lu et al studied the 
application of danger theory to mobile virus detection (Lu, Zheng et al. 2012). 
He (He and Leung 2004) studied the application of chaotic stochastic resonance 
to intrusion detection. A simplistic approach to intrusion was taken in which an 
anomaly was declared when the difference between the predicted and the 
actual frame size exceeded a threshold. Of particular interest was the setting of 
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the threshold, in which a constant false alarm (CFAR) method was used. This 
was the first application of CFAR techniques to intrusion detection. However, 
the assumption of stationary noise statistics resulted in a fixed threshold, 
limiting the usefulness of this research. 
Hidden Markov Models (HMM) have been successfully applied to many pattern 
recognition problems. Gao (Gao, Ma et al. 2002; Gao, Sun et al. 2003) studied 
the application of HMMs to anomaly detection in UNIX process call sequences, 
with good results. Zhang (Zhang and Zhu 2004) combined HMMs with ANNs 
claiming improvements over HMM techniques used alone. These improvements 
were mainly in terms of storage and processing requirements. The effect on 
detection performance of this combination was unclear.  More recently HMMs 
have been used to extract the interaction between intruders and network 
devices, to predict multi-stage attacks and prevent further damage (Shameli 
Sendi, Dagenais et al. 2012) 
Petri nets have also been applied to the problem of intrusion detection. Ali (Ali 
2001) modelled the monitoring function of the CIDF using Petri nets. Helmer 
(Helmer, Wong et al. 2001) continued the theme and used Petri nets to model 
the specification for an agent-based intrusion systems. Gao (Gao and Zhou 
2003) used Petri nets as part of the discrimination function, by using them to 
encode fuzzy rules and to make the intrusion/non-intrusion decision.  
Intrusion systems based on user behaviour has been extensively investigated 
(Kakuru 2011; Razo-Zapata, Mex-Perera et al. 2012). Users can be 
authenticated based on the frequency with which they use console commands 
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or applications, in host-based intrusion systems, and the websites accessed in 
both a host and network-based intrusion system. Feher (Feher, Elovici et al. 
2012) investigated mouse movements to authenticate users. Despite issues 
with user characteristics depending on the location of the user and specifically 
the input devices available, excellent results were obtained.  
2.3. Post Intrusion Processing 
An intrusion system generates alerts information that can be further processing 
in a number of ways: 
 Local logs, in which the alerts are stored within the intrusion system and 
are not integrated with other log sources within the enterprise. For 
distributed approaches, such as NIS, the alerts can be integrated from 
several intrusion sensors centralised into a single store; and 
 Enterprise logs, in which the alerts are combined with logs from other, 
heterogeneous devices to provide a centralised view of the security of 
the complete infrastructure. Such approaches are known as Security 
Information and Event Management (SIEM) and can provide a further 
level of intrusion detection based on the events seen at other non-
intrusion devices in the enterprise. 
The simplest form of local logs occurs when a single intrusion sensor is 
monitoring a resource, such as a network intrusion system monitoring the 
Internet gateway, or anti-virus software monitoring a single operating system. 
Analysis of the logs is usually undertaken by system administration staff 
accessing the log files directly, or undertaking an automated analysis using 
bespoke scripts designed to assess specific concerns. Tools such as SGUIL are 
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available to assist in these tasks (Visscher 2007) for network intrusion systems. 
Enterprise log handling presents different issues from local logs, as summarised 
in the guide to computer security log management (kent and souppaya 2006) 
produced by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). They 
identified the fundamental problem of log handling to be the matching of the 
limited log management resources with a continuous supply of log data. They 
identified additional challenges including: 
a) Large number of log sources within an enterprise; 
b) Inconsistent log content, formats and timestamps; and 
c) Protecting large quantities of log data, whilst allowing access to system 
administrators. 
In an attempt to standardise on the communications between intrusion systems 
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) proposed the Intrusion Detection 
Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) in RFC4765 (Debar, Curry et al. 2007).  
Two approaches to the remaining issues have been extensively studied, namely 
methods for correlating logs and visualisation techniques.  
2.3.1. Correlating Logs 
Abad et al undertook early work assessing the ability to correlate intrusion logs 
(Abad, Taylor et al. 2003). There were able to demonstrate improved accuracy 
of intrusion detection by correlating system calls and network logs using a 
sliding window. Valeur defined a comprehensive approach to alert correlation 
(Valeur, Vigna et al. 2004) proposing a nine stage process rather than limiting it 
to just a few stages. Although depicted as a serial process with each stage 
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applied sequentially, Valeur allowed some of the stages to occur in parallel, also 
including feedback between stages. 
Elshoush has surveyed alert correlation applied to an intrusion system 
consisting of cooperative misuse and anomaly approaches (Elshoush and 
Osman 2011). She used the five correlation techniques assessed by Xu (Xu 
2006), to process the output from discrete intrusion systems communicating via 
IDMEF data format, specifically: 
 Similarity between alerts; 
 Pre-defined attack scenarios; 
 Prerequisites and consequences;  
 Multiple sources; and 
 Filtering. 
Feng et al used state machines to correlate security events (Feng, Wang et al. 
2010). Attack scenarios were reconstructed using state machines combining 
clustering and causal analysis to output to a comprehensive description of the 
attack.  
Jing has evaluated the use of rough sets as a data reduction technique for 
event correlation (Jing, Lize et al. 2012). A pattern mining algorithm was then 
applied to generate the correlation rule without using prior knowledge. 
Although there is a reduction in data rate using rough sets the false alarm rate 
increased. 
More recently Salah et al have undertaken a survey of alert correlation 
techniques (Salah, Macia-Fernandez et al. 2013). This approach described the 
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state-of-the-art in alert correlation, not limited to computer systems but also 
industrial control. A taxonomy for correlation was proposed, based on number 
of data sources, type of application, correlation method and type of 
architecture. A review of commercial solutions was also given where they 
identify the problem of no clear agreement between researchers and vendors 
about the performance metrics. They note that there are no standard 
benchmarks for evaluating and comparing such systems. 
2.3.2. Visualisation 
One of the problems facing network security staff is the quantity of information 
contained in network scans and logs. For example, a single 100Mb link may well 
transmit 1010 bits during a single day. Some researchers have proposed the use 
of visualisation techniques to aid intrusion detection by network staff. Teoh 
(Teoh, Ma et al. 2002; Teoh, Ma et al. 2003; Teoh, Ma et al. 2004) investigated 
the use of visualisation for Border Gate Protocol (BGP) routing anomaly 
detection. They have also applied their techniques to intrusion systems (Teoh, 
Ma et al. 2004) with the result that have exceeded the performance achieved 
by the winners of the KDD ’99 competition. 
Conti (Conti and Abdullah 2004) investigated the visual signatures produced by 
network attack tools and was able to demonstrate that a number of 
visualisation techniques could be effective. The port-to-port plots were 
particularly good at fingerprinting tools such as NMAP and NIKTO. Conti 
recognised that the availability of source code for many of these tools would 
allow an attacker to modify the signature and potentially evade detection using 
visualisation techniques. 
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Koike visualised the output from SNORT using the SnortView tool (Koike and 
Ohno 2004). Visualisation was proposed as an alternative to optimising the 
signature database, as SnortView was able to highlight both true and false 
alarms, based on a time series view of the intrusions. 
Axelsson (Axelsson 2005) analysed four different visualisation techniques 
applied to web server logs.  He investigated both the visualisation of network 
data and the visualisation of the internal status of intrusion detection systems. 
He concluded that the topic was immature and lacking effective user studies. 
Livnat (Livnat, Agutter et al. 2005) investigated visualisation for associating 
data from disparate system logs, defining an alert in terms of what he called 
the W3 paradigm, meaning What, Where and When. Efficient ways of 
presenting data in terms of these parameters were developed, which are 
scalable to large networks. Interestingly, they did not investigate the pre-
processing of the data into intrusion system relevant parameters, but chose to 
present the basic log data. 
Yang developed a visualisation approach for network alerts (Li, Gasior et al. 
2010). Visualisation of the network topology was combined with visual 
clustering of alerts to alert users. A third stage was included to view multistage 
attacks by temporally profiling user and attacker behaviour. 
More recent research into visualisation has concentrated on SIEM, which 
integrates additional information from other network devices and servers. 
Novikova has proposed a visualisation framework based on a service-orientated 
approach (Novikova and Kotenko 2013) demonstrating the concept applied to 
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the attack modelling and security evaluation component of an SIEM (Kotenko 
and Chechulin 2012).  Xiaojin has developed a tool known as VisSRA to 
visualise both the rules and the alerts from SNORT using treemaps (Xiaojin, 
Changzhen et al. 2012). 
2.3.3. SIEM 
Within an enterprise network it is common for the output of intrusion systems 
to be sent to an SIEM application, for integration with logs from other systems, 
such as firewall, routers and security devices. At their simplest level SIEMs 
collate enterprise wide logs, providing support tools to aid the interpretation 
and management of events. Many of these tools use visualisation or log 
correlation techniques to assist users in understanding the status of their 
networks. Gartner has produced a “magic quadrant” analysis (Nicolette and 
kavanagh 2011). This analysis considers 25 commercial systems and describes 
the market as “mature and competitive”. This is in contrast to previous studies, 
such as Shipley, (Shipley 2008) which identified short-comings in the usability, 
reporting and event correlation aspects. Interestingly, Shipley reported that 
over 6,000 SNORT alerts were rejected by the Q1 Labs QRadar SIEM, which 
chose only to display one alert as valid. The same SIEM reported a 500,000:1 
data reduction for logs as a result of the analysis and correlation of events. 
SIEM systems are becoming of interest to academic research.  Gabriel used 
data mining to detect hidden patterns in malware data within an SIEM (Gabriel, 
Hoppe et al. 2009). Kotenko has proposed a common framework for the Attack 
Modelling and Security Evaluation Component (AMSEC) of a SIEM (Kotenko and 
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Chechulin 2012). Their approach integrates open source vulnerability 
databases, such as CVE, with near real-time attack modelling to predict the 
future actions of an attacker. Kotenko has also studied the issues surrounding 
the data repository of an SIEM, proposing an ontological approach (Kotenko, 
Polubelova et al. 2012). An ontological data model of vulnerabilities was 
discussed for an AMSEC. Granadillo et al have also used an ontological 
approach to SIEM modelling, applied to botnets (Granadillo, Mustapha et al. 
2012). 
Afzaal has assessed some of the systems aspects of the use of SIEM, proposing 
a resilient architecture for forensic storage of data (Afzaal, Di Sarno et al. 
2012). 
2.4. Intrusion Systems 
The techniques discussed in section 2.2 form the discrimination or decision 
function within an intrusion system. Other functions necessary to form a 
complete system can include: 
 Data pre-processing, in which the raw information is transformed such 
that the discrimination function sees a consistent dataset. De-
fragmenting frames is an example of pre-processing, in which a number 
of frames are combined to create (usually) larger frames; 
 Alert logging, which enables the details of an alert to be stored and 
retrieved in meaningful ways. A simplistic approach to logging can be 
taken, in which the raw data is stored along with some information from 
the discriminator, in a simple file structure. An alternative, more complex 
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approach can be taken in which the alerts are inserted into a database 
for retrieval and analysis offline, by other tools; 
 Configuration Management – An intrusion system can be tuned to 
respond to different threats, via the selection of discrimination 
techniques, decision thresholds or rule-sets. It is necessary to provide 
tools to manage the editing, display and logging of the configuration of 
the intrusion system; 
 Threat Analysis – A single alert from an intrusion system can sometimes 
be definitive on the presence and nature of an intrusion. However, 
usually a single alert cannot provide the confidence to declare an 
intrusion without the presence (or absence) of other alerts or 
information. To this end, intrusion systems need to provide tools which 
allow the context of an alert to be assessed. Frequently, these analysis 
systems involve data visualisation techniques, as described in the 
previous section; 
 Response Systems, in which the presence of an alert triggers an action 
from the intrusion system. Actions can include dropping frames, updating 
firewall rule-sets or blocking specific IP addresses; and 
 Protection tools – The extent of the security functionality that can be 
provided by intrusion system is such that they can become a prime 
target for intruders. It is therefore necessary to provide a suite of 
protection tools to ensure that the intrusion system cannot be 
compromised. Such tools can include encryption mechanisms to hide the 
details of the communications with a centralised controller, data rate 
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throttling mechanisms to deal with denial of service attacks or interface 
modification to prevent the transmission of data from the intrusion 
system interface. 
Although the functionality listed above is necessary to create a complete 
intrusion system there appears to be a lack of systematic study of the 
interaction of this functionality with the discrimination function. There are 
instances where the discrimination function is highly dependent on the 
additional functionality. For example the use of visualisation techniques applied 
to the raw network or host data is closely related to the threat analysis 
functionality. 
Despite this lack of systematic study a number of research organisations have 
constructed complete systems and evaluated their performance. There have 
been extensive published reviews of research on such intrusion systems (Allen, 
Christie et al. 1999; Axelsson 1999b; North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
Research and Technology Organization. 2002) and therefore this section will 
only indicate some of the key issues.  
2.4.1. Research Systems 
Axelsson (Axelsson 1999b) reviewed twenty research systems in terms of key 
parameters such as: 
 Detection principle; 
 Real-time or non-real-time operation; 
 Continuous or batch operation; 
 Network or host data sources; 
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 Passive or active response; 
 Centralised or distributed processing; 
 Centralised or distributed data collection; 
 Security; and 
 Interoperability. 
This survey provides significant insight into the modes of operation of complete 
systems, although it is now becoming dated with respect to the systems 
assessed. 
One of the most popular signature-based NIS is SNORT (Roesch 1999), 
developed as an Open Source project. SNORT is able to detect misuse through 
the application of user-defined rules. Pre-processors are included to normalise 
the captured frames and to extend the intrusion criteria over more than one 
frame (Caswell, Beale et al. 2003). Although originally thought to be a 
lightweight intrusion detection system, it is part of commercial products and has 
been a core component of many research systems. 
2.4.2. Commercial Systems 
There are a number of commercial network intrusion systems. Several are 
based on the SNORT detection engine augmented with network 
characterisation techniques to reduce initial deployment false alarm issues or 
additional tools to improve operator productivity. It is difficult to review these 
systems due to the commercial sensitivities, however some researchers have 
attempted this problem (Allen, Christie et al. 1999; Kvarnstrom 1999). Debar 
(Debar and Morin 2002) evaluated some commercial systems without 
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identifying their type. Evaluations of more modern commercial NIS appear to be 
lacking. 
2.4.3. Systems Approaches to False Alarm Control 
Although the research emphasis for reducing false alarms has been on data 
processing techniques, a number of systems approaches have also been 
proposed.  Shimamura (Shimamura and Kono 2006) proposed that false alarms 
can be reduced from NIS if alerts that have no effect on the system are 
ignored. For example if a particular attack is launched against a specific OS and 
that OS is not present in the system then the attack cannot damage the system 
and the alert can be suppressed. During an evaluation of 15 days of real 
network traffic the system, known as TrueAlarm, reduced the number of false 
alarms from 125 for a conventional NIS to zero. Whilst this result appears to be 
good it does suffer from a number of issues: 
 The assertion that an attack that cannot damage a system is of no 
interest to administrators is flawed. Such attacks can occur, for example, 
during the reconnaissance phase when an attacker is learning about the 
services provided by a network. Although some reconnaissance probes 
may not affect the system the presence of persistent attempts to 
enumerate, penetrate or damage a system is an important indicator to 
administrators and may allow measures such as IP blocking to be 
deployed before the damaging attack occurs; 
 The analysis does not address the impact on detection probability. For 
TrueAlarm this is problematic as non-damaging attacks should be 
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prohibited by the network security policy and therefore be flagged as 
network intrusions. Whilst it is conceivable that the network security 
policy could be relaxed to maintain the detection probability, the principle 
of relaxations in security to overcome system performance issues is 
flawed; and 
 Since the alert occurs after the attack frame has delivered its payload to 
the server, this approach cannot be used in-line or in intrusion 
prevention systems 
Bolzoni (Bolzoni and Etalle 2006) proposed a novel approach to reducing false 
positives in a system known as Aphrodite. His approach was to correlate the 
output of a NIS placed on the incoming network stream with anomalous 
responses from the attacked system. A separate anomaly detection system was 
placed on the output from the attacked system and an alert is declared when 
both the NIS and anomaly detection alert. False positive reductions of between 
50-100% without affecting detection rate were reported. Although this 
performance improvement is significant the attack must have to be successful 
to be detected, that is the system must be adversely affected and an 
anomalous output produced. This is unsatisfactory and limits the applicability of 
Aphrodite in IPS scenarios. 
In host-based intrusion a systems approach has been particularly successful. 
Kim (Kim and Spafford 1994) described a file integrity based approach known 
as Tripwire. An alert is issued when any of the key system files are changed on 
a host. This approach is highly successfully and is included in a number of 
commercial and Open Source systems. 
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Hofmeyr (Hofmeyr, Forrest et al. 1998) investigated the use of short sequences 
of system calls to discriminate between normal and abnormal conditions for 
common UNIX programs. This idea was successfully extended to Microsoft 
Windows environments by looking for unusual registry accesses (Apap, Honig et 
al. 2002; Topallar, Depren et al. 2004). Host intrusion detection for mobile 
devices has also examined the feasibility of correlating abnormal battery 
behaviour with intrusion events (Buennemeyer, Munshi et al. 2007). 
More recently a systematic attempt to quantify false alarms has been published 
(Cheng-Yuan, Ying-Dar et al. 2012; Cheng-Yuan, Yuan-Cheng et al. 2012). In 
this study over 2,000 instances of false positive and negatives were identified in 
real network data taken over a 16 month period. Given that the volume of 
network traffic is quoted as 100GB/hour this rate of false alarms seems 
remarkably low. Nearly 93% of the false alarms were classified as false 
positives, with the majority of those, in their view, not being the result of 
security issues but the result of security policy violations. From their published 
methodology it is difficult to determine that all the false alarms have been 
counted, in particular the false negatives. As the quantity of network data is so 
large manual confirmation of missed detections by inspection of individual 
frames is not possible. However they do not seem to have chosen to inject 
known intrusions to confirm their measurements. 
2.4.4. Intrusion System Limitations 
Axelsson (Axelsson 1999a) highlighted an important limitation of intrusion 
systems. He correctly recognised the problem posed by the very small (~10-6) a 
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priori probability of an intrusion event in large datasets. Under such conditions 
false positives can be eliminated by labelling every frame as not resulting from 
an intrusion. Clearly this is unhelpful in detecting intrusion events, but the rate 
of false negatives is small due to the small a priori probability. 
2.5. Intrusion Evasion 
As the deployment of intrusion systems has increased so has the interest in 
evading them. Both the academic and the intruder communities have developed 
tools and techniques to evade detection by intrusion systems. The principal 
academic work was undertaken by Ptacek (Ptacek and Newsham 1998). As well 
as describing denial-of-service attacks on intrusion systems, this widely cited 
paper described two techniques to avoid detection through confusion of the 
sensors, namely: 
 Insertion – In which frames destined for the target host are seen by the 
intrusion system but not seen by the target host (for example they could 
be rejected by the host due to checksum errors); and 
 Evasion – In which the intrusion system is fooled into rejecting some of 
the frames that the target host correctly processes. 
Both these techniques rely on the intrusion system processing the frames in a 
different way to the target host. One way to overcome this problem is to 
include a traffic normaliser within the network, as proposed by Handley 
(Handley, Paxson et al. 2001) and used in SNORT (Caswell, Beale et al. 2003). 
A number of Open Source tools have been created using these techniques. 
NESSUS, the well-known vulnerability scanner, has intrusion system evasion 
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techniques included within its architecture. SNOT is an arbitrary frame 
generator that uses the SNORT rules files as a source of frame information. It 
has been used in intrusion system testing, as an evasion tool and to overload IT 
security staff with false alerts. STICK is a NIS stress tool designed to generate a 
large number of alerts and cause the intrusion system to crash. WHISKER is 
also aware of evasion techniques. 
Other techniques to avoid intrusion systems include: 
 Encrypting the data, which can hide signature information from misuse 
detection systems; 
 Slow probing, in which the network probes are send with a large delay 
between them. The aim is to get the intrusion system to timeout; 
 Fragmentation, to hide the signature of the attacking frames; and 
 False-alarm attack, in which the intrusion system is tricked into 
generating a large number of alarms, so as to hide the real intrusion 
alarms (Patton, Yurcik et al. 2001). 
Fogla has studied the evasion of anomaly network intrusion systems (Fogla and 
Lee 2006). He proposed that such systems could be evaded by a Polymorphic 
Blending Attack (PBA), in which the statistics of an attack match those of 
normal network traffic. He demonstrated that PBA attacks could be generated 
automatically for arbitrary code execution and showed that anomaly intrusion 
systems could be evaded.  
Pastrana et al have proposed a functional framework for evading network 
intrusion systems (Pastrana, Orfila et al. 2011). They used genetic 
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programming techniques to derive a model of the intrusion system, from which 
evasion strategies were derived. Evasion of SYN flooding and port scanning 
attacks was demonstrated. 
Tran et al have studied the evasion of SNORT by exploiting flowbits (Tran, Aib 
et al. 2012). They parse the active signature set running on SNORT to generate 
all possible frame sequences that can evade it. They also show that additional 
signatures can be added to overcome the evasion. 
More recently Cheng et al have evaluated evasion techniques against intrusion 
systems (Cheng, Lin et al. 2012). They compared five common evasion 
techniques against three different signature based network intrusion systems, 
including SNORT. All three systems could be evaded using IP fragmentation and 
TCP segmentation.  
2.6.  Evaluation of Intrusion Detection Systems 
There has been considerable research into the experimental evaluation of 
intrusion systems. A number of approaches have been used, including: 
 Evaluation on live networks or hosts; 
 Evaluation against standard databases of network, host and intruder 
activity; 
 Generation of synthetic network or host data; and 
 Development of performance metrics. 
The aim of any evaluation must be to allow accurate comparison of systems or 
intrusion classification techniques in such a way that further research can be 
focused. Live networks can generate qualitative data but it is difficult to 
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compare systems directly without their operation in parallel. Performance 
metrics offer a quantitative approach and can be particularly effective at 
comparing systems. It is important however that the basis for calculation is 
common and that the metrics are calculated in a way that allows comparison. 
This usually requires the use of a standard labelled database of normal and 
intrusion behaviour.     
It is possible to consider the collection of network frames or host data from real 
networks and disseminate the resulting database to researchers for evaluation 
using common data. This approach has two problems: 
a) It would be difficult to label the intrusions in such a way that learning 
algorithms could be trained using noise free data. It would be possible to 
launch attacks on the network elements and generate correctly labelled 
attack data. However, at the times in which deliberate attacks are not 
being undertaken it would be difficult to guarantee that malicious activity 
was not being undertaken by system users or by real intruders that had 
penetrated the system; and 
b) Data from a real network will have sensitive information contained 
within its frames. The presence of personal information may restrict the 
data that could be released and the detailed network information, such 
as server addresses, may assist a future intruder to penetrate the 
network. Whilst there are techniques for changing the data such that 
these issues could be overcome, these changes may adversely affect the 
training or evaluation of intrusion systems.  
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As a result, the assessment of intrusion systems is dominated by the use of 
data generated from synthetic networks (the DARPA datasets), despite its 
known limitations. 
2.6.1. Security Metrics 
The application of security metrics to quantify the state of a computer system 
has been extensively studied. Almasizadeh assessed a state-based stochastic 
model of the attack process to represent the security of a system, from which 
quantitative metrics could be derived (Almasizadeh and Azgomi 2013). Two 
specific metrics were assessed namely the mean time to a security failure and 
the steady state solution describing the long-term state of the system, that is, 
the likelihood that the system is in each state. 
Ouedraogo et al have studied the application of security assurance metrics to 
operational systems, rather than the development process as in Common 
Criteria (Ouedraogo, Khadraoui et al. 2012). The security of a system is 
assessed into one of five levels using probes, based on the Systems Security 
Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM). 
Bayuk has reviewed the evolution of security metrics from the technical and 
historical perspective (Bayuk and Mostashari 2013). She concludes that metrics 
are sufficient for verification of a system, that is, it is built and operated to a 
specified level, but that validation metrics are less mature. Bayuk used cloud 
security as an example of the application of her metrics (Bayuk 2011). 
Chrun studied the use of an intrusion prevention system to derive security 
metrics (Chrun, Cukier et al. 2008). He proposed and measured ten metrics 
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equally split between outside and inside threats, using live data from a system 
with 40,000 users. The metrics were produced as time-series data, using a 
sliding window for their measurement. Despite the known limitations of 
signature-based intrusion system a major security incident was detected using 
these metrics, which had failed to be detected via the normal operational 
security techniques in place within the organisation. 
Lippmann et al have recently proposed four metrics for network security threats 
(Lippmann, Riordan et al. 2012).  Using the twenty critical controls for effective 
cyber defence defined by SANS (SANS 2013), fifteen are able to be 
continuously measured.  
2.6.2. Performance Metrics 
There are many parameters of intrusion systems that could be measured so as 
to characterise performance. These include: 
 CPU load; 
 Memory requirements; 
 Latency of detection declaration; 
 Maximum network data rate; and 
 Protocols that can be assessed. 
Whilst such metrics can be useful it is the ability of an intrusion system to 
detect intrusions whilst giving an acceptably low false alarm rate that is the 
most important, and the most challenging issue. 
A review of some of the detection metrics is provided by Abouzakhar 
(Abouzakhar and Manson 2004). The ability of an intrusion system to detect 
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intrusions is often characterised by its detection probability,    defined as the 
ratio of the detected intrusion events divided by the total number of intrusion 
events. Sometimes detection rate rather than    is used, in which the ratio is 
expressed as a percentage. 
The false alarm performance is often characterised by the probability of false 
alarm,    , which is the ratio of the number of false alarms declared divided by 
the total number of possible false alarm events that could be declared. Again 
false alarm rate is often used, which is     expressed as a percentage.  
It should be noted that     measures the false positive instances and therefore 
does not represent the full characteristics of false alarms. It does not include 
false negatives, in which a real intrusion event is missed. Therefore some 
researchers use confusion matrices to fully record the true positive (TP), true 
negative (TN), false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) statistics of an 
intrusion system. 
A frequently used assessment method is to plot    versus     (or detection rate 
against false alarm rate).  The resulting graph is known as a Receiver Operating 
Characteristic (ROC) curve.  ROC curves allow an intrusion to be assessed at 
different sensitivity settings (Fawcett 2003). Some researchers use a modified 
ROC curve, known as a lift curve, which has similar properties to a ROC curve 
(Abouzakhar and Manson 2004). 
Another measure frequently used is precision (Pr), which is defined as 
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%100)/(Pr  FPTPTP  
Equation 2-1 Definition of Precision 
Precision is often calculated with another parameter known as accuracy (Ac) 
which is defined as: 
%100)/()(  FNFPTNTPTNTPAc  
Equation 2-2 Definition of Accuracy 
The aim is to get both precision and accuracy to approach 100%, which can be 
achieved by zero false positives and zero false negatives. 
It is important to undertake the comparison of intrusion systems using the 
same basic assumptions. For example, whilst ROC curves for different systems 
can be compared directly this should not be done without detailed consideration 
of their methods of calculation. Consider the following situation. An intruder has 
found a way into a network that is monitored by a NIS. The intruder sends ten 
frames to another host in order to penetrate further into the network. The NIS 
detects one of the frames and initiates an alert. What is the    for the NIS in 
this situation? Since only one frame in ten was detected the    could be 
characterised as 0.1 (the per-frame view). Alternatively, since the activities of 
the intruder in attempting to penetrate the next host were detected the    
could be considered to be 1 (the per-connection view). If some of the frames 
used by the intruder were legitimate, for example a ping, then they could not 
be expected to be detected and the resulting    could therefore be somewhere 
between 0.1 and 1.0 (the per-malicious frame view). Thus, depending on the 
underlying assumptions, significantly different ROC curves can be created under 
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identical intrusion conditions.  This is discussed again in section 4.6.  
The problem of comparison of different systems can be seen by examining 
Figures 2-1 and 2-2. Figure 2-1 was taken from Lippmann (Lippmann and 
Cunningham 2000) and shows the comparison of three different intrusion 
systems. It is easy to see that the “Neural Net” approach is better than either 
the new or old keyword count methods as at any given false alarm per day the 
attacks detected are greater.  
 
Figure 2-1 Intrusion System Performance (Lippmann and Cunningham 2000) 
Consider now figure 2-2 taken from Estevez-Tapiador (Estevez-Tapiador, 
Garcia-Teodoro et al. 2004). Is the intrusion system produced by Estevez-
Tiador better than any of the systems investigated by Lippmann? Both research 
teams label these diagrams as ROC curves but direct comparison is extremely 
difficult. 
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During the literature research phase of this thesis 62 ROC curves were collected 
from the published research of 22 teams. From this it was clear that direct 
comparison between research groups was extremely difficult, but within groups 
it was frequently straightforward. The lack of an agreed and uniform way of 
publishing quantitative performance measurements does not help identify 
research opportunities. 
 
Figure 2-2 ROC Curves (Estevez-Tapiador, Garcia-Teodoro et al. 2004) 
Alternative ways of defining and measuring performance are discussed further 
in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis. 
2.6.3. Activity Databases 
A number of databases have been produced to assist in the evaluation and 
comparison of intrusion systems. These databases are important as they 
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potentially allow direct comparison of the techniques used by different 
researchers. They are in widespread use. 
2.6.3.1. The 1998 DARPA Dataset 
In 1998 DARPA, in conjunction with MIT Lincoln Laboratory conducted an 
evaluation of intrusion systems. An evaluation test bed was developed which 
simulated a government network of 100’s of users on 1000’s of hosts. More 
than 300 attacks of 38 different types were launched against UNIX hosts during 
seven weeks of training and two weeks of testing (see Table 2-1 adapted from 
(Lippmann, Fried et al. 2000)).  
 
 Solaris SunOS Linux Cisco Router 
Denial of Service (DoS) apache2 apache2 apache2  
 back back back  
 mailbomb land mailbomb  
 neptune mailbomb neptune  
 process table neptune process table  
 ping of death ping of death ping of death  
 smurf process table smurf  
 syslogd smurf teardrop  
 udp-storm udp-storm udp-storm  
Remote to Local (R2L) dictionary dictionary dictionary snmp-get 
 ftp-write ftp-write ftp-write  
 guest guest guest  
 http-tunnel phf imap  
 phf xlock named  
 xlock xsnoop phf  
 xsnoop  sendmail  
   xlock  
   xsnoop  
User to Root (U2R) at loadmodule perl  
 eject  term  
 ffbconfig    
 fdformat    
 ps    
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Surveillance/Probing ip sweep ip sweep ip sweep ip sweep 
 mscan mscan mscan mscan 
 nmap nmap nmap nmap 
 saint saint saint saint 
 satan satan satan satan 
 
Table 2-1 The DARPA 1998 Attacks, based on  (Lippmann, Fried et al. 2000) 
Network frames were recorded using TCPDUMP, along with host audit data 
from the BSM module. Eight different intrusion systems were evaluated as part 
of the data gathering exercise. All eight performed well when tested using 
attacks present in the training data. When tested against unseen attacks their 
performance was poor. 
2.6.3.2. The 1999 DARPA Dataset 
The 1999 DARPA intrusion system evaluation extended their 1998 work 
(Lippmann, Haines et al. 2000a). More than 200 instances of 58 different attack 
types were recorded, with Windows NT hosts now included. Three weeks of 
training data and two weeks of test data were captured, again with new attacks 
present in the test data that were not present in the training data.  TCPDUMP 
data was captured both internal to the network as well as external. 
Eighteen different intrusion detection systems were evaluated during the trial 
period. Most systems had false alarm rates below ten per day, but this is 
usually taken to be a result of the low background traffic. Network-based 
intrusion system performed well against probe and DoS attacks whilst host-
based ones were effective at detecting privilege elevation (R2L and U2R). 
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The importance of the DARPA datasets to the intrusion system research 
community cannot be understated. However there has been considerable 
criticism of their methodology and the resulting data (McHugh 2000). McHugh 
was concerned that the false alarms generated by the background traffic were 
not validated experimentally or analytically. He observed that a number of 
researchers had reported background data types (such as storms of FIN and 
RST frames) which were not present in the synthetic DARPA data. The limited 
addition of fragmented frames in the 1999 dataset did not address this issue. 
The use of ROC curves to determine the best intrusion system was also 
criticised due to their reliance on the realism of the false alarms.  
Also the attacks used within the simulation were representative of the time, 
which were dominated by Unix with only a few HTTP and Microsoft exploits. 
Attacks from advanced persistent threats were not included, nor were attacks 
against peer-to-peer or social media protocols.  
Mahoney (Mahoney and Chan 2003) assessed the DARPA data for its 
applicability to anomaly detection and found simulation artefacts affected the 
evaluation. They proposed the mixing of the DARPA data with real network data 
to overcome this limitation. 
2.6.3.3. The KDD ’99 Dataset 
The 1998 DARPA dataset was cleaned for the KDD ’99 Cup, a competition 
associated with the Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Conference. 
Connections within the DARPA dataset were used to extract 41 potential 
intrusion features (Mukkamala, Janoski et al. 2002b). Each connection was 
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labelled as being from one of five classes namely normal, denial of service, 
probe, user-to-root and remote-to-local.  
2.6.3.4. Other Datasets 
In addition to the DARPA and KDD datasets others have been used in intrusion 
studies. Schonlau (Schonlau, DuMouchel et al. 2001) collected command data 
from 50 UNIX users, including masqueraders, and made the data available for 
host-based intrusion research. Greenberg (Greenberg 1988) also collected data 
from UNIX users.  
Moore (Moore and Zuev 2005) have released their hand-labelled dataset that 
they have been using for the development of Bayesian classifiers. This database 
is flow orientated and although it has not been collected with intrusion 
detection in mind it does include attack data. 
The Measurements and Operational Analysis Team (MOAT) of the National 
Laboratory for Applied Network Research (NLANR) maintained a website which 
contains a large amount of experimental data taken from operational networks 
in the USA (Wand Network Research Group 2012). This data is larger than the 
DARPA dataset and more recent. It does not appear to contain any labelling of 
intrusions but it may become of value in future NIS studies. The NLANR website 
also hosts the network files taken from the University of Auckland, another 
valuable resource. In 2006 the NLANR funding was terminated and the 
Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis, CAIDA (The Cooperative 
Association for Internet Data Analysis 2012) assumed operational stewardship 
of the NLANR data.  
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CAIDA have also been collecting and distributing anonymised Internet traffic 
since 2008, from two high-speed monitors on a commercial backbone link. A 
considerable amount of TCPDUMP readable frame data is available. They 
routinely capture an hour of network data every month, at a peak data rate in 
excess of 8Gbits/second. Whilst this data has been collected using network 
interface cards with nanosecond precision, there is a significant amount of 
frame loss. Despite the anonymisation of the data CAIDA place a significant 
number of restrictions on its use. 
The University of Brescia has made available anonymised traces collected on 
the edge router of their university campus on three consecutive days in 2009 
(Brescia 2009). 27GB of TCPDUMP data was recorded containing web (12.5%), 
mail (0.2%), peer-to-peer (86.1%) and VoIP (1%) protocols. Frame loss was 
measured as below 1%. 
The WAND research group at the University of Waikato Computer Science 
Department collects and distributes very long trace sets (Group 2013). The 
Waikato Internet Traffic Storage (WITS) project aims to collect and document 
all internet traces available at WAND. Over 30 separate trace sets have been 
captured dating back to July 1999, including wireless network traffic. Fourteen 
datasets are available for download for networking research. 
The WITS data is also available at the RIPE Data Repository. This is a very 
large data store consisting of approximately 100TB of data, which also hosts 
some of the NLANR datasets. As well as passive network traces this database 
includes routing, TRACEROUTE and PING, as well as IPv6 data.   
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2.6.4. Network Traffic Generation 
As an alternative to using recorded network traffic synthetic traffic generators 
can be used to control the parameters of an evaluation. Specifically, they 
remove the doubt about whether or not the alert is a false positive or the 
missed alert is a false negative, allowing repeatable experiments to be 
undertaken.  
HARPOON was an attempt to generate flow-level network traffic for this 
purpose (sommers and Barford 2004; Sommers, Kim et al. 2004). BRUTE was 
another software approach to network generation (Bonelli, Giordano et al. 
2005), producing IPv4 and IPv6 frames.  
Botta et al have reviewed the limitation of modern software network traffic 
generators (Botta, Dainotti et al. 2010). More recently they have compared 
software approaches for realistic network workload simulation, proposing a new 
tool to meet the requirements (Botta, Dainotti et al. 2012). This new tool is 
based on the D-ITG tool (Avallone, Emma et al. 2004). 
In an attempt to generate network traffic at 10GBits/s traffic Bonelli studied the 
use of multi-core processors (Bonelli, Di Pietro et al. 2012). Non-software based 
solutions for network traffic generation have also been proposed. Tockhorn et 
al have developed an FPGA-based generator with the aim to achieve Gigabit 
link performance (Tockhorn, Danielis et al. 2011). 
2.6.5. Comparison Studies  
Comparison studies have been limited mainly due to the difficulties of making 
direct comparison of disparate systems. The DARPA evaluations and the KDD 
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’99 competition remain the most comprehensive undertaken to date. In addition 
a number of researchers have used their resulting databases to publish further 
performance figures.                
Mukkamala (Mukkamala and Sung 2003b) compared linear genetic programs ( 
LGP), ANNs, multivariate adaptive regression splines (MARS) and SVMs using 
five classes and the 1998 DARPA dataset. LGPs were a clear winner in terms of 
detection performance at the expense of processing time. The performance of 
the SVMs exceeded that of ANNs and the MARS implementations, and was close 
to the performance of the LGPs. In previous work Mukkamala and Sung had 
compared SVMs and ANNs, also concluding the SVMs provide the better 
detection performance. 
2.7. Conclusions 
There has been considerable research into the design and operation of intrusion 
detection systems since the original paper by Anderson in 1980. Much of the 
published work has focussed on data processing techniques with a wide range 
of algorithms from pattern recognition and other disciplines applied to this 
problem, in both isolation and combination. The focus on data processing 
algorithms has been driven by the perceived shortfall in detection performance, 
most notably the unacceptably large number of false alarms that can occur.  
Strategies for post processing of intrusion alerts, through event correlation or 
visualisation techniques have attempted to overcome the inherent limitations of 
intrusion systems and address the increasing workload they can place on 
system administration staff. 
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In parallel with the investigation of data processing algorithms there has been 
significant research into quantifying performance of intrusion detection systems 
through defining performance metrics, standard intrusion databases and 
synthetic data generators. Most notable in this was the work of the MIT Lincoln 
Labs under DARPA funding. This work was initiated over 14 years ago, and 
many research and commercial intrusion systems have been evaluated, but 
there still remains no absolute measure of the performance of real systems. 
Potential users of intrusion systems cannot get definitive statements on the 
performance of different systems and researchers are unable to say by how 
much their latest approach is better or worse. There has been no further 
attempt to extend on the Lincoln Labs work and make it more relevant to 
current security research or to the needs of intrusion users. 
In addition to data processing research, system-level intrusion approaches have 
also been attempted. In host intrusion systems these have been particularly 
successful, most notably with anti-virus software. However in network intrusion 
system applications, whilst they have been successful at reducing false alarms 
this has been at the expense of unsatisfactory or limiting assumptions. 
Despite this extensive body of research into both techniques and systems, there 
is still no solution to the general problem of confident detection of intrusions 
with an arbitrary low false alarm rate. It is the assertion of this thesis that one 
reason for this is the lack of a clear way to compare different approaches from 
different research groups, in an easily quantifiable way. This inability to quantify 
and compare systems was most recently observed by Salah (Salah, Macia-
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Fernandez et al. 2013) and is a fundamental problem which is addressed 
directly in this thesis, by proposing a taxonomy designed specifically for 
comparing systems along with new performance metrics.  
In the next chapter the definition of intrusion detection will be examined more 
closely, to address this difficulty in comparing intrusion systems directly, from 
which a new taxonomy will be derived. 
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3. A New Taxonomy for Intrusion Systems 
The literature review described in the previous chapter has identified the 
difficulty in comparing alternative approaches to declaring the presence of 
intrusions. This chapter describes a new taxonomy that aims to improve the 
comparison of intrusion systems (Tucker, Furnell et al. 2006; Tucker, Furnell et 
al. 2007).  Taxonomies are an important aspect of the analysis of systems as 
they can act as a formal description, providing order to the subject. More 
importantly, they can provide insights through the identification of gaps. Such 
insights often identify new areas of research and this was the motivation for 
developing the taxonomy described in this chapter.  
The proposed taxonomy considers the different type of outputs that can be 
produced by intrusion systems, along with the type of information used to 
determine the intrusion, as the basis for their comparison. A graphical 
combination of these parameters is described against which intrusion systems 
can be qualitatively and quantitatively compared.   
3.1. Background 
A number of taxonomies for intrusion detection have already been proposed. 
One of the earliest was undertaken by Debar and classified intrusion systems 
according to their detection method, behaviour on detection, audit source 
location, or usage frequency (Debar, Dacier et al. 1999). This was later 
extended to include the detection paradigm, as either state- or transition-based, 
where the state of the network or host was determined by the intrusion system 
(Debar, Dacier et al. 2000). Axelsson offered an alternative taxonomy in terms 
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of the detection principle and operational aspects, such as whether operation is 
continuous or in batch mode (Axelsson 2000a). Other taxonomies have been 
developed that classify intrusion systems according to the attack stage they can 
declare intrusions, such as pre-attack, real-time or post attack (Lukatsky 2002). 
Most recently Liao et al have undertaken a comprehensive review of intrusion 
detection (Liao, Lin et al. 2013) proposing a new taxonomy covering host, 
network, wireless and behaviour-based intrusion systems. Patel et al have also 
provided a systematic review of intrusion system applied to cloud computing 
(Patel, Taghavi et al. 2013), as have Modi et al (Modi, Patel et al. 2013). 
Each of these taxonomies provides insight into the operation of intrusion 
systems and is a useful framework for identifying new research opportunities.  
However, they are not a good basis for intrusion system comparison as they 
use the internal properties of such systems for classification. A taxonomy based 
on the applicability of intrusion systems is a more fundamental comparison 
approach as it describes their use, rather than the details of their 
implementation. 
Consider, for example, two network intrusion systems. System A is misuse-
based whilst System B is anomaly-based. During a series of intrusion events 
both these systems will indicate the intrusion state of the network segment 
they are monitoring, possibly to different degrees of accuracy (that is, their 
detection and false alarm rates may differ). Much work has been published on 
the quantitative comparison of such systems (for example (Abouzakhar and 
Manson 2004)), using analysis techniques such as ROC or lift curves. However, 
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in addition to the presence of an intrusion, System A can indicate the type of 
attack and the exploit being used, on the basis of the specific signatures that 
are triggered. Comparing System A with System B via a ROC curve or confusion 
matrix will not include this important property of System A and thus is not a fair 
comparison method.  
Consider also the use of the output from these two systems. If both systems 
are providing alerts to network support staff, the actions that are likely to be 
taken are different. System A will identify the network peers involved in the 
suspected intrusion behaviour as well as the nature of the attack, allowing 
support staff to take specific action quickly. Support staff using System B may 
need to undertake further investigations before the information necessary to 
stop the intrusion behaviour is derived. In summary, each of these approaches 
to intrusion detection makes differing demands on the systems that use the 
information they provide and therefore comparison techniques should include 
this in their assessment.    
3.2. A New Intrusion Taxonomy 
A new taxonomy was developed which was inspired by the work of Johnson in 
the interpretation of pictures (Johnson 1958). He studied the ability of human 
operators to find and correctly classify objects within complex images. The 
objects were relatively small and thus the a priori probability that a specific area 
of the image contained an object was very low, a situation analogous to 
intrusion events within a background of normal network or host activity 
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(Axelsson 1999a). Johnson defined the following types of operator tasks, 
amongst others: 
 Detection – the ability to say that something of interest is present in an 
image; 
 Recognition – the ability to determine the class of object present, such 
as a car or aircraft; and 
 Identification – the ability to determine the type of object present, such 
as the make of car or the type of aircraft. 
The most important aspect of Johnson’s work was the definition of minimum 
criteria necessary for successful completion of the above tasks. Using similar 
task definitions as a starting point, the new taxonomy divides the output of 
intrusion systems into one of five categories, with the first three loosely in line 
with Johnson, as follows: 
 Detection – in which the system outputs an indication of a state change 
within a network or host. There is no determination of the nature of the 
change, apart for the assumption that this indicates the occurrence of a 
possible intrusion. The principal use of such systems is for data rate 
reduction so that other systems (either automated or manual) can 
investigate further; 
 Recognition – in which the intrusion systems are capable of declaring the 
type of attack, such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), 
reconnaissance, or User to Root (U2R); 
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 Identification – in which the system is capable of declaring the exploits 
used to achieve the intrusion, such as buffer overflow or an application-
specific vulnerability;  
 Confirmation – in which the attack plan is deduced, allowing attack-
specific countermeasures to be deployed rather than coarse measures, 
such as disconnection of the internet access or isolation of key business 
servers; and 
 Prosecution – in which evidential quality data is generated identifying the 
originator of the intrusion. 
This hierarchy is shown in Figure 3-1. 
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Figure 3-1 Intrusion System Hierarchy 
As an example of the use of this taxonomy consider a simple anomaly intrusion 
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system comparing the utilised network bandwidth with historical values. An 
alert could be issued when the measured utilisation exceeded the historical 
levels by a set threshold. Such a system would be categorised as an intrusion 
“detection” system. It would be able to declare that something unusual is 
happening within the network but declaring with any confidence that the 
anomaly was caused by an intruder is not likely to be achievable to an 
arbitrarily high accuracy.  
As another example consider a SNORT intrusion system operating on a single 
network segment (Roesch 1999). When a rule is triggered and an alert 
declared, there is considerable attack-related information available. Often, rules 
are created to alert when the signatures of specific attacks are present. Thus, 
when such a rule has been triggered, the intrusion system can identify the 
exploit being used, as well as the network peers involved. Within SNORT, single 
frames can trigger multiple signatures, allowing detailed attack information to 
be accumulated downstream of the intrusion system. Within the taxonomy 
proposed here SNORT is acting as an intrusion “identification” system.   
In addition to considering the output from an intrusion system, further insight 
can be achieved from an analysis of the data scale over which the system is 
operating. In this context the data scale means whether or not the data is local 
to the host or application, or more widespread data, such as local area network 
frames are available. In modern computer systems four data scales can be 
considered: 
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 File – monitoring the status of individual files for unauthorised access or 
change; 
 Host – monitoring the applications running on and the behaviour of an 
individual host or user; 
 Network – monitoring the frames exchanged between hosts, servers and 
other network devices to assert the presence of an intrusion; and 
 Enterprise – monitoring traffic originating from trusted sources of an 
organisation that operate in the presence of other, less trusted, data 
sources. 
The File, Host and Network data scales have been used in other studies (for 
example, (Bace and Mell 2001)). However, the separation of the Network data 
scale into two sections is believed to be a novel concept. The principal 
difference between the Network and Enterprise data scales is the mixing of 
trusted and untrusted data streams within the same network segment. This is 
most often encountered in virtual private networks (VPN) between an office 
location of an organisation and its remote staff or trusted partners, via the 
Internet. VPNs are separated from the untrusted data streams using encryption 
schemes and well-known protocols. However, this separation may become 
subject to the same technology, policy or configuration vulnerabilities as other 
parts of the information processing system. Therefore, it is likely that security 
staff will want to know when their VPN communications are subject to intrusion 
attempts, irrespective of whether or not the attempts are successful. Intrusion 
systems therefore need to extend their data scale applicability to include the 
Enterprise. This is a technically challenging problem. 
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There is an alternative to the File and Host scales that could be applied in 
specific analyses, if needed. These are Application and Operating System. It is 
becoming increasingly common for enterprise applications to include data 
gathering for intrusion declaration sub-systems, independent of other security 
features of their host. Such applications are only concerned with intruder 
behaviours associated with their own files and are therefore more limited that 
the File scale used previously. This limitation is countered by the Operating 
System scale, which addresses more general issues of file-based intruder 
activity. In essence this alternative scale moves the separation of the lower two 
scales nearer to the first.  For the remainder of this thesis the use of the File 
and Host scales will be used to describe this taxonomy. 
3.3. The Application of the Taxonomy 
This taxonomy can be applied in a number of ways. The remainder of this 
chapter will examine its use to create an intrusion footprint on a grid or matrix 
formed from the output type and data scale elements of the taxonomy. The use 
of this footprint for comparison of systems will then be shown. 
3.3.1. Intrusion Matrix 
The combination of intrusion output type and data scale can be shown as an 
intrusion matrix, as in Figure 3-2. Also shown are some of the techniques that 
can be applied within a particular output type and data scale. For example, 
malware signatures or resource anomalies can be used in intrusion recognition 
systems operating at the Host data scale. Much of this matrix is covered with 
techniques that have been extensively studied. Of particular note is the 
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difficulty of practical techniques at the Enterprise data scale, when applied 
outside a managed cloud. 
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Figure 3-2 Intrusion Taxonomy 
3.3.2. Intrusion System Footprint 
The intrusion matrix can be used to plot a footprint for different intrusion 
systems. The footprints are determined from an analysis of the intrusion system 
outputs to determine which of the five output categories the system is capable 
of producing and what data scale is used to create the output.  For example, 
Figure 3-3 shows the footprints of a number of different intrusion paradigms.  
Figure 3-3a shows the footprint of representative anti-virus software (AVS) 
package. They typically include both virus-specific signatures and heuristics that 
respond to anomalous behaviours. This means they operate from the Detection 
to the Identification output types. Since the attack plan can often be 
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determined by reverse engineering of the virus, AVS packages can also be 
considered to operate at the Confirmation output type. 
 
Figure 3-3 Intrusion Footprints 
A footprint of a host-based intrusion system is shown in Figure 3-3b. To create 
this footprint it was assumed that anomaly techniques are applied and therefore 
the intrusion system is only capable of Detection or Recognition. Confirmation, 
or the determination of the specific exploit or vulnerability used (Identification), 
are unlikely to be achievable with confidence when using an anomaly-based 
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system. Host-based intrusion systems using signature techniques would be 
expected to operate at the Identification and Confirmation levels, depending on 
the discrimination capabilities of the signatures. 
Figures 3-3c and 3-3d show network-based intrusion systems using signature 
and anomaly detection respectively. These figures highlight the principal 
differences to be at the higher output types of Identification and Confirmation. 
SNORT is a typical example of a signature based intrusion system. On its own it 
is unable to perform the plan determination required for full Confirmation. 
However, when multiple SNORT sensors are deployed at strategic parts of a 
network, it may be possible to determine an attack plan from the patterns of 
signatures that are triggered. An additional module would be required to 
integrate the information and determine the plan. Hence, the Confirmation 
output type is shown partially covered by the footprint. 
Figure 3-3e is the most interesting, and shows the extensive footprint that 
could be achieved by intrusion systems based on mobile agents (see section 
2.3.3 for a review of mobile agents applied to intrusion detection). On the 
assumption that mobile agents could be created to examine the status of files, 
applications running on a host, and frames on local network segments, they 
offer the widest range of data scales of any other technique. Also, their payload 
could include integrated anomaly and signature-based techniques, and when 
combined with a communications capability this could give them the potential 
to provide output types up to Confirmation. It may even be possible that 
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techniques for Enterprise data scales and Prosecution could be integrated as 
they become available. 
Finally, Figure 3-3f shows some of the current challenges faced by intrusion 
systems. The Prosecution output type requires high integrity information to be 
gathered and secured from change. Whilst this is a common requirement in 
secure systems it must be achieved to the levels necessary to allow criminal 
prosecution, within a system that has intruders present (Sommer 1999). For the 
Enterprise data scale, the technology challenge appears to be the development 
of discriminants that will separate intrusion and non-intrusion events in mixed-
trust data flows. Such data flows will often be occurring on equipment not 
owned by the enterprise and therefore the ability to provide local monitoring of 
the network will be limited.   
It is useful to consider how Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) 
fit within this footprint. An SIEM can aggregate data from all the data scales at 
all intrusion levels, assuming the Enterprise level is restricted to procured cloud 
services only. This would mean that they could cover the intrusion footprint 
completely, providing all security information is sent to the SIEM. However an 
SIEM does not undertake the measurements on the system directly, but uses 
measurements made by other system elements, such as applications, operating 
systems, network devices and intrusion systems. Although the taxonomy 
described here, as well as the metrics described in the next chapter, could be 
applied to SIEM, this lack of inherent measurement means that they will not be 
considered further.    
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3.3.3. Comparison of Intrusion Systems 
The intrusion matrix can be used to provide a comparison between systems. A 
qualitative comparison can be made by examining the footprint of each system. 
Large footprints are likely to represent systems that provide a broader range of 
applicability and a wider range of output information during an intrusion. Small 
footprints would be typical for systems that are very specific in their application.   
A more quantitative comparison can be made by examining the performance of 
systems where their footprints overlap. Each element of the intrusion matrix is 
accompanied by a set of performance metrics relevant to the output data type. 
These performance metrics could include false alarm rates, intrusion 
probabilities, or confusion matrices measured in such a way as to be 
appropriate to the position within the intrusion matrix. As an example consider 
a single element within the intrusion matrix, say the (Network, Identification) 
element. If the footprints of two intrusion systems overlap on this element, 
performance metrics relevant to Identification should be calculated for the two 
systems. The probability of identification could be determined as a function of 
the false alarm rate, to produce Identification ROC curves. Examination of the 
ROC curves at this overlap point within the intrusion matrix would allow 
comparison of the systems in the role of intrusion identification.  A fair 
comparison would require the examination of performance metrics at all points 
of overlap on the intrusion matrix as well as a recognition of the additional 
capabilities offered at points where they do not overlap. 
Some of the elements of the intrusion matrix presented have been extensively 
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studied and can be considered commercial successes. For example, AVS 
packages are very good at providing confident alerts at the Files and Host data 
scales (Post and Kagan 1998). Such software can be very specific, identifying 
the virus and hence, by implication the “plan” of the originator of the virus. 
Heuristic algorithms can provide a degree of detection capability in which the 
AVS indicates that there is a virus present but is not specific about its type. AVS 
packages are also well known to provide a high alert probability with a low false 
alarm rate. Thus a large area of this matrix can be achieved with very high 
performance. 
Meanwhile, some of the elements of the intrusion matrix are poorly understood 
at this time. Effective techniques at the Enterprise data scale are rare and of 
limited applicability. This applies to any of the intrusion output capabilities. The 
enterprise data stream may be present with untrusted streams and on 
untrusted network equipment (for example, Internet backbone routers). 
Current intrusion systems are not able to operate outside of the trusted 
systems of the enterprise, except in limited circumstances, leaving Enterprise 
scale intrusion systems to rely on remote diagnosis of intrusion behaviour. 
However some aspects of the trust issues are addressed in cloud computing 
where the provider of the cloud can be subject to contractual and service level 
agreements for security, in which intrusion declaration could form a part. In this 
context the cloud is equivalent to leased infrastructure, rather than the general 
purpose Internet infrastructure that would be difficult for a single organisation 
to monitor.   
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It can therefore be seen that there are three aspects of the intrusion matrix 
that provide insight to the performance of an intrusion system and should be 
considered when comparing systems, namely: 
 The number of elements of the matrix that an individual system footprint 
covers as this can indicate its applicability; 
 The position of the elements of the footprint within the intrusion matrix, 
as some element positions present a significant challenge to the 
achievement of high performance; and 
 Only the elements that overlap are of any significance in the direct 
quantitative comparison of intrusion systems. 
3.4. Relationship with Other Definitions of Intrusion 
One of the earliest definitions of intrusion was from Amoroso. He defined 
intrusion detection as “the process of identifying and responding to malicious 
activity targeted at computing and networking resources” (Amoroso 1998). In 
the same year Ptacek defined intrusion as “unauthorized usage of or misuse of 
a computer system” (Ptacek and Newsham 1998) whilst Alessandri defined 
intrusion as “a malicious activity threatening the security policy that leads to a 
security failure, that is to a security policy violation” (Alessandri, Cachin et al. 
2001). More recently many researchers have used the definition of Bace in 
which intrusion is defined as “attempts to compromise the confidentiality, 
integrity, availability, or to bypass the security mechanisms of a computer or 
network” (Bace and Mell 2001).  
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For the remainder of this thesis we will use a simple definition based on 
Alessandri, without the restriction of malicious intent. Therefore we consider 
intrusion to be defined as “an activity that leads to the violation of the security 
policy of a computer system”.  Further insight can be gained by considering the 
relationship of this definition with the definitions of detection, recognition and 
identification presented earlier.  
In this context, an intrusion detection can be seen as the declaration that the 
security policy has been violated, but the specific clause that has been violated 
is not identified. Intrusion recognition systems are able to declare which clauses 
or subsets of clauses have been violated. Intrusion identification systems are 
able to declare which clauses or subsets have been violated, as well as 
declaring the way in which they have been violated.    
The above discussion can be used as the basis of a mathematical model of the 
intrusion declaration process, potentially allowing the theoretical limits to be 
determined in the same manner as Johnson’s work for imaging systems. Also 
the inclusion of AVS within this taxonomy opens the challenging and interesting 
option of building on the theoretical work already published in this area. The 
work of Cohen (Cohen 1987) has already established theoretical limits on the 
detectability of viruses, proving that no algorithm can perfectly detect all 
possible viruses. More recently Li et al have proposed a theoretical basis for 
intrusion, but this work has yet to reveal any useful conclusions (Li, Das et al. 
2005). It is hoped that this taxonomy will build on this theoretical basis and 
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lead to a better understanding of the limits of performance for intrusion 
systems, as well as providing an improved framework for their comparison. 
3.5. Conclusions 
Published research literature in intrusion detection has failed to define precisely 
and consistently the meaning of “detection” and therefore comparison of 
detection systems is problematic. Indeed, it is common for some researchers to 
refer to intrusion detection, whilst others to intrusion recognition within the 
same context.  
In this chapter a new taxonomy for intrusion systems has been defined in terms 
of five levels of intrusion operating over four data scales, producing an intrusion 
system footprint. The footprints for different types of intrusion system have 
been examined with the qualitative observation that the larger the footprint of a 
system the larger its applicability to intrusion problems. Intrusion systems can 
only be compared quantitatively in a meaningful way when they have 
overlapping areas on their footprint.  
Existing definitions of intrusion detection have been examined. The relationship 
between the new levels of intrusion functionality has been defined in terms of 
breaches of the security policy of a system with intrusion “detection” being 
defined as “an activity that leads to the violation of the security policy of a 
computer system”. This chapter has shown that intrusion systems can only be 
meaningfully compared when they are attempting to do the same task, over the 
same scale.  
The following chapters will concentrate on the detection, recognition and 
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identification scales only with the next chapter providing a systems-level 
discussion of intrusion, focusing on the Network scale. 
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4. Systems Considerations 
The previous chapter has established an alternative view of intrusion systems, 
in terms of the different types of outputs that can be produced. This chapter 
examines the systems implications of these different output types. Although 
many of these implications can apply across different scales, for this chapter 
and for the remainder of this thesis the emphasis will be on network intrusion 
systems (NIS) and, in particular, signature-based NIS. The acronym NIS is 
proposed to mean network intrusion systems operating at the detection, 
recognition and identification scales, to avoid confusion with the more widely 
used NIDS (network intrusion detection system) acronym. It is introduced to 
clarify that the systems considerations apply more broadly than to detection 
alone. 
The chapter commences by establishing a common terminology and 
understanding about the nature of signature-based NIS. This is followed by a 
discussion of the reasons for deployment and the characteristics of an ideal 
NIS. These characteristics are illustrated in terms of a model of an ideal NIS 
and a discussion of the current challenges facing NIS. Finally, two performance 
metrics are proposed to assist in the use of the new taxonomy. 
4.1. Principles of Network Intrusion Systems 
Currently there is no complete theoretical treatment of NIS. There has been 
considerable modelling of network traffic (Barford, Kline et al. 2002b; Allen and 
Marin 2003; Estevez-Tapiador, Garcia-Teodoro et al. 2003; Jun, Jiahai et al. 
2005; D'Apice, Khokhlov et al. 2010; Bahaa-Eldin 2011) and attempts to 
Chapter 4 Systems Considerations                                     
 
 89 
establish a full theoretical model (Patcha and Park 2004; Li, Das et al. 2005; 
Beghdad 2009). However it is difficult to use these results to further the design 
of better NIS. In this section some basic theoretical results will be stated as a 
pre-cursor to establishing performance metrics later in the chapter.  
In order to establish the important issues associated with a signature-based NIS 
it is useful to view it from a set theory perspective of intrusion alerting, as 
follows. Signature-based NIS generally operate by comparing each network 
frame individually against a set of frame-based signatures that represent 
malicious behaviour of interest. This is a simplified view as intrusion systems 
can contain pre- and post-processors which can extend their operation beyond 
a single frame. The frag3 pre-processor in SNORT is an example, re-assembling 
multiple fragments of a frame, therefore extending the application of the 
signatures over several network frames. The stream4 pre-processor, also in 
SNORT, gives it the capability to alert on frames according to where they are in 
a connection, that is, according to connection state. Post-processors can be 
used to limit the output from an intrusion system, suppressing previously 
alerted conditions for example, extending the decision process of the NIS over 
many frames or connections. 
Although this single frame view is a simplification it does offer some insight into 
NIS operation. Consider intrusion alerting from the perspective of the universe 
of network frames,    collectable on a network segment. This is a very large 
set. For a maximum transmission unit (MTU) of 1500 bytes, the number of 
potential frames at the full MTU is 21500x8 which is approximately 103612 or 
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considerably larger than the baryon number of the observable universe (~1080).  
Included in this set are frames that meet the defined network protocols and 
their options for payloads, as well as those that violate all current protocols. 
Despite the large number of set members some simple results can be derived. 
There exists a subset of   that consists of the frames that may be used by 
intruders to violate the security policy of a network.  These could include, for 
example, frames in which there are protocol violations, to defeat the TCP/IP 
stack of the target machine, or frames that comply with the network protocols 
but deliver malicious payloads. This subset is designated,    , is considered to 
be a proper subset to ensure that there is the possibility of separating intrusion-
like from non-intrusion-like frames, that is 
     
Equation 4-1 Fundamental Assumption of NIS 
Equation 4-1 illustrates a fundamental assumption of signature-based network 
intrusion, that    is a proper subset of  . This means that there are some 
frames, and hopefully many, that can only be the result of behaviours 
consistent with the network security policy and therefore can be discriminated 
by a NIS on a per-frame assessment. An important consideration is that    is 
not dependent on the specific implementation of a signature-based NIS, but is a 
fundamental property of a network and specifically its security policy, network 
architecture, protocols and vulnerabilities.  The size of    is not fixed as the 
discovery of new vulnerabilities and attack methods, or the deployment of 
devices using new protocols, will affect the number of frames that comprise this 
set.  
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In the universe of frames there also exists a subset that consists of frames that 
can be generated as a result of actions consistent with the network security 
policy. This subset, designated    is not necessarily a proper subset, hence it 
can be defined as     . It is also independent of the design of a signature-
based NIS.  
A problem faced by signature-based NIS is that: 
        
Equation 4-2 The Problem of NIS 
This is a fundamental limitation of signature-based NIS. It is not possible to 
uniquely map each network frame into either    or    and therefore error free 
classification of all frames as either intrusion-like or non-intrusion-like is not 
possible. Some frames are consistent with normal user and intruder behaviour 
simultaneously. Therefore perfect declaration of an intrusion cannot occur by 
considering only single frames and matching them to known intrusion 
signatures. 
Equation 4-2 can be proven by construction. Consider for example the use of 
ICMP PING. Some applications use PING to verify connectivity to remote 
servers. However an intruder can also use PING to locate potential hosts to 
attack. The presence of a PING frame on a network segment therefore does not 
necessarily indicate that an intruder is present yet it is common for alerting on 
PING frames to be included in a signature set for a NIS.  
No published research could be identified that has quantified the overlap 
between    and   . Practical experience suggests that the overlap could be 
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large, mainly due to the frames present in techniques used legitimately by 
support staff, which would be considered malicious when used by unauthorised 
individuals.  
Although    is not dependent on the signatures used within a NIS, it is highly 
dependent on the network security policy. Re-considering the PING argument 
given above highlights this relationship. If the network security policy forbids 
the use of PING by users and support staff and also forbids the deployment of 
applications or operating systems that use it autonomously, then alerting on a 
PING on a network is a valid intrusion declaration as the policy has been 
violated. The PING frames would exist only in the set    and not in   . 
Forbidding PING is not a practical solution to the limitations of signature-based 
NIS. However it demonstrates an important point that making the network 
security policy more specific reduces the size of    and hence the overlap with 
  . 
Consider next the subset of   that comprises the frames on which a given set 
of NIS signatures will produce an alert, designated     . For the perfect NIS the 
following equations hold true: 
         
          
Equation 4-3 An Ideal NIS 
This is unlikely to be achievable for practical systems due to the implications of 
the limitations highlighted in Equation 4.2. Also the size of    is unknown, due 
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to as yet undiscovered exploit methods. In essence the first part of Equation 4-
3 is concerned with the achieving high detection probability and low false 
negative rates, whilst the second part is concerned with achieving low false 
positive rates. 
In this simplified situation of decisions made on single frames, the goal of the 
misuse NIS designer would be to select signatures to get as close to this ideal 
relationship as possible. This could be done in two distinct ways: 
 Increasing the number of exploit-specific signatures; and 
 Decreasing the specificity of the signatures. 
Increasing the number of signatures could provide increasing coverage for new 
attack methods as they are discovered. Highly specific signatures are less likely 
to be triggered by legitimate user actions. However as the number of signatures 
is increased there would be practical difficulties in applying them to network 
frames in real-time, particularly as network speeds increase.  
Decreasing the specificity of signatures would increase the coverage of    even 
for as yet undiscovered attacks, but increase the likelihood that frames that are 
not intrusion-like would cause alerts, that is         would increase. 
4.2. Reasons to Deploy a Network Intrusion System 
 It is instructive to consider the reasons for the deployment of a NIS, to assist 
with the development of a better understanding of false alarms. A NIS could be 
deployed for a number of reasons, including to: 
 Comply with industry standards – Standards, such as the Payment Card 
Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS) (PCI Security Standards 
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Council 2010), often require that intrusion systems are deployed. 
Compliance is often mandatory and confirmed by independent audit; 
 Demonstrate secure operation and corporate governance – Organisations 
teaming with industrial partners or seeking business with new clients are 
often required to demonstrate that information assurance processes are 
effective. Pre-bid questionnaires are frequently used by Government and 
large organisations to screen potential bidders for major contracts. If the 
contract involves access to sensitive information the questionnaire is 
likely to request network security information as well as security 
standards compliance; 
 Gather forensic information to enable a criminal prosecution – A NIS in 
which the logs are correctly managed could be used to initiate 
disciplinary procedures or criminal action against employees, or others 
accessing or using data assets inappropriately and against the network 
security policy; 
 Block an on-going attack, limiting further compromise – Determination of 
an intrusion in real-time, or early in the attack, can enable action to be 
taken to limit compromise of systems or information assets. Intrusion 
Prevention Systems (IPS) can drop frames, slow connections or 
terminate sessions to deter, limit or stop the actions of an attacker 
(Papadaki 2004); 
 Undertake post-intrusion damage assessment – After an attack it can be 
essential to understand what information assets or systems have been 
compromised, for example for compliance with regulations governing 
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management of personal data. The owners of the information assets 
may need to be informed, so that they can take appropriate action. A 
NIS is potentially one source of data, along with server, firewall and 
other network device logs; and 
 Discover attack methods – An NIS is just one component of a defence in 
depth strategy for network security. As new attack methods are 
developed it is essential that the network remains secure. Analysis of 
attacks alerted by a NIS can be used to confirm that the security controls 
in the other layers of the defence remain effective. 
4.3. The Ideal Network Intrusion System  
Analysing the concept of an ideal NIS is a useful way to understand the 
limitations of current systems. An early attempt to document the properties of 
an ideal NIS was undertaken by Cramer, who identified the characteristics as 
timeliness of response; high probability of detection; low false alarm rate; 
specificity of attack; scalability to large networks and low a priori information 
requirements (Cramer 1995).  Later, Lin was concerned about implementation 
issues (Lin, Tseng et al. 2001) and defined the properties of an ideal intrusion 
detection system as “an efficient detection mechanism and provide good 
representation of expert knowledge for intrusion patterns, which should be 
easily understood and maintained”.  Behera extended Cramer’s list to include 
the limited use of host and network system resources, flexibility in detecting 
new attacks and the ability to correlate data from different machines to detect 
coordinated attacks (Behera 2001). Chinchani additionally recognised as 
important the ability to be deployed in a heterogeneous and distributed 
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environment (Chinchani, Upadhyaya et al. 2002). The most recent set of ideal 
characteristics is on the COAST website which provides the following list 
(COAST 2012):  
“an ideal NIDS should run continuously; be fault tolerant; be resistant to 
subversion; have minimal overhead on the network and hosts; observe 
deviations from normal behaviour; be easily tailored to the system being 
monitored; be able to cope with changing system behaviour; and must be 
difficult to fool”. 
In this section a more general view of the set of ideal characteristics for a NIS 
is taken, derived from the viewpoint of the individuals responsible for network 
management.  The properties identified above fail to capture all of the desirable 
characteristics of an ideal NIS from this viewpoint and do not allow their inter-
relationships to be clearly seen. A recent information security breaches survey 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2012), indicates a shift from information security 
being an expenditure, towards being an investment. In the UK 20% of 
companies require a return on investment (ROI) calculation to support 
expenditure on information security. The ROI calculation would need to take 
into account, for example, the financial impact of reputational damage or loss 
of new product design details, if the information assets of the organisation were 
to be compromised. To provide such detailed justification, network managers 
require a clear understanding of the benefits of NIS, the achievable 
performance and the total cost.  Therefore, from the perspective of individuals 
responsible for managing computer networks, an ideal NIS should: 
 Improve the security of the network; 
 Achieve high sensitivity, in which high probability of intrusion alerts are 
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achieved with low false alarm rates; 
 Achieve high selectivity, in which the different intrusion mechanisms can 
be differentiated so as to allow a response specific to the intrusion; 
 Be appropriate to meet the threat; and 
 Have low cost of ownership. 
It may seem unusual to include the requirement to improve the security of the 
network in the above list, but it is the raison d’être for intrusion systems and 
therefore it is essential that it be explicitly evaluated. Each new device or 
protocol stack added to a network has the capability to introduce new 
vulnerabilities through technology weaknesses, configuration errors, or security 
policy inadequacies. The net result does not automatically mean that network 
security is increased, as the work of Ptacek showed (Ptacek and Newsham 
1998). Additional security concerns that need to be explicitly evaluated include: 
 The ability to operate and survive during a direct attack on the NIS; 
 Ensuring that the logs are handled in a forensically secure manner to 
enable criminal prosecutions to be sought; 
 The tolerance to equipment failure is appropriate, with the most secure 
networks requiring a fail-secure approach; 
 Both previously seen and unseen intrusion mechanisms must be 
detectable; and 
 The NIS must not be vulnerable to evasion and insertion attacks, as well 
as other defeat techniques (Ptacek and Newsham 1998). 
The need for high sensitivity encapsulates the requirement for detection, 
recognition and identification probabilities to be high, simultaneously with an 
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acceptably low false alarm rate. From a detection theory viewpoint, this 
requires a large signal to noise ratio, where the signal is considered to be a 
measurement in which an intrusion is present and the noise is considered to be 
a measurement in which an intrusion is not present (Schwartz and Shaw 1975). 
The close relationship between false alarms and the detection of real intrusion 
events is most often shown by ROC curves, as described in (Abouzakhar and 
Manson 2004). High sensitivity implies a sharply rising ROC curve achieving 
high alert probabilities under low false alarm rates. It is important that high 
sensitivity is maintained across the complete set of intrusion measurements, 
including unseen attacks, intrusion events during direct attack of the NIS and 
under conditions of multiple intrusion events from many attackers. 
High selectivity is concerned with the ability to discriminate between different 
intrusion mechanisms and is linked with the need to determine the cause of the 
intrusion, to be able to select or recommend the most appropriate response. 
The previous chapter discussed the characteristics of intrusion detection 
systems with differing intrusion recognition and identification capabilities 
(Tucker, Furnell et al. 2007). As in the need for high sensitivity, it is important 
that high selectivity is maintained across the complete set of intrusion 
measurements, including unseen attacks, intrusion events whilst the NIS is 
under direct attack and under conditions of multiple intrusion events from many 
attackers. 
The appropriateness of the NIS covers a wide range of properties. It is most 
directly related to the “timeliness of response” parameter described by Cramer. 
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However the importance here is that the NIS must be capable of meeting the 
security requirements stated within the network security policy, rather than be 
able to respond rapidly. For example, in a school network the Governors may 
be concerned with the need to protect the integrity of individual student 
grades. An offline intrusion system analysing log files in batch mode could 
easily be capable of meeting their security policy requirements. However, in a 
commercial organisation generating revenue solely from web transactions, real-
time response would be essential to block attacker activities before customer 
details had been compromised and the company reputation permanently 
damaged.  
Other appropriateness-related issues include: 
 Network coverage – in which the NIS is required to meet differing threat 
protection levels in different parts of a network, throughout the 
enterprise; 
 Temporal coverage – in which the NIS is required to meet continuous or 
batch processing requirements; 
 Adaptive performance - based on changing threat, network conditions or 
availability of resources such as network staff; and 
 The ability to gather evidential quality information to assist prosecution 
of intruders. 
The final characteristic of an ideal NIS is low cost of ownership, which 
generates a number of additional considerations, including: 
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 Ease of deployment – centralised deployment and management of a NIS 
will reduce ownership costs significantly; 
 Sensitivity to deployment constraints – When the performance of a NIS is 
sensitive to constraints such as the location of network sensors, the cost 
of ownership can increase. Space in data-centres is often charged at a 
premium and therefore NIS that can be deployed flexibly, without loss of 
performance, will be more attractive from the cost of ownership 
viewpoint. An additional but important consideration is the constraints 
placed on other systems that can be deployed after the selection and 
deployment of a NIS; 
 Support requirements – should be minimised by reducing the need for a 
priori information, routine maintenance including signature updates and 
specialists to investigate alerts. The achievement of high sensitivity and 
selectivity are key to reducing the support costs as time will not be 
wasted investigating false positives; 
 Resource usage – increasing the use of network resources, such as 
bandwidth, storage and processing power, increases the cost of 
ownership by requiring upgrades to the network infrastructure earlier 
than would otherwise be needed; 
 Scalability – As organisations grow it is important that the NIS solution 
can scale and that complete replacement is not essential when a 
threshold network size is reached; and 
 Heterogeneous and distributed networks – should not be a constraint. 
Networks are rarely homogeneous, often containing legacy protocols and 
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equipment. A NIS that requires significant network upgrades or 
standardisation is likely to need a large initial investment. 
4.4. A Model of an Ideal NIS  
Network intrusion systems generally sense the network traffic on key network 
segments and look for the presence of intrusion signatures or anomalous 
behaviour. The declaration of an intrusion is then made via the examination of 
the properties of individual frames, or on the statistical parameters of complete 
connections.  NIS generally do not interact with the network and often their 
ability to transmit frames onto the monitored network is disabled by hardware, 
via modifications to the network interface card or cable. This is due to the need 
to hide the presence of the intrusion system from would-be attackers. Figure 4-
1 shows a simple model of a passive NIS. 
In this model the Extract Measurements block processes network frames to 
determine fundamental features of the received data. Such features could 
include session indicators, frame size, protocol types, or client and server 
information. The selection of features is one of the most important aspects in 
the design of NIS. Frequently, more than one measurement is made, allowing 
an assessment of network activity to be created from many viewpoints 
(Mukkamala and Sung 2003d). The Extract Measurements block can contain 
local storage, to allow the extraction of measurement over many network 
frames. However, when measurements are required over an extended time 
period it is more likely that partial measurements will be passed to the 
Associate Measurements block for storage in the Potential Intrusions store.  
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Figure 4-1 A Functional View of an Ideal NIS 
The Associate Measurements block takes the latest measurements, partial 
measurements or inputs from other NIS, and attempts to assign this data to 
individual records in the Potential Intrusions store. Bass discusses the 
importance of association techniques in the fusion of multiple sensors (Bass 
2000). Each record in this store contains the set of measurements on which an 
Chapter 4 Systems Considerations                                     
 
 103 
intrusion/ non-intrusion decision can be made. It is important to realise that 
these sets will be in error due to uncertainties in the measurement process, 
incomplete data, an intruder deploying deliberate measures to deceive the NIS 
or to association errors. 
The Intrusion Decision block takes the tentative records from the Potential 
Intrusion store and, using the supporting information in the A Priori Data store, 
classifies each record as intrusion-like or non-intrusion-like. It may also 
separate intrusion events into individual intrusion attack types, to enable the 
selection of the most appropriate response, reducing the network support 
requirements. The Potential Intrusion store is updated with the result from the 
Intrusion Decision block and if an intrusion is declared then an alert is output 
from the NIS for further action.  This block may make its decision in a simple 
way, for example by checking for the presence of protocol errors, or in a more 
complex way, such as utilising neural networks or support vector machines to 
transform the measurements before a threshold or decision measure is applied.  
Also shown in Figure 4-1 is an Adaption block taking measurements from the 
Extract Measurements block and updating the A Prior Data store. This block, if 
present, can extract information to support models of normal behaviour on 
which many anomaly-based NIS depend.  Often the A Prior Data block is not 
dynamically updated from network measurements, but is derived from offline 
analysis of network vulnerabilities or specific attack mechanisms.  
Not all of the blocks and stores shown in Figure 4-1 need to be explicitly 
present. Consider for example SNORT. In its simplest form, that is a single 
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network sensor with no pre-processors, the Extract Measurements block 
becomes the capture of a complete network frame. There is no Potential 
Intrusions store and therefore the Associate Measurements block only passes 
the frame to the Intrusion Decision block where it is parsed to look for the 
presence of intrusion signatures taken from the A Prior Data store. The 
presence of a signature generates an alert.  
The discussion above represents a simplified view of network intrusion systems 
and is not thought to have been presented elsewhere. In this respect it can be 
considered as a model of a first generation NIS, with modern implementations 
extending the intrusion assessment over many frames, as described in section 
4.1. One motivation for its inclusion here is that other technologies use a similar 
model, and therefore this can be thought of as a design pattern. The most 
notable example of its use is in air traffic control (ATC) radar, as described 
below.  
ATC radar makes regular measurement of the position and velocity of aircraft 
and associates each new set of measurements with the tracks of previously 
seen aircraft, to update their position and velocity. If the measurements cannot 
be associated with an existing aircraft then a new aircraft is declared and a 
track file is initiated. When track files have not been updated for a set period 
the file is deleted, on the assumption that the aircraft is no longer in the ATC 
radar control space.  In this design pattern, the position and velocity 
measurements assume the same significance as the measurement of network 
frames. The Associate Measurements block assigns new position and velocity 
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measurements with the existing aircraft tracks, in much the same way as it 
performs the association of measurements in a NIS.  
For radar however the problem of how best to associate new measurements 
with previously seen events has been studied extensively, with techniques 
based on probabilistic data association, Kalman filtering, interacting multiple 
models and multiple hypothesis tracking being routinely applied (Kirubarajan 
and Bar-Shalom 2004). The use of these techniques in NIS is still to be studied 
in depth, despite their well-known performance in radar.  
4.5. Current Challenges in NIS 
The passive approach to network intrusion has a number of difficulties in 
achieving the ideal NIS characteristics described in the section 4.3. Surprisingly, 
one of the biggest challenges is with the need to improve security. When NIS 
have a high false alarm rate the network support staff are likely to disbelieve 
alerts, often taking no action when they occur. Even when low false alarm rates 
are achieved, low intrusion alerting probabilities can generate a false sense of 
security in the network support staff. This can occur, for example, when 
previously unseen intrusions are present and the lack of alerts may result in the 
support staff believing that the network is secure. 
This last point is important and reveals a significant limitation of current NIS.  
The assumption that a NIS is correctly asserting the status of a network or 
network device as in one of two states, that is intrusion-free or not intrusion-
free, is flawed. The measurements taken by a NIS to make this assertion are 
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generally not capable of confirming which state a network is actually in, without 
further assumptions.  
For example, consider a simple signature-matching NIS, such as SNORT. A 
frame is captured from the network (measured) and checked against the known 
signatures of intrusion-like frames. If the frame is not in the set of known 
intrusions the NIS does nothing, awaiting the next frame to check. However, if 
the frame is in the set of known intrusions an alert is issued. The presence of a 
frame that does not show intrusion characteristics cannot be used to assert that 
the network is free of intruders. It is supporting evidence for this assertion, but 
it is not sufficient. An intruder could be using new, previously unseen 
techniques to compromise the security of the network. The combinations of 
alert or no alert, along with the presence or absence of evidence of hacking can 
be seen in Table 4.1. Only one condition is capable of correctly asserting the 
security status of the network, which is the correct processing of an intrusion-
like frame to declare an alert. 
 
Table 4-1 The Assertion Matrix 
Consider further the “Correct Assertion” entry in this table. Equation 4-2 shows 
that even when an intrusion-like frame is present and the NIS outputs an alert, 
it does not necessarily mean that an intrusion is present in the network.  
Absent Present
No Alert
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This limitation reveals more concerns regarding the operation of NIS, when 
combined with the work of Axelsson (Axelsson 1999a). He realised that 
intrusion-like behaviour is rare compared with non-intrusion-like behaviour, 
suggesting a ratio of 1:50,000 for audit records. For frames within a correctly 
configured and secured network, using a defence-in-depth strategy, this ratio 
could be significantly larger. However, using this ratio a NIS will spend 
99.998% of the time processing frames that are either not capable of asserting 
the security status of the network, or will make the wrong assertion of its 
security status.  In this respect, such a NIS could be considered to be only 
0.002% efficient. 
The efficiency of a NIS is important when the practical problems of 
discriminating intrusion from non-intrusion measurements are considered. 
Signature-matching NIS are able to complete their classification of frames 
quickly, often in real-time. However when more sophisticated and processor 
intensive techniques are deployed, such as support vector machines, the 
inefficiency in the NIS approach can result in substantial increases in the size 
and cost of the hardware necessary for real-time operation.  This will continue 
to be a problem as the bandwidths increase beyond the 1GB/s networks that 
are currently widely deployed.  
Additional problem areas for passive NIS include (Allen, Christie et al. 1999; 
Bace and Mell 2001): 
 Low-observable intrusion events – A number of intrusion methods are 
difficult to detect from their network signatures alone. Indeed, the 
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measurement capability of passive NIS does not guarantee that all 
network properties can be observed, as described by Monticelli 
(Monticelli and Wu 1985). A particularly difficult problem is the remote 
detection of packet sniffers using passive sensing alone. Packet sniffers 
have only a small effect on the network, due to their passive operation. 
Very high sensitivity discrimination techniques are required to classify 
correctly the NIS measurements for detection of packet sniffers; 
 The speed and volume of data on the network – As businesses deploy 
new services onto their networks the difficulties of passive detection 
become exacerbated. Data intensive applications, such as video 
streaming or VoIP, will require NIS hardware capable of dealing with the 
increased data rates. NIS efficiency will worsen as the intrusion-like 
frames become further diluted within the large number of frames from 
such applications;     
 Separation of data into individual attack streams when multiple intrusions 
are in progress. This requires discrimination techniques with high 
selectivity; 
 Initialisation of the intrusion system when first deployed in an 
operational network. When a NIS is first deployed there is likely to be 
many alerts indicated, causing issues of confidence in the NIS with staff 
responsible for its maintenance. These alerts are often due to miss-
configuration of network devices, applications using non-standard 
communications techniques and even non-optimal setup of the NIS itself. 
Although support staff soon learn to recognise the characteristic alerts in 
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their network that result from these mechanisms, a determined intruder 
could use these same mechanisms to penetrate further into the network, 
hiding their activities within perceived normal NIS behaviour; 
 Detection of a network interface card (NIC) in promiscuous mode. Many 
techniques have been identified that are capable of asserting that a NIC 
is in promiscuous mode by sending special frames (Verwoerd 1999), 
however detection from passive sensing of network frames alone is 
problematic; 
 Low bandwidth attacks, where a conventional passive NIS could have 
difficulty in maintaining sufficient state information when the attack 
occurs slowly, over many days or weeks; and 
 Encrypted attacks, in which the intruder encrypts communications, 
making the extraction of information via passive sensing particularly 
difficult or almost impossible. Inspection within the payload of an 
encrypted frame cannot be achieved without access to the encryption 
keys. 
The preceding discussion shows that confidently determining whether a 
network is under attack can be difficult with a passive NIS just sensing the 
frames on a network segment.  In contrast, active probing deliberately allows 
the intrusion system to create and transmit special frames over the monitored 
network, to gain additional information other than that available from passive 
network sensing. This is discussed further in Appendix D. 
4.6. NIS Performance Metrics 
In order to develop a deeper understanding of the performance of NISs the 
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remainder of this thesis will concentrate on performance in terms of sensitivity 
and selectivity only.  
4.6.1. The Problem of Defining Performance 
It is not a simple problem to quantify the performance of a NIS. Consider the 
following example. An intruder launches a network attack on an organisation. 
The attack consists of         frames directed at a single network server. A NIS 
alerted to        frames in the attack, that is multiple signatures were triggered 
during the attack, where 
                  
Equation 4-4 Number of Frames in an Attack 
What is the probability of detection     that should be ascribed to the NIS for 
the given attack? One answer might be        as the attack was detected by 
the NIS. This is a connection-based view of detection, where the detection of 
an intrusion frame within any of the connection frames classifies the connection 
as malicious. Alerting against multiple intrusion frames within a single 
connection is not significant for detection, but could improve attack recognition 
or identification.   
Correlation of the source and destination addresses could allow the other 
frames in the attack to be identified in subsequent analysis, if full network 
recording is available (not usually so).  Alternatively network recording could 
have been triggered after the first alert, on the specific source and destination 
pair of addresses, to allow analysis of frames after the first detection that has 
occurred. Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) techniques can also be initiated to 
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prevent further attacks from the same source.   
A deeper assessment however, shows this approach to be unsatisfactory. If an 
alert occurred late in the attack, the post-intrusion damage assessment would 
be seriously compromised if full network recording was unavailable. Also late 
detection limits the ability of a NIS to halt the damage caused by an attack. IPS 
techniques may well stop further intruder activity between the source and 
destination addresses, but if the attacker has already achieved most of their 
goals this limitation may not have a significant impact on the attacker. 
Detections late in a connection are to be expected when malicious payloads are 
delivered with the intent of causing damage rather than stealing information. 
This is a limitation of the connection-based view of detection. 
An alternative approach to quantifying performance might use the fact that not 
all of the intrusion frames have been detected, that is: 
   
      
       
 
Equation 4-5 Detection Probability - Frame-Based View 
This approach can be considered to be a frame-based performance measure. It 
is complicated by determining whether or not specific frames were intended as 
malicious. For example, consider an authorised user logging onto an FTP 
server, deliberately uploading a malicious payload and then logging off the 
server. The whole exchange may be over in a small number of frames. The log-
on and log-off frames are not malicious as the user is authorised. The upload 
may use several frames with only one containing malicious data. In this 
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example it would become difficult to decide which frames should be considered 
part of the attack. The logon, although by an authorised user was for malicious 
intent. The frames that did not contain the malicious part of the payload were 
nevertheless necessary to the attack.  
The moment there is a violation of network policy an intrusion event has 
occurred. The frames involved in the attack prior to the policy violation are of 
no consequence therefore the simplest definition of    has been adopted for 
the remainder of this thesis.  
4.6.2. Sensitivity 
Sensitivity represents the ability of a NIS to alert when a specific attack is 
underway. Its selection as a performance measure was motivated by radio 
systems, where the noise in a receiver and the environment can limit the 
reception of a signal. At its simplest level, when the background hiss within the 
radio exceeds the amplitude of signal being received, it can be difficult to 
perceive the signal.  
The same concept applies in computer networks, where the presence of frames 
can mask or overwhelm an intrusion system. A simple example of this is 
alerting on PING. This can be very effective if the network being monitored 
does not use PING, but ineffective when swamped by the “noise” of normal 
application-generated or support personal use of PING.   
4.6.2.1. Definition of Sensitivity 
In detection theory, see for example (Van Trees 2001), the ability of an 
algorithm to detect the presence of a specific event is cast in terms of two 
conditional probability density functions that relate to the output from the 
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algorithm. The first is the probability density function for achieving a given 
output,   on condition that a valid event, that is an intrusion, is not present, 
given by    |         ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ . The second probability density function is predicated 
on the condition that an intrusion is present, given by    |          . Within 
many detection systems there is an explicit threshold,  , which can be applied to 
make the intrusion/no intrusion decision. Under these circumstances and for 
continuous decision processes in one dimension:  
   ∫    |             
 
 
 
    ∫    |         ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
 
 
    
Equation 4-6 Definition of    and     
Where    is the probability of declaring that an intrusion is present, on 
condition that an intrusion is actually present and     is the probability of 
declaring an intrusion to be present when an intrusion is not present. 
It is common to represent the probability density functions as Gaussian with 
standard deviation   and to represent the conditionality as a difference in the 
mean,  . Under these circumstances the equations for    and     become: 
   
 
 √  
∫  
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∫  
   
   
 
 
   
Equation 4-7     and      for Signals in Gaussian Noise 
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These equations are combined and shown graphically in Figure 4-2. This figure 
offers a geometric interpretation of detection in terms of the parameters of 
Equation 4-7. The blue curve shows the probability density function when an 
intrusion is present whilst the red curve shows it when no intrusion is present. 
For fixed   and   the effect of varying the threshold t can be seen. When t 
increases both    and     decrease, with    decreasing more rapidly than    . 
 
Figure 4-2 Graphical Interpretation of    and     
There is no value of the threshold, t, that separates out the two conditional 
probability density functions, unless the conditionality parameter,  , is made 
arbitrarily large. Indeed the separation of the two conditional probability density 
functions as a ratio of the width of each density function expresses the degree 
x0
                         
 
 
t
Pfa
Pd
Chapter 4 Systems Considerations                                     
 
 115 
of difficulty of detection as a single number. This is the method used in other 
engineering disciplines to express detection sensitivity, as shown in Equation 4-
8 where SNR stands for signal-to-noise ratio measured in decibels (dB): 
           
 
 
 ) 
Equation 4-8 Definition of Detection Sensitivity 
4.6.2.2. Interpretation of Sensitivity 
Equation 4-8 defines the detection performance of a NIS in terms of a single 
parameter, the SNR. Previous measures have required the specification of four 
parameters namely the false negative, false positive, true negative and true 
positive rates. With four parameters it is difficult to compare directly differing 
implementations whilst the use of SNR simplifies comparison; higher values of 
SNR indicating better detection performance.  
In applying Equation 4-8 to network intrusion systems three problems are 
immediately obvious, that are addressed in the following discussion: 
 Conditional probability density functions may not be Gaussian; 
 There is no explicit threshold present in a signature-based NIS; and 
   and   are not normally measured in the evaluation of a NIS. 
It is unlikely that the conditional probability density functions will be Gaussian. 
Although arguments based on the central limit theorem could be applied to 
imply that they may be Gaussian-like it is better to view the Gaussian 
assumption as a further parameterisation of the detection model. Alternative 
parameterisations are possible, for example using a Poisson probability density 
function. It is also possible to apply this method without knowing the exact 
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form of the conditional probability density function. The Tchebycheff inequality 
(Papoulis 1991) can be used to set limits on the detection performance based 
on   and   measurements irrespective of the form of the probability density 
functions. Therefore the effect of a deviation from a Gaussian probability 
density function could be assessed, in terms of the minimum detection 
performance implied by the Tchebycheff inequality.  
Although there is no specific threshold within signature-based NIS there is an 
implied threshold setting in the selection of the individual signatures. Consider 
for example the case when there is just a single signature which is designed to 
trigger on all possible frames. This is equivalent to setting the threshold, t, at -
∞ as both the detection and false alarm probabilities would be 1.0. If the single 
signature was set to trigger only on improbable frames, such as a frame of only 
one bit, then this would be equivalent to setting the threshold, t, at +∞ as both 
the detection and false alarm probabilities would be 0.0. The selection of a 
given set of real signatures moves the implied setting of the threshold between 
these extreme values.  
More subtly the set of signatures in combination with the network security 
policy controls the SNR for a given NIS. This can be seen by considering limiting 
cases of network security policies. If the policy consisted of a single 
requirement not to use PING within the network then signatures could easily be 
constructed to trigger only on PING and on every instance. Thus, the    would 
be 1.0 and the     would be 0.0, implying a large SNR for the NIS for attacks 
using PING. If however the network security policy had a single requirement 
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that passive network sensing, that is packet sniffing, must not be used, it is 
much more difficult to design signatures to achieve this requirement. Although 
techniques for the detection of network interface cards in promiscuous mode do 
exist, achieving this at high SNR is difficult. Missed instances of passive 
detection are likely (    < 1.0) and false alarms are likely to occur (   > 0.0). It 
can be seen therefore that if the security policy clause is difficult to measure 
with signatures, then that intrusion system will have a low SNR for the 
corresponding attack method.  
Although   and   are not normally measured in the evaluation of a NIS their 
ratio can be determined from measurements of    and    . This can be 
undertaken using the following algorithm: 
1. Set the value of   to one and determine what threshold setting, t 
produces the measured     ; 
2. With   set to zero and   to one calculate the value of the threshold 
setting t that produces the measured    ; and 
3. Determine what value   must be set to align the thresholds from the first 
two stages. This is the required ratio to be applied in Equation 4-8. 
The required absolute value of sensitivity can be interpreted by considering 
typical network and intrusion statistics. From the data presented in Appendix A 
for the DARPA 1999 dataset it can be seen that typically, in the network 
modelled in the DARPA simulation, there were 5x104 connections per day. 
Given that a reasonable goal might be one false alarm per attack type per day, 
this would imply a value of     of 2x10
-5. A high probability of detection is 
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desirable (say       ) in which case the required sensitivity would need to be 
14.6dB. Higher values of sensitivity would be required if the desire was to 
increase    or decrease    , as shown in Figure 4-3.  
The curves shown in Figure 4-3 were created using a program written in the 
Mathcad environment rather than using the polynomial relationships for 
calculating the area under a Gaussian curve (Abramowitz and Stegun 1964). 
From Figure 4-3 it can be seen that sensitivities greater than 12dB are required 
for confident detection to occur. Higher values are necessary when the volume 
of network traffic is greater or when a lower     is required. 
 
Figure 4-3 Relationship Between     and SNR 
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4.6.3. Selectivity 
The use of selectivity as a NIS performance measure was also motivated by its 
use in radio systems. In such systems, selectivity measures the ability of a 
receiver to separate adjacent radio channels into distinct signals and not merge 
them into a single unintelligible one. This is important when the separation of 
radio channels is small.  
Similarly, in NIS selectivity is concerned with the separation of individual attack 
types. When the number of attacks types is small, equivalent to large channel 
separation in the radio analogy, distinguishing different attack types may be 
straight forward. However when the number of attack types is large, this can 
become more difficult. Selectivity in NIS is concerned with the accurate 
determination that a given attack type is underway, whilst sensitivity is 
concerned with determining, in general, that an attack is underway.   
4.6.3.1. Definition of Selectivity 
Sensitivity is concerned with the detectability of intrusions of interest within the 
totality of frames present on a network segment. This single measure is useful 
in quantifying the performance of a NIS in terms of its detection and false alarm 
statistics. To undertake functions other than detection, such as recognition and 
identification as discussed in Chapter 3, achieving high sensitivity alone is 
insufficient. In these cases it is essential to be able to distinguish between 
different types of attack accurately, so that the correct inferences can be made. 
This is known as selectivity and it is shown diagrammatically in Figure 4-4 using 
a pattern recognition paradigm. In this figure clusters for intrusion and non-
intrusions are shown plotted on a simplified two-parameter feature space.  
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Figure 4-4 Geometric Interpretation of Sensitivity and Selectivity 
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In the sensitivity column the clusters for different intrusion types are grouped 
into a single cluster and the difference between low and high sensitivity can be 
easily seen. In low sensitivity cases the overlap between intrusion and non-
intrusion parameters (analogous to    and    in Equation 4-2) is high, making 
the correct assertion between intrusion and non-intrusion difficult. 
In the column that illustrates selectivity the clusters for different intrusion 
attacks (events) are shown separately. In conditions of low selectivity there is 
significant overlap between the individual intrusion clusters making it difficult to 
confidently assign an event to a specific intrusion attack type. Under conditions 
of high selectivity it is possible easily to distinguish individual intrusion types. Of 
particular interest is the “typical situation” graph which shows overlap between 
some intrusion event types and the non-intrusion events cluster. 
In order to develop the measurement of selectivity further it is necessary to 
consider the set of intrusion event types that need to be discriminated. There 
are a number of possible sets that could be used: 
 Attack types, in which the set members constitute different attack 
vectors into a network. Clearly distinguishing between set members 
would identify likely countermeasures; 
 Network Policy Requirements, in which each set member is a single or 
group of requirements. Using this approach compliance issues, as 
discussed in section 4.2 can be assessed directly; and 
 Standardised event types, which would allow direct comparison or 
benchmarking of different NIS. 
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Any one of these three types could be used, depending on the application. 
The most convenient way of visualising selectivity is as a matrix with the 
horizontal and vertical axes consisting of the set of intrusion event types to be 
discriminated. There are a number of different calculations that can be used to 
quantify the individual entries in the matrix including those based on: 
 Confusion matrix values (Provost and Kohavi 1998), in which the number 
of times the predicted and actual intrusion event types coincide;  
 Covariance values (Papoulis 1991), in which the joint probability density 
function between pairs of intrusion event types is evaluated; and 
 Distance values (Duda, Hart et al. 2001), in which each entry quantifies 
the separation between the two pairs of intrusion events in some 
parameter space. 
In anticipation of the use of the DARPA 1999 dataset for experimental 
evaluation the distance values approach was selected along with the individual 
DARPA attack types as the set of intrusion events. The DARPA dataset allows a 
probability of a given signature being triggered during specific attacks to be 
determined from their extensive truth data. Therefore a distance measure 
based in N-dimensional probability space is proposed as follows. 
Each intrusion event type (DARPA attack type) has a vector associated with it, 
the elements of which represent the probability that a given signature will 
trigger during an attack of that type. Consequently the parameter space is an 
N-dimensional unity hypercube, where N is the number of signatures used by 
the NIS, with each intrusion event type represented as a point in this space.  
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The distance        between two event types A1 and A2 in this space is 
given the following equation in which        is the probability that the i
th 
signature is triggered during an attack of type A1: 
          √∑                 
   
   
 
Equation 4-9 Calculation of Selectivity Metric between Two Event Types 
This is just the Euclidean distance metric in N-dimensional space. Using 
Equation 4-9,           defines selectivity of the two attack types    and   . 
4.6.3.2. Interpretation of Selectivity 
The larger the distance          the easier it is to discriminate the two event 
types    and   . As an example consider the following two limiting cases when 
N is set to 4.  
In the first case the signatures that are triggered do not overlap, that is, 
different signatures are triggered for the two different event types. This can be 
achieved, for example, by letting XA1={1,1,0,0} and XA2={0,0,1,1}. Under these 
conditions           has a value of 2. This represents the perfect 
discrimination between these two event types. 
In the second case the signatures that are triggered overlap perfectly, that is, 
the same signatures are triggered for both event types, with the same 
probability level. This can be achieved, for example, by letting XA1={1,1,1,1} 
and XA2={1,1,1,1}. Under these conditions          has a value of 0. This 
represents indistinguishable events. 
The theoretical maximum value of   is √ . However, there are only (N-1) pairs 
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of intrusion event types that can simultaneously take on the maximum value. 
As there are        ⁄  pairs of significance in the selectivity matrix it can be 
seen that when individual pairs take on the maximum theoretical value it is at 
the expense of selectivity for other pairs of intrusion event types. 
Consider the following situation in which there are 100 signatures and 10 
different intrusion event types. If one of the event types has a probability 
vector whose elements are all unity and all the other vectors have elements of 
zero, then this event type will have the maximum selectivity of 10 with all the 
other event types. However, the selectivity between the other event types will 
be zero and no discrimination between them can occur.  
A better approach is to consider the selection of signatures such that the 
probability vector of each intrusion event type has an equal share of non-
overlapping unity values with the vectors of other intrusion event types. That is, 
each vector has   ⁄  unity values, where M is the number of intrusion event 
types. In the example above each vector would ideally have 10 elements in 
their probability vector with a value of unity. Under these conditions the 
maximum selectivity is √   and this maximum is achievable by all significant 
pairs in the selectivity matrix.  
Thus rather than the theoretical maximum of √  it is better to consider the 
maximum to be √  ⁄ , on the assumption that the discrimination of all pairs of 
significant intrusion event types are equally important. When this assumption is 
not valid the number of unity values in the probability matrix for high priority 
pairs can be increased, to improve selectivity still further. 
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Finally, in the preceding discussion the emphasis has been on the unity 
elements of the probability vector for each intrusion event type. This has been 
done to illustrate the limiting cases and hence the theoretical maximum values 
of selectivity. In real situations the vectors will contain the full range of 
probability values, but the goal remains to maximise selectivity and this is best 
achieved with unity values, that is, signatures should be designed always to 
trigger when specific intrusion event types occur.   
4.7. Metrics for High Level Definitions of Intrusion 
The discussion so far has concentrated on the definition of metrics for the 
“detection” aspect of the taxonomy presented in Chapter 3. It is possible to 
consider calculating probabilities for recognition (  ), identification (  ) and 
confirmation (  ).  
Sensitivity addresses detection directly whilst selectivity is more concerned with 
the discrimination between intrusion event types. Sensitivity can be considered 
as a measure of detection performance, when the number of different attack 
types is small or even unity, that is there is no attempt to detect specific attack 
types. However, when sensitivity is applied to a large number of individual 
attack types, as in the previous discussion, it is more like a performance 
measure for recognition or identification performance rather than purely 
detection. Thus sensitivity can apply at higher levels of intrusion functionality 
depending on the selected attack types. 
Clearly, good sensitivity and selectively are a pre-cursor to achieving confident 
recognition, identification and confirmation. However as algorithms for 
achieving these goals have not been defined, performance metrics for them will 
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not be considered further, with the remainder of this thesis concentrating on 
sensitivity and selectivity without differentiating their application for detection, 
recognition or identification. 
4.8. Conclusions 
This chapter has addressed the systems considerations of the operation of a 
Network Intrusion System (NIS). It started with the development of a 
mathematical view of NIS operation from the perspective of simple set theory. 
Currently there is no complete mathematical view of NIS however this chapter 
has been able to define the properties of an ideal system, in terms of the type 
of frames present on a network segment. The fundamental problem of 
signature-based NIS is that some frames can be both intrusion-like and non-
intrusion-like simultaneously, making the perfect signature-based NIS 
unachievable. 
Despite this limitation, the properties of an ideal NIS have been discussed after 
the reasons for deployment were described. From this a functional model of an 
ideal NIS was developed and current challenges to real systems defined.  
Two performance measurements have been identified in terms of a detection 
model in which intrusion and non-intrusion statistics are parameterised as 
Gaussian distributions with differing means. These are called as sensitivity and 
selectivity. The options for alternative parameterisations have been discussed 
and the potential for lower performance levels described. 
Sensitivity defines the performance of an NIS in terms of its ability to alert only 
when a valid intrusion event is present. To achieve good performance 
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sensitivities in excess of 12dB are required, depending on the network data 
rate, required detection probability and acceptable false alarm rate. The use of 
selectivity applies to detection, recognition and identification performance, 
depending on the attack types selected for the measurement. 
Selectivity defines the ability of a NIS to discriminate between different 
intrusion event types. It is defined as a distance function between points in a 
parameter space. The parameter space is spanned by vectors whose elements 
represent the probability that a specific signature would be triggered, for a 
given attack type. Theoretical performance properties of selectivity have been 
derived and the implications for the assignment of signatures to individual 
clauses of the system security policy have been discussed. 
In the following chapter the practical application of sensitivity and selectivity 
will be described. 
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5. Experimental Evaluation 
This chapter describes an experimental evaluation of the performance of a 
modern signature-based NIS, in terms of the two performance metrics 
described in the previous chapter. It begins with a discussion of the objectives 
of the evaluation. Then a description of the experimental configuration is 
provided, followed by a detailed rational for each of the elements of the 
configuration. The measured performance of the NIS is then described in detail, 
first in terms of more conventional metrics and finally in terms of sensitivity and 
selectivity. 
5.1. Objectives of the Experimental Programme 
The objectives of the experimental stage of this research were to: 
 Provide quantitative performance data on a modern NIS that can be 
used to highlight areas where improvements are necessary and can be 
undertaken; and 
 Demonstrate the use and value of sensitivity and selectivity in 
quantifying performance. 
It is important to realise that it is not an objective to optimise the performance 
of the selected NIS. Therefore, although areas of improvement are identified 
where relevant, the reported performance is not the best that could have been 
achieved using conventional techniques. No tuning of the NIS has been 
undertaken beyond identifying the local network segments. Specifically, the 
standard default set of signatures was deployed in full without any attempt to 
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remove signatures with high false alarm performance or add ones to detect 
missed intrusions. 
5.2. Overview of the Experimental Configuration 
SNORT was selected as the NIS principally due to its maturity. It has been in 
continual development for over 14 years and during this time has become the 
core detection engine of many commercial intrusion systems (Sourcefire 2012). 
There is considerable published material on its performance, optimisation and 
deployment. Finally, as an Open Source project it is freely available in source 
code and binary form, allowing modification if required. 
A key feature of SNORT is its ability to process previously recorded network 
frames as well as live frames arriving at a selected network interface card. The 
use of recorded frames has many distinct advantages over live data for the 
current research including: 
 Repeatability – The measured performance can be confirmed by other 
researchers; 
 Explanation – Unexpected results can be further analysed by examining 
the recorded frames with tools such as WIRESHARK (Wireshark 
Foundation 2012); and 
 Automation of Results Analysis – With a pre-recorded sequence of 
network frames it is possible to label specific attacks and therefore 
automate the collection of performance statistics. 
With these advantages in mind the configuration shown in Figure 5-1 was used 
to gather the results reported in this chapter. As can be seen in this figure, 
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SNORT uses a set of intrusion signatures and a configuration file to process the 
recorded network frames. The output from SNORT is written to file and 
processed offline to extract alerts, which are then compared with a table of 
truth data containing details on all the real intrusions within the set of recorded 
network frames. A statistical analysis of the results is then performed from 
which the performance of the NIS is determined. 
SNORT
SNORT Signatures
Performance 
Analysis
Intrusion Truth Data
Recorded 
Network Frames
NIS Performance
SNORT 
Configuration File
 
Figure 5-1 Experimental Configuration 
5.3. Experimental Setup 
5.3.1. Database Selection 
There are a number of options available for the database of frames to use with 
SNORT, as described previously in section 2.6.3. The DARPA 1998-2000 series 
is of interest as they have been used extensively by other researchers and 
therefore there is a lot of results which could be contrasted. Also the large 
TCPDUMP datasets available at CAIDA, RIPE and the WITS project are of 
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relevance due to the quantity of data and their more modern protocols. 
However, the DARPA 1999 database was selected, for the following reasons: 
 Volume of data – Five weeks of frame data are available covering at 
least 12 hours each day of a simulated network, totalling over 22GB of 
data;  
 Controlled Environment – As the network traffic is simulated, rather than 
recorded from a live network, the presence of specific protocols and 
events is deliberate, rather than accidental. Specifically, two of the five 
weeks contained no intrusion events, which is particularly useful in 
determining false positive performance of a NIS. Specific attacks have 
been introduced at defined instances during weeks 2, 4 and 5; and 
 Research Corpus- There is a considerable body of research published 
using the DARPA 1999 data allowing the comparison of the techniques 
developed here with that of other researchers. 
Although there are compelling reasons to select the DARPA 1999 dataset there 
are limitations of this data which restrict the conclusions that can be drawn 
from its use. These were documented in section 2.6.3.2. However, despite 
these limitations, the lack of modern protocols such as peer-to-peer, VoIP and 
IM, and the predominance of Unix attacks this database is sufficient to illustrate 
the use of sensitivity and selectivity as performance metrics. 
The DARPA 1999 dataset contains, amongst other things, TCPDUMP files from 
the inside of the network, that is, inside the simulated network gateway, as well 
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as separately from outside the gateway. As this increased the volume of data as 
well as allowing external attacks directed at the network servers to be detected, 
it was initially intended that both the inside and outside datasets would be 
used.  However during the initial usage of the DARPA data as part of this 
research it was discovered that the inside and outside data capture machines 
were not time-synchronised. Figure 5-2 shows the difference between 
timestamps on identical frames within the inside and outside datasets. These 
offsets were measured at the beginning of each day of simulation, and do not 
represent the drift during the day (see Appendix A for a description of the x-
axis nomenclature). Appendix B describes the process used to determine the 
time offset and provides quantitative data on the intra-day clock drift. 
 
Figure 5-2 Time Synchronisation Error in DARPA 1999 
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Figure 5-2 shows that time offsets as large as 46 seconds could exist between 
these two datasets. In order to overcome this problem it would have been 
necessary to create two sets of truth data, as some of the attacks had durations 
shorter than the time offsets. Rather than add this additional complexity to the 
experimental work it was decided to limit the assessment of performance to 
that achieved against the DARPA TCPDUMP data taken inside the network only. 
5.3.2. Intrusion Truth Data 
The DARPA 1999 dataset includes a set of intrusion truth data from which 
correct intrusion alerting could be determined. There are two types of truth 
data, one each for the training and testing datasets.  
5.3.2.1. Training Dataset Truth Data 
During Week 2 of the DARPA 1999 simulation 43 deliberate intrusion events 
were included. It was intended that this data, along with the intrusion event 
free weeks 1 and 3, would be used as training data for intrusion systems that 
required it.   
The truth data for this week consists of the date and time of the start of the 
attack, the DNS name of the target of the attack and the type of attack, 
including a description of the way the attack was implemented. The IPv4 
address of the source of the attack and the attack duration were not recorded.  
The lack of information on the attack duration is a serious limitation of this 
data. The matching of intrusion alerts with attacks requires accurate time and 
duration of these events, however no additional data other than that published 
on the Lincoln Labs website was available (Lippmann 2008). Some researchers 
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have assumed that the duration of the attacks was one second (Mahoney 
2012).  
During this research the original DARPA truth data was supplemented with 
measurements taken using WIRESHARK (see Appendix C). Of the 43 attacks 
during week 2 evidence for six of them could not be located from inspection of 
the recorded network frames and were therefore excluded from this research. A 
histogram of the attack durations for those that could be detected is shown in 
Figure 5-3. As can be seen the one second assumption is inaccurate with 13 
attacks having durations of over 200 seconds. 
 
Figure 5-3 Histogram of Attack Durations for Week 2 of DARPA 1999 
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5.3.2.2. Testing Dataset Truth Data 
The testing truth data was more comprehensive than the training dataset truth. 
Table 5.1 shows the parameters recorded for each attack, along with a 
description of their interpretation. As the DARPA data was collated for 
evaluation of both host-based and network intrusion systems, an additional 
column is shown to indicate if the truth data parameter applies to NIS 
evaluation. Despite this comprehensive list of data, the IPv4 address of the 
source of the attack was not recorded. 
Parameter Description For NIS 
IDum Identity number for a given attack instance. Yes 
Date Date of the attack. Yes 
StartTime Start of the attack. Yes 
Duration Duration of the attack. Yes 
Destination IPv4 address of the victim of the attack. Yes 
Attackname The common name of the attack type. Yes 
Insider Indicating if the attack originated from a host inside 
or outside the DARPA network. 
Yes 
Man Indicating if the attack was manually initiated at a 
console or automated through a script. 
Yes 
Console Indicating if the attack was carried out on the 
console of the target machine or undertaken 
remotely. 
Yes 
Success Indicating if the attack was successful or not. Yes 
aDump Indicating if there was a host dump file of the attack. No 
oDump Indicating that there was evidence of the attack in 
the outside TCPDUMP files. 
Yes  
iDump Indicating that there was evidence of the attack in 
the inside TCPDUMP files. 
Yes 
BSM Indicating if there is evidence of the attack in the 
solaris BSM log. 
No 
Syslogs Indicating if there is evidence of the attack in the 
system logs.  
No 
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Parameter Description For NIS 
FSListing Indicating if there is evidence of the attack in the file 
system data. 
No 
Stealthy Indicating if the attack is considered stealthy or not. Yes 
New If the attack was new to the DARPA 1999 evaluation, 
that is, it was not in the DARPA 1998 simulation. 
Yes 
Category Indicating the category of the attack. Yes 
OS Indicating the operating system of the attack victim. Yes 
Table 5-1 Testing Truth Data for DARPA 1999 
5.3.3. SNORT Configuration and Signature Files 
The actions of SNORT are controlled via a configuration file. Appendix E shows 
the configuration file used for all the results published in this thesis. In this 
Appendix, the comments have been deleted to reduce the size of the final text. 
The configuration file was modified from the standard one supplied with 
SNORT, in the following ways: 
 The home network was set to the internal network and server subnet of 
the DARPA dataset (inside); 
 Directory paths were selected to allow SNORT to import signatures and 
additional standard data files from specified locations; 
 The output format for alerts was selected as comma separated variable 
(CSV) with full logging of intrusion data; and 
 All standard intrusion signatures were enabled. 
It is usual for SNORT to undergo an optimisation process when first deployed 
within a network, by selecting and enabling a subset of the available intrusion 
signatures. The aim of this optimisation is to eliminate non-intrusion alerts that 
can arise from normal network activity, rather than from intruder activity. This 
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was not undertaken for the experimental work reported here so that the raw 
performance of SNORT could be determined. Also the elimination of common 
alert types on a network is an unsatisfactory approach to poor false alarm 
performance as it opens an attack vector for an intruder.  
Table 5.2 shows the version types for SNORT and the supporting software that 
was used during this experimental programme.  
Software Version 
SNORT 2.8.6 Dated 26th April 2010 
SNORT Rules 2860, Dated 13th May 2010 
LIBPCAP 1.1.1 
PCRE 8.02 
Linux OS Fedora 13 
Table 5-2 Software Versions Used in the Experimental Work 
SNORT, LIBPCAP and PCRE were downloaded as source from their primary 
websites and compiled to run on the Linux workstation on which all the 
experimental work was undertaken. 
5.3.4. Truth Data and Performance Analysis 
Shell scripts were written to automate the running of SNORT against each of 
the inside TCPDUMP files, extracting the results from each and collating them 
into single files for the whole of the five weeks of simulated data.  Three 
consolidated sets of results were produced covering: 
 A count of the number of each signature type that was triggered; 
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 A summary of the number of frames and sessions processed, along with 
the number of signatures triggered for each of the DARPA data files 
(simulation days); and 
 A single file combining all the data associated with every signature 
triggered, including time, source and destination IPv4 addresses and 
ports used, in CSV format.  
The next stage was to match each alert produced by SNORT against an event 
in the truth table, labelling the detection as a true or false positive, depending 
on whether or not a match occurred. At first the solution to this problem 
seemed straight forward. All that was necessary was to create a program to 
check the dates and times of alerts, as well as target IP address, network 
protocol and target port against the published truth data.  
A PERL script was created to achieve this goal but the number of matched 
detections was unexpectedly low. The truth table events did not match many 
with the signatures that had been triggered. The matching criteria were 
reduced to date, time and target IP address, but the number of alerts matching 
events in the truth data was still low. The PERL script was further modified to 
allow a fuzzy match for the time of the event, as all other parameters in the 
matching algorithm were precise. The low number of matches persisted.  
In an attempt to confirm that the poor performance was real the individual 
TCPDUMP files were examined frame by frame using WIRESHARK, for evidence 
of individual attacks. This was a major task as can be seen from the summary 
data presented in Appendix A. The inside dataset consists of over 50 million 
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frames across 26 files, with many of the files too large to be loaded into 
WIRESHARK.  
In order to address these problems, WIRESHARK filters were developed to 
extract relevant frames from the TCPDUMP files, which were relevant to specific 
attacks. The use of WIRESHARK in this way is described in Appendix C, along 
with the definition of the filters necessary to highlight one specific attack, 
namely NTinfoscan. This approach reduced the number of frames viewed within 
the WIRESHARK frame window, simplifying the process of visually identifying 
the frames within an intrusion event. One outcome from this process was the 
revelation of the time synchronisation problem shown in Figure 5-2. 
This process identified a number of differences between the official truth data 
and that revealed by the examination of the individual attack frames. The most 
significant difference concerned the start time and duration of each attack. 
Many of these were incorrectly recorded in the original truth data, with errors 
exceeding the duration of many attacks. A new truth table was produced using 
the WIRESHARK analysis, combining the attacks in the training and testing 
datasets. This table differed from the original truth data in a number of ways: 
 All events are now recorded in UTC. The original truth data recorded 
events in EST and was further complicated by two changes to daylight 
saving time during the five weeks of simulated network activity. The UK 
changed to BST on 28th March affecting events in weeks 4 and 5, whilst 
the US changed on 4th April, affecting only week 5.  As SNORT processes 
individual frames it converts the TCPDUMP timestamp stored with each 
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frame to the local time standard by default. SNORT detection events are 
then recorded in the local time standard which can include the effects of 
the change to daylight saving time on the computer on which it is 
running. As time was used to correlate alerts with the truth data it was 
necessary to take steps to avoid the potential for timing errors due to the 
one or two hour time slips. SNORT was forced to record all events in 
UTC via a command line option and the truth data was presented in the 
same time system; and 
 A complete set of data was not always present in the original truth data, 
as described in section 5.3.2 for Week 2. The enhanced truth dataset 
was supplemented with missing data, such as the source IPv4 address of 
the attacker and attack duration. 
Although the move to UTC was compelling and simplified the matching process 
it did introduce an additional complication that each day in the original DARPA 
simulation is now spread across two days. Therefore date and time of intrusion 
events were now required to match with the appropriate truth data entries.  
Figure 5-4 shows an analysis of this final truth data showing the distribution of 
attack durations. It can be seen that although the majority of attacks are over 
in less than one minute, nearly 10% of attacks last more than 20 minutes.  
With the truth data and the SNORT alerts both recorded in UTC, the alerts can 
be split into those that match attacks, that is true positives, and those that do 
not. Although scripts had been created originally to automate the matching 
process, as described above, the final split was made manually. This unusual 
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step was taken as the split was to be undertaken once and the time taken was 
shorter than the time to finalise and test the scripts using the new truth data. 
As correct classification of alerts is key to this research, a manual assignment 
removed any uncertainty in this process. In view of the difficulties that had 
been experienced with automating scripts this seemed the most prudent 
approach. 
 
Figure 5-4 The Duration of Attacks in DARPA 1999 
5.4. Results 
5.4.1. Alert Statistics 
Using the configuration file shown in Appendix E SNORT was run against the 
DARPA 1999 TCPDUMP files that were collected from inside the simulated 
network. In all five weeks, 67,384 alerts were produced as shown in Table 5.3 
below. 
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Week No of Alerts Intrusions Present 
1     9404 No 
2     25138 Yes 
3     12248 No 
4     8518 Yes 
5     12076 Yes 
Table 5-3 SNORT Intrusions Detected 
The results from Weeks 1 and 3 can be used to estimate the false positive rate 
for SNORT processing the DARPA 1999 dataset, as shown in Table 5.4 below, 
using frame statistics derived from Appendix A and those shown in Table 5.5. 
False alarms per frame, per connection and per second are shown as the 
original DARPA 1999 data is simulated and therefore these measures can be 
used to gauge the size of the simulation. 
Week 
False Alarms 
Per Frame (-) 
False Alarms Per 
Connection (-) 
False Alarms Per 
Second (-) 
1 1.19x10-3 3.52x10-2 2.37x10-2 
3 9.56x10-4 3.46x10-2 2.32x10-2 
Average 1.05x10-3 3.48x10-2 2.35x10-2 
Table 5-4 SNORT False Positive Performance 
Table 5.4 highlights the poor performance of SNORT when it is not optimised 
for a given network. On average one in every thousand frames is incorrectly 
declared as an intrusion alert. Given the number of frames per second this 
means a false positive is declared every 42 seconds, or 85 false positives per 
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hour. Performance this poor means that manual assessment of the alerts would 
be impractical and automated post alert assessment would be required. 
 
Week No of Frames 
(-) 
No of Connections 
(-) 
No of Seconds 
(-) 
1 7,887,003 267,141 395,991 
3 12,814,738 354,272 527,024 
Total 20,701,741 621,413 923,015 
Table 5-5 DARPA 1999 Networking Statistics 
5.4.2. False Alarm Assessment 
By matching the alerts with intrusions in the truth data they can be classified as 
a false or true positive.  Table 5.6 shows the total count of each of the SNORT 
signatures that did not match with an intrusion event, across all five weeks of 
the DARPA simulation. This table shows some interesting results. First, as there 
were a total of 67,384 alerts produced, over 73% did not match any intrusion 
event in the DARPA attack simulations. The false positives are dominated by 
ICMP signature events. By removing these signatures from SNORT the number 
of false alarms would reduce from 49,458 to 21,380. However, the IP and port 
sweeps which use ICMP pings would not be detectable.  
Secondly, only 36 different signatures were triggered as false positives. During 
the analysis SNORT was using 3,321 different signatures to search for 
intrusions therefore such a small number of different signatures producing false 
positives is surprising. Across all 67,384 alerts, including the true positives, only 
52 different signatures were triggered.  
At first sight the small number of different signatures might be thought to be 
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due to the age difference between the signatures and the TCPDUMP data. In 
the 11 years between the DARPA simulation and the signatures used by SNORT 
there has been considerable expansion of the number and type of protocols 
used in modern networks. However, other researchers have reported similar 
results processing real data captured from a network in over 40 days in 2008 
(Tjhai, Papadaki et al. 2008). 
SNORT Detection Signature 
Total False 
Alerts 
ICMP Destination Unreachable Port Unreachable 17656 
(ftp_telnet) FTP command parameters were malformed 16328 
ICMP Echo Reply 5088 
ICMP PING 5036 
CHAT IRC message 1655 
TELNET login incorrect 740 
ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing 617 
(spp_ssh) Protocol mismatch 469 
ICMP PING BSDtype 298 
ICMP PING *NIX 298 
(ftp_telnet) Invalid FTP Command 281 
SHELLCODE x86 NOOP 201 
CHAT IRC nick change 193 
CHAT IRC channel join 182 
ICMP Destination Unreachable Host Unreachable 85 
SHELLCODE x86 inc ebx NOOP 81 
SHELLCODE x86 inc ecx NOOP 55 
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SNORT Detection Signature 
Total False 
Alerts 
ICMP Time-To-Live Exceeded in Transit 51 
(ftp_telnet) FTP traffic encrypted 39 
FTP Bad login 27 
WEB-CLIENT Portable Executable binary file transfer 13 
(http_inspect) NON-RFC DEFINED CHAR 12 
WEB-CLIENT Microsoft emf metafile access 11 
(ftp_telnet) Evasive (incomplete) TELNET CMD on FTP 
Command Channel 
9 
FTP PORT bounce attempt 8 
SHELLCODE x86 setuid 0 5 
FTP passwd retrieval attempt 4 
(ftp_telnet) Telnet Subnegotiation Begin Command without 
Subnegotiation  
3 
NETBIOS SMB C$ unicode share access 2 
NETBIOS SMB D$ unicode share access 2 
X11 xopen 2 
(ftp_telnet) Telnet traffic encrypted 2 
NETBIOS SMB ADMIN$ unicode share access 2 
SQL ping attempt 1 
SQL version overflow attempt 1 
WEB-MISC cat%20 access 1 
Grand Total    49,458 
Table 5-6 False Positive Alert Types 
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Table 5.7 shows the complete set of detection signatures, along with the 
number of times the signature created true and false positives. In this context a 
true positive is when a signature was triggered during a valid attack, and with 
the same source and destination IP addresses as in the simulated attack. A 
false positive was declared when an alert was triggered outside the duration of 
a simulated attack, or during an attack with one or other of the source and 
destination IP addresses not corresponding with that used in the simulated 
attack. 
Detection Signature 
No. False 
Alerts 
No. True 
Alerts 
P(correct 
alert) 
P(false 
alert) 
WEB-MISC cat%20 access 1 5 0.833 0.167 
X11 xopen 2 8 0.800 0.200 
ATTACK-RESPONSES directory 
listing 
617 133 0.177 0.823 
SHELLCODE x86 inc ebx NOOP 81 0 0.000 1.000 
SHELLCODE x86 inc ecx NOOP 55 27 0.329 0.671 
SNMP request tcp 0 87 1.000 0.000 
SNMP trap udp 0 3 1.000 0.000 
SNMP trap tcp 0 87 1.000 0.000 
SNMP AgentX/tcp request 0 86 1.000 0.000 
CHAT IRC message 1655 0 0.000 1.000 
WEB-CLIENT Portable Executable 
binary file 
13 0 0.000 1.000 
POLICY potentially executable file 
upload 
0 13 1.000 0.000 
CHAT IRC channel join 182 0 0.000 1.000 
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Detection Signature 
No. False 
Alerts 
No. True 
Alerts 
P(correct 
alert) 
P(false 
alert) 
IMAP login buffer overflow attempt 0 2 1.000 0.000 
SQL ping attempt 1 0 0.000 1.000 
SQL version overflow attempt 1 0 0.000 1.000 
WEB-CLIENT Microsoft emf metafile 
access  
11 0 0.000 1.000 
NETBIOS SMB D$ unicode share 
access 
2 3 0.600 0.400 
NETBIOS SMB C$ unicode share 
access 
2 3 0.600 0.400 
NETBIOS SMB ADMIN$ unicode 
share access 
2 3 0.600 0.400 
FINGER / execution attempt 0 24 1.000 0.000 
FINGER root query 0 4 1.000 0.000 
FINGER redirection attempt 0 4 1.000 0.000 
FINGER 0 query 0 4 1.000 0.000 
FTP .rhosts 0 4 1.000 0.000 
FTP PORT bounce attempt 8 6 0.429 0.571 
FTP passwd retrieval attempt 4 0 0.000 1.000 
FTP satan scan 0 3 1.000 0.000 
ICMP PING *NIX 298 2 0.007 0.993 
ICMP PING BSDtype 298 2 0.007 0.993 
ICMP PING 5036 7076 0.584 0.416 
ICMP Destination Unreachable Host 
Unreachable  
85 0 0.000 1.000 
ICMP Destination Unreachable Port 
Unreachable  
17656 2816 0.138 0.862 
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Detection Signature 
No. False 
Alerts 
No. True 
Alerts 
P(correct 
alert) 
P(false 
alert) 
ICMP Echo Reply 5088 2 0.000 1.000 
ICMP Time-To-Live Exceeded in 
Transit 
51 0 0.000 1.000 
ICMP PING NMAP 0 7000 1.000 0.000 
FTP Bad login 27 80 0.748 0.252 
CHAT IRC nick change 193 0 0.000 1.000 
RPC portmap listing TCP 111 0 199 1.000 0.000 
RSERVICES rlogin login failure 0 1 1.000 0.000 
SHELLCODE x86 NOOP 201 23 0.103 0.897 
SHELLCODE x86 setuid 0 5 0 0.000 1.000 
SHELLCODE Linux shellcode 0 2 1.000 0.000 
TELNET login incorrect [**] 740 156 0.174 0.826 
(http_inspect) NON-RFC DEFINED 
CHAR 
12 0 0.000 1.000 
(ftp_telnet) Invalid FTP Command 281 4 0.014 0.986 
(ftp_telnet) FTP command 
parameters were malformed 
16328 54 0.003 0.997 
(ftp_telnet) FTP traffic encrypted 39 0 0.000 1.000 
(ftp_telnet) Evasive (incomplete) 
TELNET CMD  
9 0 0.000 1.000 
(ftp_telnet) Telnet traffic encrypted 2 0 0.000 1.000 
(ftp_telnet) Telnet Subnegotiation 
Begin Comm 
3 0 0.000 1.000 
(spp_ssh) Protocol mismatch 469 0 0.000 1.000 
Table 5-7 Analysis of Signatures Triggered by DARPA 1999 
It can clearly be seen that a number of signatures, such as “SHELLCODE x86 
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inc ebx NOOP” only triggered during non-intrusion events. However other 
signatures, such as “ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing” produce both real 
and false positives. Some signatures, such as all those related to SNMP, only 
produced true positives.  
Also shown in Table 5.7 are estimates of the a priori probabilities of correct and 
false alerts being generated by each SNORT signature. These were derived 
from the simple relations 
                 
              
                                     
 
               
               
                                
 
Equation 5-1 Estimation of the A Priori Statistics for Each SNORT Signature 
5.4.3. Detectability of Attack Types 
Table 5-7 shows the detection performance from the perspective of different 
SNORT signatures. Of more direct interest for the current research is detection 
performance in terms of the different attack types simulated in the DARPA 1999 
dataset. This is shown in Table 5-8. 
 
Type Attack Type 
No. of 
Attacks 
No. 
Detected 
Pd 
D
e
n
ia
l 
o
f 
se
rv
ic
e
 Apache2 3 0 0.000 
Arppoison 4 0 0.000 
Back 6 0 0.000 
Crashiis 10 0 0.000 
Dosnuke 4 0 0.000 
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Type Attack Type 
No. of 
Attacks 
No. 
Detected 
Pd 
Land 4 0 0.000 
Mailbomb 6 0 0.000 
SYN Flood 6 4 0.667 
Ping of Death 6 4 0.667 
ProcessTable 2 0 0.000 
Selfping 3 0 0.000 
Smurf 5 0 0.000 
Sshprocesstable 1 0 0.000 
Syslogd 4 0 0.000 
Tcpreset 3 0 0.000 
Teardrop 3 0 0.000 
Udpstorm 2 0 0.000 
Warezclient 4 4 1.000 
U
se
r 
to
 R
o
o
t 
(U
2
R
) 
Anypw 1 0 0.000 
Casesen 3 3 1.000 
Eject 5 2 0.400 
Ffbconfig 3 0 0.000 
Fdformat 2 1 1.000 
Loadmodule 5 1 0.200 
Ntfsdos 3 0 0.000 
Perl 8 1 0.125 
Ps 2 0 0.000 
Sechole 2 2 1.000 
Xterm 3 3 1.000 
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Type Attack Type 
No. of 
Attacks 
No. 
Detected 
Pd 
Yaga 4 4 1.000 
R
e
m
o
te
 t
o
 L
o
ca
l 
(R
2
L
) 
Dictionary 1 1 1.000 
Framespoofer 1 1 1.000 
FTPwrite 4 4 1.000 
GuessFTP 2 2 1.000 
GuessPOP 1 0 0.000 
GuessTELNET 4 3 0.750 
Guest 3 3 1.000 
HTTPTunnel 5 0 0.000 
IMAP 2 2 1.000 
Named 3 3 1.000 
NCFTP 5 5 1.000 
Netbus 4 3 0.750 
Netcat 4 4 1.000 
Phf 5 5 1.000 
Ppmacro 3 3 1.000 
Sendmail 2 2 1.000 
SNMPget 4 0 0.000 
SQLAttack 2 0 0.000 
SSHTrojan 3 0 0.000 
Xlock 3 3 1.000 
Xsnoop 3 3 1.000 
P
ro
b
e
s Insidesniffer 2 0 0.000 
IPSweep 10 9 0.900 
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Type Attack Type 
No. of 
Attacks 
No. 
Detected 
Pd 
LSDomain 2 0 0.000 
Mscan 1 1 1.000 
NTinfoscan 4 4 1.000 
Portscan 18 5 0.278 
Questo 4 0 0.000 
Resetscan 1 0 0.000 
Satan 4 4 1.000 
D
a
ta
 
Secret 8 2 0.250 
Table 5-8 Detectability of Different Attack Types 
The different attack types are defined in Appendix A. The “No. of Attacks” 
column shows the number of different attacks present in the enhanced truth 
data for the DARPA simulation, that is, the number of unique attack labels that 
pertain to the specific attack type. The “No. Detected” column shows the 
number of distinct attacks for which there was a SNORT alert issued within the 
duration of the attack, and with the same source and destination IP addresses. 
There was no correlation of the signature that was triggered with the attack 
mechanism in use and therefore the potential for accidental detection is present 
due to signatures being triggered that were not related to the attack. Indeed, 
some alerts occurred due to the presence of ICMP PINGs rather than attack 
specific signatures. 
Table 5-8 shows some interesting results. There are many attack types that are 
not detected at all whilst others are easily detected. Only two attack types (Perl 
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and Portscan) are marginally detected, that is with    near to zero. Examination 
of the Perl result in detail suggests that the single detection was due to a noisy 
SNORT signature (“(ftp_telnet) FTP command parameters were malformed” of 
which there were 16,382 instances during the simulation). Only 36 different 
SNORT signatures account for all of the detections in Table 5-8. 
5.4.4. Sensitivity Measurements 
The measurement of sensitivity can be illustrated by examining two specific 
attacks, for example FTPWrite and Xterm. Table 5-8 shows that both are easily 
detectable with a    of 1.0. However, the sensitivity approach yields a different 
result, showing that SNORT is not sensitive enough to detect Xterm with any 
confidence. 
Consider Table 5-9 in which the individual signatures that are triggered for each 
of these attacks are shown. As can be seen there are only two different 
signature types that are responsible for detecting these two attacks. In each 
attack simulation each of the attack types is consistently detected by the same 
signatures, giving some confidence that both attack types are being detected 
properly. However there were 16,328 instances where the “(ftp telnet) FTP 
command parameters were malformed” triggered when there was no attack 
underway. Therefore the presence of this alert conveys less useful information 
than the “FTP .rhosts” signature which only occurred during real attacks.  
Attack 
Type 
Attack 
Label 
Triggered SNORT Signatures 
FTPWrite 31.000000 
(ftp_telnet) FTP command parameters were malformed 
FTP .rhosts 
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43.000000 
(ftp_telnet) FTP command parameters were malformed 
FTP .rhosts 
41.135830 
(ftp_telnet) FTP command parameters were malformed 
FTP .rhosts 
52.101901 
(ftp_telnet) FTP command parameters were malformed 
FTP .rhosts 
Xterm 
52.100738 (ftp_telnet) FTP command parameters were malformed 
55.091529 (ftp_telnet) FTP command parameters were malformed 
55.174733 (ftp_telnet) FTP command parameters were malformed 
Table 5-9 SNORT Signatures for FTPWrite and Xterm 
This qualitative argument can be quantified by the following. Consider an attack 
type consisting of M individual attacks within the DARPA dataset. For each 
attack let there be N signatures triggered, including multiple triggers of the 
same signature. Let              be the probability of an individual signature, 
   , in a given attack,     taken from Table 5-7 being triggered. The probability 
of false alarm of an attack type  ̂   and probability of detection,  ̂  for the attack 
type is given by: 
 ̂   ∏ ∏    
 
     
 
     
          
 ̂      ̂   
Equation 5-2 Estimation of  ̂  and  ̂   for an Attack type 
In deriving Equation 5-2 it was assumed that an alert is declared for a given 
attack type when any one of the signatures is triggered. In this respect it can 
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be considered as an OR logic rather than an AND logic in which all the signature 
types must trigger to declare an attack type to be present. 
For the FTPWrite and Xterm attack types, this results in Table 5-10. The values 
of  ̂  and  ̂   from this table can be placed into the algorithm discussed in 
section 4.6.2 to yield a SNR for the FTPWrite attack type of 18.6dB and for the 
Xterm attack type of 0dB. Thus this SNORT implementation is more sensitive to 
detecting FTPWrite attack types than detecting Xterm attacks, in contradiction 
of the results implied by Table 5-8. 
Attack Type M N Pfa(1,atk) Pfa(2,atk)  ̂   ̂   
FTPWrite 4 2 0.997 0 1 0 
Xterm 3 1 0.997 - 0.008 0.992 
Table 5-10  ̂  and  ̂   for the Attack Type FTPWrite and Xterm 
To automate this process a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet was created to take the 
results from the analysis of SNORT against each attack type and calculate the 
corresponding  ̂  and  ̂   values. This spreadsheet did not use the individual 
signature    and     values from Table 5-7. Instead modified values were used 
in which the “number of true alerts” was reduced only to those that applied to a 
given attack type. Consequently the  ̂   values were worse than used in the 
method outlined above for FTPWrite and Xterm with a corresponding reduction 
in sensitivity.  
The calculation of SNR from   ̂  and  ̂   values was undertaken by creating a 
Mathcad program. This was necessary to calculate the appropriate areas under 
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Gaussian functions. In order to do this, values of 1 and 0 were replaced with 
0.99999 and 1x10-5 respectively, due to the accuracy of numerical integration.  
When this method is applied to all the attack types in the DARPA dataset the 
result is shown in Figure 5-5. This figure shows that there are still many attack 
types that are not detectable and some, such are Dictionary, that are easily 
detectable. Only nine of the attack types achieve the 12dB level described in 
the previous chapter. 
5.4.5. Selectivity Measurements 
The measurement of selectivity is concerned with discriminating between 
different attack types. The raw data for each signature triggered in the SNORT 
simulation is shown in Table 5-11 as a function of the different attack types. In 
this table blank entries indicate that the specific signature did not trigger for the 
corresponding attack type. Signatures that did not trigger during any of the 
attacks are not shown, as are attack types in which no signatures were 
triggered. This was done to reduce the size of the table and therefore present 
only relevant combinations of signature and attack type. 
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Figure 5-5 Sensitivities of Different Attack Types 
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Table 5-11 Attack Type vs SNORT Signature 
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By examining Table 5-11 a number of conclusions can be drawn. First, the 
interaction between signatures and attack types is sparse, with only a small 
number of non-zero values present. Tantalisingly the number of signatures (34) 
is comparable with the number of detected attack types (33). However since 
there is not a one-to-one mapping, the perfect association between signature 
and attack type is clearly not present. Secondly, some signatures are triggered 
in multiple attack types, most notably the “(ftp telnet) FTP command 
parameters were malformed” signature. This implies that the presence of these 
signatures is not as good at discriminating attack types as other signatures. 
Thirdly, some attack types trigger multiple signatures and signature types, 
improving the discrimination between them. 
Table 5-12 shows an alternative way of presenting the information from Table 
5-11, where the probability of a given signature triggering when an attack type 
is underway is shown. The non-zero probabilities are highlighted in green to 
make them easier to locate. Of particular interest in this table is the large 
number of probability values of 1.0. This may be a factor of the small number 
of attacks present in each attack type in the DARPA data. Typically there are 
less than five instances of each attack type and if a given signature is triggered 
during each attack, then a probability of 1.0 is recorded. 
Table 5-13 shows a heat map of the selectivity of the given set of SNORT 
signatures applied to the attack types present in the DARPA dataset. The colour 
coding that is applied highlights challenging discriminations in red and shows 
easier discriminations in green. The leading diagonal is shown in red with a 
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Table 5-12 Probability of Individual Signatures vs Attack Type 
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number of off-diagonal values also presenting discrimination difficulties. There 
are a number of cells where discrimination is easier (green) most notably the 
Satan, Sechole and Casesen attack types.  
The largest value in Table 5-13 is 3.52, between the Satan-IMAP attack types. 
Theoretically, the largest value could be 57.6 if all 3,321 signatures are 
considered although a maximum of 5.83 would apply if the non-triggering 
signatures are excluded. This indicates that although there is discrimination 
highlighted on this heat map, it is significantly lower that the theoretical limit.  
To illustrate the use of the selectivity matrix consider again the two attack types 
of FTPWrite and Xterm, along with the signatures that were triggered during 
these attacks, as shown in Table 5-9. The probability vector has component 
entries that are zero except for the “(ftp_telnet) FTP command parameters 
were malformed” signature (both FTPWrite and Xterm) and “FTP .rhosts” 
signature (FTPWrite only) which are at unity. Consider three cases for the 
signatures triggered for a specific connection between two network devices: 
 Case 1 - only the “(ftp_telnet) FTP command parameters were 
malformed” signature is triggered; 
 Case 2 – both the “(ftp_telnet) FTP command parameters were 
malformed” and “FTP .rhosts” signatures are triggered; and 
 Case 3 - both the “(ftp_telnet) FTP command parameters were 
malformed” and “FTP .rhosts” signatures are triggered, along with a third 
signature, for example “WEB-MISC cat%20 access”. 
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Table 5-13 Selectivity Heatmap for Different Attack Types 
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For each case, the distance, as defined in Equation 4-9, between the measured 
probability vector and the row vectors representing each attack type shown in 
Table 5-12 is calculated and shown in Table 5-14 below. 
Attack Type Distance Case 1 Distance Case 2 Distance Case 3 
Casesen 1.414 1.732 2 
Dictionary 1.414 1.732 2 
Eject 0.632 1.183 1.549 
Fdformat 0.5 1.118 1.5 
Framespoofer 1.414 1.732 2 
FTPwrite 1 0 1 
GuessFTP 1.414 1.732 2 
GuessTELNET 1.25 1.601 1.887 
Guest 1.414 1.732 2 
IMAP 2 2.236 2.449 
IPSweep 1.353 1.682 1.957 
Loadmodule 0.8 1.281 1.625 
Mscan 1.732 2 2.236 
Named 1.414 1.732 2 
NCFTP 0 1 1.414 
SYN Flood 1.532 1.829 2.085 
Netbus 1.458 1.768 2.031 
Netcat 1.25 1.601 1.887 
NTinfoscan 1.521 1.82 2.077 
Perl 0.875 1.329 1.663 
Phf 1.414 1.732 1.414 
Ping of Death 1.202 1.564 1.856 
Portscan 1.077 1.47 1.778 
Ppmacro 1.732 2 2.236 
Satan 2.979 3.142 3.298 
Sechole 1.732 2 2.236 
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Attack Type Distance Case 1 Distance Case 2 Distance Case 3 
Secret 0.75 1.25 1.601 
Sendmail 1.414 1.732 2 
Warezclient 0 1 1.414 
Xlock 1.414 1.732 2 
Xsnoop 1.414 1.732 2 
Xterm 0 1 1.414 
Yaga 1.436 1.75 2.016 
Table 5-14 Examples of the Use of Selectivity 
The smaller the distance the nearer the measured probability vector is to a 
given attack type. For Case 1 there are three attacks that make a perfect 
match, that is, NCFTP, Warezclient and Xterm. It is not possible to discriminate 
between these attack types given the probability vector measured for Case 1. 
For Case 2, there is only one perfect match, namely FTPWrite. All other attack 
types are at least a distance of 1.0 away and therefore this represents a 
confident selection of the FTPWrite attack for the measured probability vector. 
The nearest alternative attack types are still NCFTP, Warezclient and Xterm, but 
the presence of an additional measurement in the Case 2 probability vector 
improves the discrimination over Case 1. 
For Case 3, the smallest distance is still the FTPWrite attack type. However the 
distance is not zero indicating that this is not a perfect match. Alternative 
attacks are now only a distance of 0.414 away and there are now four nearest 
neighbours, namely NCFTP, Warezclient, Xterm and Phf.  
These cases illustrate some important points about the use of selectivity. There 
is significance to the measured distance, with zero indicating perfect match, but 
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not necessarily perfect discrimination. Additional measurements can improve 
the discrimination but also may no longer achieve perfect matching to an attack 
type. Also, not all additional measurements will improve discrimination, but they 
may reduce the distance to alternative attack types. 
In order to apply this approach, after measuring the distance a further level of 
processing is necessary to either declare a specific intrusion event is underway 
or to provide information to other security devices on the network. Two obvious 
processing approaches are: 
 Intrusion Declaration – in which decision thresholds are applied to the 
shortest distance and to the separation between the shortest distance 
and the distance to alternative attack types, in order to declare an 
intrusion. The shortest distance would need to be below the first 
threshold and the separation of alternative attacks above the second 
threshold to declare an intrusion; and 
 Probabilistic or Fuzzy Approach – in which no decision is made by the 
NIS. Instead a vector of the distance to all attack types is output to 
combine with information from other security devices in a hierarchical 
approach. In some implementations it may be better to output the vector 
as a measure of probability rather than distance, for inclusion in expert 
systems or evidential reasoning.  
The investigation and optimisation of this additional processing will be the 
subject of further research. 
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5.5. Discussion 
The results shown in the previous section illustrate the use of sensitivity and 
selectivity in the performance assessment of NIS. The results show that 
sensitivity is poor, with only 15 of the 58 attack types present showing a non-
zero value, despite 33 attacks containing SNORT alerts. The selectivity of the 
evaluated set of SNORT signatures is also poor indicating that accurate 
discrimination between the different attack types is difficult. 
Although these results are poor they could be improved through tuning the 
selection of SNORT signatures so that only those with the most advantageous 
impact on sensitivity and selectivity are included. Whilst this appears to be the 
right approach, particularly with the observation that only 34 of the 3,321 
SNORT signatures were triggered for valid intrusions, the process of achieving 
this optimisation is not straight forward. It is proposed that this is achieved in 
the following way: 
 Security Policy Mapping – with each individual requirement in the 
network security policy represented by at least one signature, but ideally 
more. This will enable policy violations to be the focus of signature 
selection rather than intrusion mechanisms; 
 Standardised Policy Violations – in which a standard set of intrusions are 
defined to highlight all known ways in which individual policy violations 
can be achieved. The use of standards will allow comparison between 
NIS operating on different live networks; and 
 Automated Analysis – in which the set of standardised attacks are 
applied over a live network with automated sensitivity and selectivity 
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measurements produced. 
It is likely that such an approach will take considerable time to build up false 
alarm statistics, as well and sensitivity and selectivity measurements. This will 
be the topic of future research. 
5.6. Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has demonstrated the application of the performance metrics 
sensitivity and selectivity to the simulated attacks present in the DARPA 1999 
dataset, using SNORT as an exemplar signature-based NIS. The achieved 
performance for both metrics was poor with an inability to detect many of the 
attacks, as well as discriminating between individual attacks. 
The utility of sensitivity as a performance measure has been demonstrated. In 
particular sensitivity can be used to distinguish between fortuitous detection by 
noisy signatures which produce a high false alarm rate, and detection by 
signatures responding to the attack specifics. At best noisy signatures would be 
given a lower priority by network support staff and at worse noisy signatures 
would be disabled. The use of sensitivity provides an alternative approach in 
which the significance of a given alert is determined based on the other 
signatures triggered for the same connection.  
The sensitivity metric replaces the usual four measures of true positive, true 
negative, false positive and false negative rates with a single number. It 
represents the fundamental performance of a NIS as without detection of an 
attack type the discrimination implied by the selectivity metric cannot occur. 
Only nine of the intrusion event types present in the DARPA dataset were 
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detected with a sensitivity greater than 12dB. 
Selectivity measurements have shown that it is possible to distinguish between 
a small number of attack types. However the highest value of selectivity was 
3.52, which is significantly lower than the theoretical limit of 5.83, indicating 
that there is significant room for improvement. 
In order to use the taxonomy described in Chapter 3 improvements in 
performance is necessary. Sensitivity will need to be improved to ensure that 
more attack types are detected with a high confidence. Selectivity will be 
needed for recognition, identification and confirmation to be successful.  
A summary of the conclusions of this thesis will now be presented. 
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6. Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter provides a summary of the research activities that have been 
undertaken along with their principal conclusions. All the objectives of this 
research have been achieved in full, as follows: 
a) Objective 1 - Review the techniques and performance measures that 
have been applied to intrusion systems, to identify the most promising 
techniques for further evaluation; – A literature review has been 
conducted and is reported in Chapter 2; 
b) Objective 2 – Re-evaluate the meaning of “detection” in the context of 
NIS – Detection has been defined in Chapter 3, along with other high-
level intrusion system functions; 
c) Objective 3 - Assess the application of detection theory to NIS and 
propose metrics that can be used to characterise their performance – 
Chapter 4 describes a systems engineering approach to NIS and defines 
two performance metrics new to intrusion systems, namely sensitivity 
and selectivity; and 
d) Objective 4 - Demonstrate experimentally the use of the performance 
metrics and the potential for false alarm rejection using a representative 
NIS and practical data – Chapter 5 describes the use of SNORT against 
the DARPA 1999 inside network dataset, with practical sensitivity and 
selectivity measurements being undertaken. 
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6.1. Summary of Research Activities 
A programme of research has been undertaken to determine improved metrics 
for comparing intrusion systems, using techniques developed from other 
detection-based technologies, such as used in radar or sonar.  
The research commenced with a literature review. As intrusion detection has 
been an active research topic for over 30 years considerable published work is 
available. A detailed systems and techniques assessment of other research was 
made with particular emphasis given to performance evaluation metrics and 
their limitations. The survey identified that a wide range of data processing 
techniques had been assessed and a large number of different intrusion 
systems developed for research and commercial purposes. However the 
problem of poor performance persists and the difficulty of comparing intrusion 
techniques and systems was highlighted. 
A taxonomy of intrusion systems was then developed as a basis for a more 
precise definition of “detection”. Key NIS discrimination technologies identified 
in the literature were mapped onto a graphical representation of the taxonomy 
to illustrate how meaningful comparison could and could not be made. The link 
between an intrusion event and the network security policy was established. 
A systems-level assessment of the issues facing NIS was undertaken to identify 
key considerations in defining performance. The reasons for deployment and 
the characteristics of an ideal system were developed and current challenges 
defined. Two metrics known as sensitivity and selectivity were proposed to 
measure the detection and discrimination performance respectively. These 
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metrics were defined mathematically and guidance on their interpretation in 
intrusion detection was developed. 
Finally, an experimental evaluation of NIS was undertaken using SNORT and 
the DARPA 1999 dataset of network frames recorded on the inside of the 
simulated network. A new set of truth data was developed to enable the 
correlation of SNORT intrusion alerts with DARPA attack simulations. A manual 
assignment of SNORT alerts to specific attacks or to false alarms was made. 
From this assignment measurements of sensitivity and selectivity were 
undertaken illustrating the application of these metrics. The results indicated 
that SNORT, with a baseline set of signatures from 2010 has poor sensitivity 
and selectivity for attacks in the DARPA 1999 dataset. 
6.2. Research Achievements 
As well as achieving the research objectives a number of original contributions 
to the corpus of knowledge regarding network intrusion systems has been 
made including: 
 The literature survey identified inconsistencies in the terminology used 
for intrusion systems with researchers rarely defining what is meant by 
“detection” with some describing the process as “intrusion recognition”. 
Difficulties in comparing practical measured performances were also 
identified, in particular the inconsistent use of receiver operating 
characteristic curves between different research groups; 
 A novel taxonomy has been developed based of the output of an 
intrusion system and the data scale over which it operates. It has been 
demonstrated that this taxonomy is ideally suited to comparing intrusion 
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systems on an equitable basis. High-level functions have been defined 
for intrusion systems, based on their required outputs. The acronym NIS 
has been proposed to generalise intrusion from detection to recognition 
and identification; 
 A new relationship between network security policy and the definition of 
an intrusion has been developed. An intrusion has been defined as an 
event that breaches the network security policy. It is proposed that each 
clause or group of clauses in the policy are used to select at least one 
signature for misuse-based intrusion systems. The interrelation between 
network security policy and implied threshold setting in a classical 
detection system has been described; 
 The reasons for the deployment of an intrusion system have been 
developed along with the characteristics of an ideal system. A model of 
an first generation ideal passive system has been described and the 
connection to other design patterns has been established; 
 The basic properties of a misuse-based intrusion system have been 
developed and a fundamental problem identified, namely the non-unique 
mapping to intrusion-like or non-intrusion-like for some network frames. 
This problem limits the achievable performance for practical misuse-
based intrusion systems; 
 The observation that current passive intrusion systems are inefficient has 
been made. Intrusion systems spend much of their processing effort 
processing non-intrusion data. The implications of this for the 
development of advanced data processing techniques is described;  
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 Two performance metrics, sensitivity and selectivity, new to intrusion 
systems have been defined mathematically and their properties 
developed. Their application to intrusion systems has been described; 
 Sensitivity and selectivity has been measured for the SNORT intrusion 
system processing data from the DARPA 1999 network simulation. The 
utility of sensitivity to describe performance in terms of a single 
parameter rather than the four performance measures has been 
established. The use of selectivity in undertaking high-level intrusion 
functions, as described in the novel taxonomy described above, has been 
described; and 
 New limitations of the DARPA 1999 database for intrusion system 
evaluation have been identified. Poor time synchronisation between the 
inside and outside datasets limit their simultaneous use without different 
truth data for each. 
The use and definition of sensitivity and selectivity was based on detection 
theory as used within other technologies, such as radar and sonar. During the 
course of this research it was observed that other analogies could be made with 
these technologies, specifically allowing the NIS to stimulate deliberately the 
network to gather further information to improve performance. This is reported 
in Appendix D and is given the term Aggressive Network Intrusion System 
(AgNIS) to differentiate the approach from Active Intrusion Detection. Although 
this approach is not new to NIS, a systematic evaluation of the methods for 
integration did not appear to have been addressed by other researchers. 
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6.3. Research Limitations 
As with all research the depth with which individual topics could be investigated 
is limited by the available effort and the need to achieve all the objectives of 
the work. In this research three significant limitations have been identified, as 
follows: 
 Performance Metrics – The impact of the assumption of a Gaussian 
probability density function has not been established precisely. 
Alternative parameterisations should be investigated, including using 
measured density functions, to quantify the impact. In addition, the 
sensitivity and selectivity metrics should be extended to high-level 
intrusion functions, such as recognition and identification; 
 Use of the DARPA 1999 Dataset – This dataset has a number of well-
known issues with new limitations being identified in this research. It is 
now 14 years old and not representative of modern networks. The goal 
of the practical phase was not to optimise performance, if this were not 
the case the DARPA dataset would have been unsuitable. The 
demonstration of the use of the new taxonomy as well as the sensitivity 
and selectivity metrics on a live network is required; and 
 Exploitation of the new metrics – The retrospective measurement of 
sensitivity and selectivity from the published results of other research 
teams has not been attempted, mainly due to the difficulty of mapping 
their results to this new measurement framework. Although a ROC curve 
can be used to estimate sensitivity, through curve fitting, the differences 
between the measurement methodologies used by different research 
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groups would still make this a difficult task.  
In order to evaluate further the limitations of this work it was decided to gauge 
the view of other professionals by obtaining independent review of the body of 
this thesis. This is reported fully in Appendix F. No further limitations were 
identified and the taxonomy and new metrics were thought to be of value by a 
consulting security architect.   
6.4. Further Work 
Further work can be considered for both the experimental and systems aspects 
of this research. Throughout this thesis opportunities for further research have 
already been described. In this chapter a new research topic is proposed based 
on addressing the limitations of the current research, as described in the 
previous section. 
It is proposed that an NIS demonstrator is constructed and operated over a live 
network to establish the practical use of these metrics in real-time systems. The 
calculation of performance metrics should be automated. In order for this to 
occur a standardised set of attack types will need to be developed along with 
methods for automatically assigning signature alerts to simulated attacks. Full 
network recording at the NIS will be needed to confirm that any false alarms 
that are due to system limitations and not genuine, unapproved intrusion 
behaviour against the intrusion system. It is anticipated that real-time 
performance could be achieved by assuming that no genuine intrusion 
behaviour is present, with offline correction as this assumption is verified. This 
demonstrator would enable benchmarking of intrusion systems. 
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The demonstrator should record all statistics so that the practical implications of 
the Gaussian probability density function assumption can be assessed. This 
should be supplemented by a theoretical assessment using both alternative 
density functions and the Tchebycheff inequality.  
Strategies for the selection of signatures will need to be developed and 
evaluated using the performance metrics. The practicality of mapping 
signatures to different network security policies will be determined. The 
relationship between a given set of signatures and the achievable sensitivity 
and sensitivity should be examined and quantified.   
Finally, the range of performance metrics should be extended to cover high-
level intrusion functionality identified by the taxonomy described in Chapter 3. 
Such an experimental programme as proposed in this chapter could be the 
basis for developing high-level intrusion functionality, becoming a component of 
a new form of distributed intelligent security paradigm. New architectures or 
data processing techniques, such as AgNIS, could be evaluated in real-time and 
their performance contrasted with alternative approaches.  
6.5.  The Future for Network Intrusion Systems 
Despite over 30 years of active research, the performance achieved by network 
intrusion systems remains inadequate. False alarms, both positive and negative 
are at unacceptable levels. False positives require significant system 
administrator effort to investigate whilst false negatives are more insidious 
giving administrators the false perception that their networks are secure. 
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The programme of research described here has created a more precise 
definition of detection and high-level intrusion functions such that performance 
comparison between systems and data processing algorithms can confidently 
be made. The use of sensitivity and selectivity as basic performance metrics, 
along with the future development of standardised attacks, should highlight the 
most promising data processing techniques and systems approaches. The goal 
should be for future research to be published in terms of these standard metrics 
on live data, rather than the current trend of using synthesised datasets.  
Alternative systems approaches to intruion will be required, such as AgNIS, to 
address improved sensitivity for attacks which have only a minor impact on 
network traffic. Techniques to improve selectivity will also be required, as the 
functionality with NIS moves towards recognition and identification systems.  
Finally, the demand for high performance intrusion systems is unlikely to 
diminish. Although a defence in depth strategy for security architectures, 
coupled with improving performance in other network security elements will 
limit the potential for damage from intruders, it is likely to remain a key 
requirement that the status of a network as intrusion-free will need to be 
confirmed continuously. In order for this to be an overall benefit rather than a 
resource burden, high sensitivity and selectivity is required across the complete 
range of attack types implied by the organisations network security policy. 
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Appendix A. The DARPA 1999 Dataset 
A.1. Introduction 
The DARPA 1999 dataset is one of the most widely used sources of network 
and host intrusion data. It has been used by many research teams to evaluate 
both data processing algorithms and complete intrusion systems. The 
documentation for the dataset can be downloaded from the Lincoln Laboratory 
website (MIT Lincoln Laboratory 2012b) and comprehensive descriptions of the 
data collection methodology have been provided by Lippmann (Lippmann, 
Haines et al. 2000b; Lippmann, Haines et al. 2000a) and Kendall (Kendall 
1999). 
As considerable published research exists already on the use of the DARPA 
1999 dataset, only aspects relevant to the main body of this thesis will be 
described here. An outline description has already been provided in section 
2.6.3. 
For this research a data labelling scheme has been adopted to identify which of 
the many files present in the dataset have been used. A four digit code 
identifies the week and day number of the recorded files, thus W3D5 
corresponds with a TCPDUMP recording taken on Week 3 Day 5. This code was 
augmented with two additional identifiers to indicate whether the data was 
recorded on the inside or outside network segment and whether the data was 
recorded for training or testing purposes. Finally the data label has a prefix of 
1999, to differentiate it from the 1998 and 2000 datasets. Thus a file can be 
identified by a label such as “1999_W2D1_inside_training”, which is a DARPA 
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1999, Week 2, Day 1 recording on the inside network, captured for training 
purposes. 
A single file label identifies the complete frame recording for a given day, on 
the specified network segment. When it is not necessary to identify the 
segment or the purpose of the recording, just the initial four digit code is used. 
A.2. Description of the Simulated Network 
This research is concerned with network intrusion systems and therefore only 
the TCPDUMP files recorded on the inside and outside of the simulated network 
were of relevance. Host intrusion data was not used.  
Figure A-1 provides an overview of the simulated network. 
Outside Network Inside NetworkCisco 2514 Router
192.168.1.0 172.16.0.0
Sniffer and Inside
 Timeserver
Inside GatewaySniffer
Victims
Attackers and 
Virtualised Hosts
Attackers and 
Virtualised Hosts
Outside Gateway 
and Timeserver
 
Figure A-1 DARPA 1999 Network, based on (MIT Lincoln Laboratory 2012b) 
It can be seen that there are two network segments separated by a router. 
Both the inside and outside network segments are populated with a variety of 
operating systems. Separate packet sniffers are present on the two network 
segments. These sniffers recorded simultaneously the frames present on both 
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network segments using TCPDUMP. Full frames were recorded including the 
payload. As the network was simulated the usual privacy concerns did not 
apply.  
A number of attacks were simulated throughout the five weeks of data 
gathering. These are summarised in Table A-1. It is important to realise that 
not all of these specific attacks leave a detectable trace in the recorded 
TCPDUMP files as the experimental setup was also to investigate host based 
attacks. Further information on each attack can be found at the MIT Lincoln 
Labs website (MIT Lincoln Laboratory 2012c) and the research of Kendall 
(Kendall 1999). 
Attack 
Type 
(No of 
Attacks) 
OS Specific Attacks 
Solaris SunOS NT Linux Cisco 
Probe 
(37) 
Queso Queso NTinfoscan Queso - 
Illegal-sniffer Illegal-sniffer 
Illegal-
sniffer 
Mscan - 
IPsweep IPsweep IPsweep LSdomain - 
Portsweep Portsweep Portsweep Satan - 
DoS (65) 
Neptune Arppoison Arppoison Apache2 - 
Pod Land Crashiis Arppoison - 
Processtable Mailbomb Dosnuke Back - 
Selfping Neptune Smurf Mailbomb - 
Smurf Pod TCPreset Neptune - 
Syslogd Processtable - Pod - 
TCPreset - - Processtable - 
Warezclient - - Smurf - 
- - - TCPreset - 
- - - Teardrop - 
- - - UDPstorm - 
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Attack 
Type 
(No of 
Attacks) 
OS Specific Attacks 
Solaris SunOS NT Linux Cisco 
R2L (56) 
Dict Dict Dict Dict SNMPget 
FTPwrite Xsnoop Framespoof Imap - 
Guest - Netbus Named - 
HTTPtunnel - Netcat Ncftp - 
Xlock - Ppmacro Phf - 
Xsnoop - - Sendmail - 
- - - SSHtrojan - 
- - - Xlock - 
- - - Xsnoop - 
U2R (37) 
Eject  Loadmodule Casesen - - 
FDformat - NTFSdos - - 
Ffbconfig - Makepw - - 
Ps - Sechole - - 
- - Xsnoop - - 
Data (13) Secret - NTFSdos Secret - 
- - Ppmacro - - 
Table A-1 Attack Types in the DARPA 1999 Dataset 
A.3. Network Statistics 
The start and stop dates and times for the TCPDUMP data files are shown in 
Table A-2. The original documentation provided by the Lincoln Laboratory 
shows times measured in Eastern Standard Time (EST). Each recorded set of 
data started early in the morning (typically 8:00am) and finished on the same 
day, typically 6:00pm. However, EST caused some difficulties in handling the 
files using GMT or BST as a local time, due to daylight savings time differences. 
Consequently the information was converted to UTC. 
The data in Table A-2 was derived from the outside dataset rather than the 
inside dataset that was used during this research. This was done as there was 
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additional data available outside, specifically W3D8. It is important to remember 
that there is a minor time offset between the inside and outside datasets, as 
discussed in the next appendix. 
Label 
Start 
Date 
Start 
Time 
(UTC) 
End 
Date 
End Time 
(UTC) 
Comments 
W1D1 Mar 1 01:00:02 pm Mar 2 11:00:02 am Attack free, for training 
W1D2 Mar 2 01:00:02 pm Mar 3 11:00:01 am Attack free, for training 
W1D3 Mar 3 01:00:03 pm Mar 4 11:00:01 am Attack free, for training 
W1D4 Mar 4 01:00:03 pm Mar 5 11:00:02 am Attack free, for training 
W1D5 Mar 5 01:00:02 pm Mar 6 11:00:02 am Attack free, for training 
W2D1 Mar 8 01:00:01 pm Mar 9 11:00:49 am Labelled attacks, for training 
W2D2 Mar 9 01:00:01 pm Mar 10 07:59:59 am Labelled attacks, for training 
W2D3 Mar 10 01:00:03 pm Mar 11 11:00:01 am Labelled attacks, for training 
W2D4 Mar 11 01:00:03 pm Mar 12 11:00:00 am Labelled attacks, for training 
W2D5 Mar 12 01:00:02 pm Mar 13 11:00:00 am Labelled attacks, for training 
W3D1 Mar 15 01:00:02 pm Mar 16 11:00:00 am Attack free, for training 
W3D2 Mar 16 01:00:01 pm Mar 17 11:00:00 am Attack free, for training 
W3D3 Mar 17 01:00:03 pm Mar 18 11:00:00 am Attack free, for training 
W3D4 Mar 18 01:00:02 pm Mar 19 09:11:44 am Attack free, for training 
W3D5 Mar 19 01:00:03 pm Mar 20 06:02:46 am Attack free, for training 
W3D6 Mar 22 01:00:04 pm Mar 23 10:14:14 am Attack free, for training 
W3D7 Mar 23 01:00:00 pm Mar 24 10:59:58 am Attack free, for training 
W3D8 Mar 24 01:00:01 pm Mar 25 11:00:00 am Attack free, for training 
W4D1 Mar 29 01:00:02 pm Mar 30 10:59:57 am Embedded attacks, for testing 
W4D2 - - - - No data is available 
W4D3 Mar 31 01:00:09 pm Apr 1 10:59:57 am Embedded attacks, for testing 
W4D4 Apr 1 01:00:01 pm Apr 2 10:59:49 am Embedded attacks, for testing 
W4D5 Apr 2 01:00:00 pm Apr 3 10:59:53 am Embedded attacks, for testing 
W5D1 Apr 5 12:00:02 pm Apr 6 09:59:56 am Embedded attacks, for testing 
W5D2 Apr 6 12:00:00 
Noon 
Apr 7 09:59:58 am Embedded attacks, for testing 
W5D3 Apr 7 12:00:00 
Noon 
Apr 8 09:59:52 am Embedded attacks, for testing 
W5D4 Apr 8 12:00:00 
Noon 
Apr 9 09:59:53 am Embedded attacks, for testing 
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Label 
Start 
Date 
Start 
Time 
(UTC) 
End 
Date 
End Time 
(UTC) 
Comments 
W5D5 Apr 9 12:00:04 pm Apr 10 09:59:58 am Embedded attacks, for testing 
Table A-2 DARPA 1999 Start and Stop Times 
Table A-3 provides some basic statistics for each of the inside dataset files. 
These statistics were produced by a command line utility include with 
WIRESHARK, known as CAPINFOS. 
Label 
No 
Frames 
(-) 
No TCP 
Conversations 
(-) 
No UDP 
Conversations 
(-) 
Total No 
Conversations 
(-) 
Duration 
(s) 
W1D1 1,492,331 39,637 11,363 51,000 79,210 
W1D2 1,237,119 46,053 9,559 55,612 79,196 
W1D3 1,726,319 46,141 10,339 56,480 79,197 
W1D4 1,947,815 41,709 11,590 53,299 79,191 
W1D5 1,483,419 37,446 13,304 50,750 79,197 
W2D1 1,753,377 44,406 10,974 55,380 79,194 
W2D2 1,585,120 56,324 18,699 75,023 68,600 
W2D3 1,011,149 26,207 20,364 46,571 79,195 
W2D4 1,563,069 68,051 14,092 82,143 79,191 
W2D5 1,362,422 49,939 10,639 60,578 79,191 
W3D1 2,106,744 43,900 9,374 53,274 79,197 
W3D2 1,831,648 50,028 10,246 60,274 79,195 
W3D3 1,849,753 48,515 9,666 58,181 79,197 
W3D4 1,559,156 19,767 10,979 30,746 72,700 
W3D5 1,635,425 61,319 8,092 69,411 61,339 
W3D6 1,679,048 12,598 10,931 23,529 76,396 
W3D7 2,152,964 49,007 9,850 58,857 79,000 
W3D8 No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data 
W4D1 1,647,573 16,790 10,304 27,094 79,195 
W4D2 No Data No Data No Data No Data No Data 
W4D3 1,766,074 45,943 14,850 60,793 79,189 
W4D4 2,356,503 52,349 14,535 66,884 79,188 
W4D5 1,945,538 32,288 17,111 49,399 79,192 
W5D1 2,291,319 52,365 9,006 61,371 79,193 
W5D2 3,404,824 81,554 10,996 92,550 79,199 
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Label 
No 
Frames 
(-) 
No TCP 
Conversations 
(-) 
No UDP 
Conversations 
(-) 
Total No 
Conversations 
(-) 
Duration 
(s) 
W5D3 2,087,942 46,198 14,621 60,819 79,192 
W5D4 3,201,381 106,690 18,007 124,697 79,192 
W5D5 3,393,918 59,581 11,671 71,252 79,193 
Table A-3 Statistics for the DARPA 1999 Inside Dataset 
The data in Table A-3 was used to calculate the false alarm statistics reported 
in section 5.4. 
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Appendix B. Clock Drift in the DARPA 1999 Dataset 
During this research, initial attempts to match SNORT intrusion alerts with 
attacks within the TCPDUMP network recording taken from both the inside and 
outside of the DARPA 1999 simulation network were unsuccessful. It was 
expected that the truth data provided on the Lincoln Laboratory website (MIT 
Lincoln Laboratory 2012a) would be definitive and precise, however surprisingly 
few SNORT alerts matched events in this data. The most likely reasons were 
that either the matching algorithm was in error, or that SNORT was not 
detecting the intrusions in the first instance. Testing of the matching software 
revealed no issues however there did appear to be a time shift between the 
intrusions that were detected by SNORT and the corresponding truth data 
entries. This appendix describes the activities undertaken to determine the root 
cause of the problem and consequently document the magnitude of the effect. 
B.1. Initial Analysis 
The use of time within the DARPA simulation was examined in detail. An initial 
attempt to match identical frames in the inside and outside datasets revealed 
large time differences between the network recordings. The source and 
destination IP addresses, as well as the absolute TCP sequence numbers were 
matched for frames near the beginning of each pair of network recordings. As 
the sequence numbers are unique for a given client or server (IETF 1981; 
Stevens 1994) matches using these criteria should have indicated 
corresponding frames precisely. Using this matching technique all the pairs of 
network recordings for each day of the simulation showed time offsets. Whilst 
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most of the offsets were only a few seconds, some were much larger with the 
W2D1 data showing an offset of over 46 seconds.  
B.2. Further Analysis 
The presence of an offset in time between the simultaneous network recording 
taken on the inside and outside of the simulated network was surprising and 
therefore warranted further investigation. WIRESHARK was used to view a 
limited number of frames in corresponding inside and outside datasets. This 
showed that there was occasional protocol violations (IETF 1981) when TCP 
absolute sequence numbers were re-used within a few seconds by a host. 
Therefore it was necessary to extend the frame matching criteria to include 
source and destination ports to ensure that false matches did not occur. When 
this was undertaken the time offsets shown in Figure B-1 were obtained.  
 
Figure B-1 Clock Drift Between the Inside and Outside Network Sniffers 
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Further analysis of the network recordings revealed that Network Time Protocol 
(NTP) (IETF 1992) was configured and running in the DARPA 1999 simulation. 
Therefore it should be expected that there would be very little or no time offset 
between the networks. In the outside network, host 192.168.1.10 was 
configured as the time server and the outside sniffer (192.168.1.90) was in 
general correctly synchronised to it. No other outside hosts were time 
synchronised to this NTP server. In the inside network, the NTP server was set 
as 172.16.112.10, which was also used as the network sniffer. Five other hosts 
on the inside regularly time synchronised with the inside sniffer. These hosts 
were the “victim” machines for the simulated network attacks.  
The outside network NTP server regularly attempted time synchronisation with 
the inside NTP server. NTP synchronisation requests were made using 
“symmetric active” mode, but no corresponding “symmetric passive” frames 
were sent in response and hence no synchronisation between the inside and 
outside networks occurred. On the first day of the simulation (W1D1) the inside 
NTP server also made regular NTP Client Mode requests to the outside NTP 
server, which responded correctly in NTP Server Mode, allowing time 
synchronisation to occur between the networks. No further Client Mode 
requests from the inside NTP server to the outside NTP server are present in 
the simulation after the first day.  
By examining the NTP exchanges between the network time servers the 
anticipated mode of operation can be determined. This is shown in Figure B-2. 
It can be seen that the time server and network sniffer are separate physical 
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servers in the outside network, but combined in the inside network. No 
evidence of connections to Stratum 0 NTP servers could be located within the 
frames recorded in either the inside or outside datasets. 
The design requirement would have been to synchronise time across all servers 
and hosts in both the inside and outside networks. This would enable the 
alignment of events recorded in network sniffer files with host logs, also stored 
during the simulation. For the current research the most important requirement 
is the synchronisation between the inside and outside network sniffers, shaded 
red in Figure B-2.  
NTP Stratum 2
NTP Stratum 1
Inside Time Server & Sniffer
172.16.112.10
Outside Network
Inside Network
Outside Time Server 
192.168.1.10
Outside Sniffer
192.168.1.90
 
Figure B-2 NTP Hierarchy within the DARPA 1999 Simulation 
Appendix B Clock Drift in the DARPA 1999 Dataset 
 
216 
During the first day of the simulation the network appears to be operating as 
designed. However, after the first day the inside and outside network sniffers 
were de-coupled and their clocks drifting with respect to each other. The 
outside sniffer was synchronised with the outside NTP server, but the inside 
and outside NTP servers were not synchronised.  
In summary, it appears that for the first day of the DARPA 1999 simulation the 
inside and outside network were correctly synchronised. After the first day, 
however, they were time synchronised, but not to each other, hence the offset 
in their times at the start of each days simulation, as highlighted in Figure B-1.  
B.3. Clock Drift Measurement 
Further work was undertaken to quantify the clock drift between the inside and 
outside networks during each day of the simulation for which full 
synchronisation was not operating. TCPDUMP was used to extract specific 
frames from each of the network files. Only frames from weeks 2, 4 and 5 of 
the simulation were used as weeks 1 and 3 contained no intrusion events and 
therefore were not of interest. Connection initiation frames (i.e. with the SYN 
flag set) were extracted for connections to the principal “victim” hosts, 
recording the absolute TCP sequence numbers as well as the usual TCPDUMP 
text output. Microsoft Excel was used to match corresponding frames between 
the inside and outside network recordings. A single match was taken every hour 
as representative of the time error and plotted in Figures B-2 to B-4. The initial 
large timing error for W2D1 persisted for about 36 minutes. It occurred due to 
a failure of the first seven NTP synchronisations between the outsider sniffer 
and NTP server. One simulated attack occurred during this period. 
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Figure B-3 Clock Drift between the Inside and Outside Network – Week 2 
 
 
Figure B-4 Clock Drift between the Inside and Outside Network - Week 4 
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Figure B-5 Clock Drift between the Inside and Outside Network - Week 5 
It can be seen that the clock drift is consistent throughout the duration of the 
simulations. Regression analysis was undertaken with the results shown in 
Table B-1. This table shows that linear regression appears to be a good 
representation of the data (i.e. the standard error is low) and the drift in the 
clocks between the inside and outside networks is approximately 0.73 seconds 
per hour. 
Simulation 
Day 
Slope 
(s hr-1) 
Intercept 
(s hr-1) 
Standard Error 
(s hr-1) 
W2D1 0.7238 2.954 0.00640 
W2D2 0.7224 1.634 0.00608 
W2D3 0.7239 1.256 0.00628 
W2D4 0.7231 1.874 0.00789 
W2D5 0.7244 1.249 0.00327 
W4D1 0.7211 1.785 0.00432 
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Simulation 
Day 
Slope 
(s hr-1) 
Intercept 
(s hr-1) 
Standard Error 
(s hr-1) 
W4D2 No Data Available No Data Available No Data Available 
W4D3 0.7203 1.640 0.00201 
W4D4 0.7210 1.794 0.00128 
W4D5 0.7229 1.182 0.00625 
W5D1 0.7232 1.784 0.03423 
W5D2 0.7231 1.844 0.01201 
W5D3 0.7253 2.211 0.02636 
W5D4 0.7259 2.078 0.02383 
W5D5 0.7254 1.721 0.00534 
Table B-1 Linear Regression Parameters for Clock Drift 
B.4. Conclusions 
The lack of time synchronisation between the inside and outside networks in 
the DARPA 1999 simulation makes matching SNORT alerts with intrusion events 
in the truth data, across both the inside and outside datasets, problematic. 
Three obvious approaches to overcome the limitations in the recorded data are:  
 Multiple Truth sets, one for each of the inside and outside networks; 
 Truth correction, in which the truth data is configured for one of the 
networks and a correction applied to estimate the truth for the other 
network. The repeatability of the clock drift as shown in Figures B-3 to B-
5 suggests that this approach could be designed to be sufficiently 
accurate, after the NTP initial synchronisation problems for W2D1 ; and 
 Fuzzy time matching, in which precise time is not used as a match 
criterion. Instead a time window would be used, corresponding to the 
clock uncertainty. 
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Although any of these methods could have been made to work it was decided 
for the research reported in this thesis to limit the analysis to only one of the 
datasets, eliminating the need to correct for clock drift between the networks.   
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Appendix C. WIRESHARK for Attack Truth 
Determination 
C.1. Introduction 
During this research difficulties were experienced in matching SNORT alerts 
with specific intrusion events in the DARPA 1999 attack truth data.  At first it 
was thought to be either the result of poor matching software or that the 
SNORT signatures were not able to respond to the attack types present in the 
dataset. Further analysis has identified issues with the DARPA 1999 dataset and 
its truth data. The previous appendix has addressed the clock drift between the 
inside and outside network segments. This appendix describes the analysis that 
was undertaken to improve the DARPA 1999 truth data using WIRESHARK 
measurements. 
C.2. Initial Investigation 
The initial investigation concentrated on the correctness of the matching 
software. No issues were identified with the software so effort was directed to 
the SNORT signatures. Although some attacks produced no alerts from SNORT 
others produced alerts with minor time discrepancies. Therefore it was decided 
to examine the recorded frames to see if the attacks could be detected and 
confirmed manually.  
As each days recordings for a given network segment typically contained over 
one million frames (see Table A-3) a totally manual process was impractical. A 
frequently used approach to extracting relevant frames from large datasets is to 
use the filtering functionality of TCPDUMP to pipe frames through additional 
Appendix C WIRESHARK for Attack Truth Determination 
 
   
processing software. Although this approach could have worked it lacked the 
ability to visualise attacks, without writing new software. Instead WIRESHARK 
was used to analysis the datasets for traces of the synthesised attacks. 
WIRESHARK has a number of advantages for this task including: 
 It is able to load the TCPDUMP files from the DARPA dataset without the 
need for pre-processing or file conversion software; 
 The colour-coded visual display of individual frames was useful in 
identifying attack elements; 
 As WIRESHARK processed the complete frame it was easy to examine in 
detail the characteristics and bit-settings of frames of interest; 
 Included within WIRSHARK is an advanced filtering engine compatible 
with TCPDUMP, that can be used to display only frames of interest; and 
 The frames associated with individual connections could be extracted 
automatically. 
These advantages meant that WIRESHARK was particularly suited to extracting 
the frames relevant to a given attack. However, its use was not without 
problems. Versions of WIRESHARK used during early analyses were unable to 
load a complete set of frames for a whole day without memory errors. Although 
this was inconvenient, command line software provided with WIRESHARK or 
filter parameters invoked at start-up were able to limit the number of frames 
loaded so that memory errors did not occur. More recent versions of 
WIRESHARK do not appear to have this problem. 
WIRESHARK was therefore used to load segments of a recording for a given 
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network segment and attack frames were located using the existing truth data 
as a starting point. This was done for all the attack types present in the 
simulation, and the truth data was updated with measurements derived from 
the located frames. 
C.3. NTinfoscan Analysis  
There are a large number of different attack types and instances within the 
DARPA 1999 dataset. As an illustration of the method and the results that can 
be obtained this section will describe the analysis for just one attack type, 
namely NTinfoscan. 
The DARPA 1999 intrusion detection attacks database  (MIT Lincoln Laboratory 
2012c) describes the NTinfoscan as: 
“… a NetBIOS based security scanner. It scans the NT victim to obtain share 
information, the names of all the users, services running, and other 
information. The results are saved in an html file named .html where victim is 
the victim's hostname.” 
 
This database also gives the attack signature information as follows: 
“Sniffing reveals that the attack FTPs to the victim as user anonymous with 
password guestaccnt@compuserve.com and makes numerous HTML GET 
requests to files in such directories as /cgi-bin and /scripts. Originally, the ntis 
ftp'd to the victim with the password, ntinfoscan. 
The security audit log can also be used to detect the attack. A login by IUSR via 
Advapi, followed by the execution of newdsn.exe by SYSTEM indicates a web 
scan. A login via KsecDD followed by multiple SAM_USER accesses by SYSTEM 
indicates a netbios scan.” 
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There are four instances of the NTInfoscan attack, one in the training dataset 
and three in the testing dataset (attack labels 44.08000, 54.110416 and 
54.183002). Examining the first instance in detail, this occurred during W2D1. 
The truth data provided the following information about this specific attack: 
 Start time – 08:01:01 EST (13:01:01 UTC) ; 
 End time – Not provided; 
 Destination IP – hume.eyrie.af.mil (172.16.112.100);  
 Ports Used – Not provided; and 
 Source IP – Not provided; 
Using WIRESHARK the three phases of the attack could be seen easily. The 
source of the attack was 206.48.44.18 and using this information the frames 
associated with each phase could be extracted and the data show in Table C-1. 
Attack 
Phase 
Wireshark Filter No of 
Frames 
(-) 
Start 
Time 
(UTC) 
End Time 
(UTC) 
FTP/Telnet 
ip.addr==206.48.44.18 and 
ip.addr==172.16.112.100 
and (tcp.port == 20 or 
tcp.port == 21 or tcp.port 
== 23) 
42 13:00:58.1 13:02:02.4 
HTTP 
ip.addr==206.48.44.18 and 
ip.addr==172.16.112.100 
and tcp.port == 80 
90 13:01:59.7 13:17:02.0 
Netbios ip.addr==206.48.44.18 and 1250 13:16:59.9 13:17:01.3 
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ip.addr==172.16.112.100 
and tcp.port==139 
Table C-1 NTInfoscan Data for W2D1 Inside Network  
Table C-1 shows approximately three second time difference between the 
official DARPA 1999 truth data and that recorded using this method. It can also 
be seen that the attack duration was over 16 minutes. This approach also 
identifies the three separate phases of the attack, offering the potential for 
further insights to SNORT operation against this attack type. 
The same filters were applied to the outside dataset, revealing the same 
number of frames. However the times of events were different, as would be 
expected from the analysis presented in Appendix B. For example the start of 
the FTP/Telnet attack occurred at 13:00:11.7, that is 46.4 seconds earlier than 
the inside dataset. 
C.4. Conclusions 
WIRESHARK can be used to locate the frames associated with attacks in the 
DARPA 1999 dataset. Exact timing information can be derived, as well as 
parameters not within the formal truth data, such as the attack source. Within a 
given attack the parameters of individual phases can also be extracted if 
applicable. 
WIRESHARK was used during this research to update the formal truth data for 
the DARPA 1999 dataset which was used to derive the results provided in 
section 5.4.   
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Appendix D. Performance Improvement 
The dominant paradigm for network intrusion systems (NIS) is based on the 
passive sensing of network traffic, in which the NIS does not interact with other 
devices on the monitored network.  Passive NIS monitor the network sessions 
between devices, and the frames broadcast throughout the network, from 
which a determination of an intrusion or non-intrusion event can be made on 
the basis of known intrusion signatures or anomalous behaviour. This appendix 
examines one specific method of improving this process further by integrating 
active probing along with passive sensing, to support the correct assignment 
between intrusion and non-intrusion events.  
Active probing deliberately stimulates network devices into providing more 
information about their state than can be derived from passive techniques 
alone. In this aggressive detection process, detection is based on the network 
or node response to specially designed frame sequences, augmenting the 
passive interpretation of network activity. This appendix will show that 
aggressive3 techniques allow the declaration of intrusion events that are difficult 
or impossible using data derived solely from passive sensing of a network 
segment. In this context it offers improvements to the sensitivity of a NIS over 
conventional passive techniques. Improvements to selectivity are also 
highlighted.  
Given the opportunities for performance improvement it will be necessary to 
                                        
3 The term aggressive is proposed as an alternative to the more correct term active, as active 
intrusion detection already has an accepted alternative meaning. 
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consider aggressive architectures as an essential part of future high 
performance network intrusion systems. 
D.1. Aggressive Detection 
The active paradigm, in which signals with specially designed characteristics are 
transmitted and the properties of the reflected signal are measured, is well 
known in other disciplines.  In sonar, for example (Urick 1967), military systems 
often operate in a passive listening mode, sensing the environmental noise and 
attempting to extract potential target signatures. Passive techniques are 
preferred as targets are not alerted to the presence of a sonar system, which 
can then be used to gain a tactical advantage. However, many sonar systems 
also include an active element in which a sound wave is transmitted and the 
reflected energy is sensed and processed to confirm the presence of a target. 
This confirmation is inherently easier from its reflected energy than from its 
passive signature, but the target can be alerted to the presence of the sonar by 
its transmitted energy.  
Active sonar systems generally have higher sensitivity and selectivity compared 
with their passive counterparts, at the expense of reduced security, through 
revealing their presence and location. By optimising the combined use of active 
and passive techniques many of the security disadvantages of active techniques 
can be reduced or even overcome, providing significant overall advantage 
compared with the use of passive techniques alone.   
The active paradigm is also used in radar systems (Skolnik 1980), where the 
improved sensitivity over passive-only radars allows long range detection of 
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targets of interest.  Perhaps less well-known is the application of the active 
paradigm to television systems, where time gating of the signal from the active 
element, usually a laser, can achieve the rejection of unwanted signals in the 
camera (Moore, Jaffe et al. 2000), significantly improving system sensitivity.   
The motivation for this research is the extension of these principles to network 
intrusion systems, by combining active and passive network sensing techniques, 
to improve sensitivity and selectivity compared to NIS using passive-only 
techniques.  This integration of passive and active detection techniques we call 
aggressive detection, to differentiate it from purely active or passive systems. 
NISs are faced with issues similar to sonar or radar systems. They extract 
potential intrusion signatures from network measurements that are often 
gathered passively, to hide the presence of the intrusion system. However, it 
can be difficult to infer the existence of some intrusions from the passive 
sensing of network traffic alone. For example, it is hard to determine that a 
network host has unapproved packet sniffing software installed by an 
authorised user. This type of intrusion occurs without any unusual frames being 
transferred over the monitored network and post-installation the user could 
remove the sensed data using local media without transmitting it over the 
network. In the experimental work reported in the chapter 5 the “Insidesniffer” 
attack type could not be detected by SNORT. 
The potential of active probing techniques in network security has been 
recognised by others. Verwoerd noted that a number of active network tools 
were valuable in the examination of network state (Verwoerd 1999). He 
 Appendix D Performance Improvement       
  
231 
identified some active probing techniques that could be used to assist 
networking staff in interpreting the alerts produced by an intrusion system. 
Later Lindqvist (Lindqvist 2001) identified the potential for including active 
techniques within the discrimination part of an intrusion system. He considered 
the application of active probing techniques to support the EMERALD intrusion 
detection system (Neuman and Porras 1999), both in the host and network 
modules. However, neither of these researchers examined the issues associated 
with the integration of the active and passive parts of an intrusion engine, 
which is the subject of this appendix.  
D.1.1. Aggressive Network Intrusion Systems 
A functional model of an aggressive network intrusion system (AgNIS) is shown 
in Figure D-1 below. The principle of operation is as follows. The Passive 
Element senses the frames present on the network making its intrusion/non-
intrusion determination in much the same way as in the passive NIS shown in 
Figure 4-1. Instances of intrusion-like frames however, do not trigger the 
output of an alert but instead data is transferred to the Active Element, via the 
Control Channel, so that an active network probe can be selected and 
transmitted onto the network. The Passive Element continues to acquire frames 
from the network, receiving the response to the active probe as well as further 
network activity. If this response confirms that an intrusion event is underway, 
the Passive Element will output an alert through the Management Channel. If 
the response confirms that an intrusion event is not underway, the Passive 
Element will maintain a record in its Potential Intrusion store, so that future 
probes are not requested, unless there is a further change in state. If the 
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response neither confirms nor rejects the presence of an intrusion event the 
Passive Element can take a number of actions, depending on selected strategy 
including: 
 Output an alert, to allow network support staff to investigate further; 
 Request additional probes from the Active Element; or 
 Wait for further confirmatory network measurements before an alert is 
output. 
 
Network
AgNIS
Active Element Passive Element
Probes Responses
Activity
Control Channel
Management 
Channel
AlertsControlControl
 
Figure D-1 A Simple AgNIS Functional Description 
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D.1.2. Active Element Probes 
The design and selection of active probes is key to the performance of an 
AgNIS and should be based the following considerations. First, most networks 
include management and diagnostic capabilities to assist the support staff deal 
with network incidents. Such capabilities could provide significant information to 
a NIS when intrusions are suspected. An obvious approach is for the active 
element to access SNMP management blocks on suspect devices (Mauro and 
Schmidt 2001), but an AgNIS could also make information requests to the 
network management tools directly. 
Secondly, the network devices are accessible by the support staff and therefore 
software could be installed on them, designed to respond to specific, 
authenticated probes that reveal their security status. This is in many ways 
similar to the SNMP approach discussed above. However, it offers the potential 
for more specific information to be passed to the NIS, such as personal firewall 
logs. This approach will only be effective when the network security policy 
forbids the connection of personally owned devices, as is frequently the case. 
Thirdly, other network devices may be capable of acting as a source of active 
probes. For example, network vulnerability tools, such as NESSUS, interrogate 
network devices to confirm their configuration. Vulnerability checks could be 
monitored by the passive element of an AgNIS to derive additional intrusion 
information. The infrequent nature of vulnerability checks is unlikely to make 
this a practical approach and a better way may be to allow the AgNIS to initiate 
a vulnerability scan on demand. Alternatively, a study of the probes used in 
vulnerability scanning could reveal useful techniques for direct integration into 
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the active element of an AgNIS. 
Fourthly, probes could be designed to change the behaviour of network devices 
to improve their data gathering capability during a suspected intrusion event. 
For example, network sniffers could be turned on and commanded to send data 
to the passive element when specific frames or sequences of frames occur.  
Fifthly, the network tomography techniques developed by Coates (Coates, Hero 
et al. 2002) may be useful to extract information from traffic measurements 
made at a small number of network nodes. These techniques are 
computationally demanding and the probes are network resource intensive, but 
they may be useful for an AgNIS protecting large-scale networks, such as 
deployed by Government Agencies or some global enterprises. Further research 
is necessary to evaluate their potential in the current application; however their 
ability to extract low-observable measurements is attractive.  
Finally, the techniques used by intruders in the reconnaissance stage of an 
intrusion are designed to reveal detailed information about the target network. 
Whilst much of this information could be provided a priori to the AgNIS, many 
of these techniques are sophisticated and potential sources of useful 
measurements, including:  
 Port scanning, to determine a change in state of a network device (Lee, 
Roedel et al. 2003); 
 UDP probes to elicit status information from network devices (Arkin 
1999); 
 Operating system (OS) finger printing, to confirm that it has not changed 
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(Taleck 2003); 
 MAC / IP address mismatches, to sense a NIC in promiscuous mode 
(Spangler 2003); 
 Decoy services, to tempt intruders into declaring their presence; 
 Latency testing, to determine the presence of a denial of service attack, 
or a NIC in promiscuous mode (Spangler 2003); 
 Messages to fictitious hosts, to trigger reverse DNS lookups (Wu and 
Wong 1998); and 
 SMB probes to examine configuration of the host (Hertel 2004). 
Clearly there is a wide range of active probes that could be integrated into 
future network intrusion systems. The next section describes architectures for 
achieving this integration. 
D.2. Architectures for Aggressive Detection 
There are many ways that passive and active systems can be integrated to 
produce an aggressive detection system. In this appendix two characteristics of 
the integration have been chosen, namely the physical separation and the 
quantity of information that needs to be transferred between the active and 
passive elements. The motivation for the selection of these two characteristics 
stems from the military use of the active paradigm, as discussed earlier. In 
many military applications the active and passive elements are not co-located. 
Such systems are generically called bi-static, and offer an improved survivability 
compared with mono-static or co-located active and passive elements.  
Examining the properties of mono-static and bi-static geometries in the current 
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application provides useful insights, as described later in this appendix, but it is 
not immediately obvious that this application will deliver all of the usual 
advantages of bi-static geometries. Specifically the detection of the 
communications between the active and passive elements could reveal their 
presence and location to an intruder, if the network that is being protected is 
used for this communication. As a consequence, the quantity of information 
was selected as a characteristic for study, as the probability that the passive 
element will be detected by an intruder will increase with increasing 
communications between the elements. 
When physical separation and quantity of information are combined, four 
generic architectures result for including active probing within intrusion 
systems, namely: 
 Integrated, Loosely Coupled (ILC) – in which the active element of the 
intrusion system is combined with the passive intrusion engine, within 
the same host. The active and passive elements operate independently 
of each other. However the passive element combines the response of 
the network to the probes with the passively sensed normal traffic, to 
make the intrusion/non-intrusion decision. The limited communications 
between the active and passive elements will not be detectable by an 
intruder due to their co-location on a single host; 
 Integrated, Tightly Coupled (ITC) – in which the active element initiates 
probes under specific requests from the passive element in response to 
the detection of potential intrusions. The passive element then combines 
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the alert data derived from passive-only sensing with the response from 
the active probes, to amend its intrusion/non-intrusion decision. Both the 
passive and active elements reside on the same host and therefore the 
communications between them will not be detectable by an intruder;   
 Distributed, Loosely Coupled (DLC) – in which the active element is on a 
different network node from the passive element of the intrusion engine 
and operates independently, in the same way as the ILC architecture 
described above. The separation of the elements will mean that the 
limited communications between them will be detectable if it occurs over 
the network that is being monitored; and   
 Distributed, Tightly Coupled (DTC) – in which the active and passive 
elements are on separate nodes within the network but the active probes 
are sent in response to requests from the passive element. Again, the 
separation of the elements will mean that the communications between 
them will be detectable if it occurs over the network that is being 
monitored. 
Each of these approaches has different system-level implications, which will be 
discussed next. 
D.2.1. ILC Architecture 
In this architecture the active and passive elements of the intrusion engine are 
contained on the same host and operate independently of each other. This is 
illustrated in Figure D-2, where an AgNIS is shown protecting the servers on 
network segment 1, from unauthorised activity from users on network segment 
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2. 
The passive element senses the frames present on network segment 1. This 
network segment contains frames from authorised users as well as the probe 
and response frames from the active element. Whilst the two elements could 
use the same NIC, they are likely to be present on separate NICs to reduce the 
vulnerability of the intrusion system. Multiple NICs allow the IP address of the 
passive element to be disabled, hiding its presence and reducing opportunities 
for denial of service attacks.   
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Figure D-2 Integrated, Loosely Coupled AgNIS 
The active element sends probes in a pre-set sequence, at selected timings 
according to a predetermined plan that is shared with the passive element. The 
 Appendix D Performance Improvement       
  
239 
properties of the sequence, such as probe type and frequency, are determined 
by the support staff in response to their concerns regarding the security of the 
network. Network devices at higher risk or requiring increased assurance will be 
probed more frequently and with a wider variety of probes. The selection of the 
timing interval between probes will be from a consideration of: 
 The number of network devices that are being monitored; 
 The impact on network bandwidth; and  
 The need for randomisation to reduce the vulnerability of the intrusion 
system to predictive attacks using the probe sequence to penetrate 
further into the network.  
It is not necessary for an intrusion to be detectable by the passive element 
before active probes are transmitted. This means that ILC systems have the 
potential to allow detection of low-observable intrusions that are less likely to 
be detected using passive sensing techniques alone. This is expected to 
improve the detection rate and as well as reduce the false alarm rate compared 
with an intrusion system operating solely using passive sensing. The result 
would be an improvement in sensitivity compared with a passive-only NIS. 
The effect of using this architecture on the selectivity of a NIS is unclear at this 
time. The selectivity associated with low-observable events will have improved, 
due to their improved detection. However as the probes are not selected to 
improve discrimination on events detected by the passive element, instead 
being determined by the pre-agreed plan, it is unlikely that selectivity will 
generally be improved. More research is required to evaluate this further.  
Appendix D Performance Improvement 
 
240 
ILC architectures are considered of little interest as they are at significant risk of 
attack. The active probes alert an attacker to the presence of an intrusion 
system and identify the host on which it is operating. Penetration or denial of 
service attacks on the host would be expected. Also, they use network 
bandwidth for the probes and responses, even during non-intrusion times. 
D.2.2. ITC Architecture 
In the ITC architecture the active probing element is under the direct control of 
the passive element, as shown in Figure D-3. The passive element determines 
potential intrusion events from its sensing of the frames on the network 
segment 1, which are then passed to the active element for further 
interrogation.  
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Figure D-3 Integrated, Tightly Coupled AgNIS 
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The AgNIS combines the results of the passive classifiers with the additional 
information derived from the active probing to improve the intrusion/non-
intrusion discrimination. Again, separate NICs are likely to be needed for the 
active and passive elements, in order to reduce the vulnerability of the intrusion 
system.   
When operating with this architecture, the active probes provide information to 
confirm or reject of the presence of an intrusion, initially detected using passive 
techniques. Therefore it is unable to detect low-observable intrusions directly, 
but is able to provide the method for a reduction in false alarms.  
The sensitivity of the AgNIS can be increased over the use of passive 
techniques, in the following way. The passive element would operate at a low 
decision threshold level, equivalent to moving to the right hand side of a ROC 
curve. This will produce a high detection rate for intrusion events, but also a 
large false alarm rate. In a NIS using passive techniques alone this false alarm 
rate is likely to be too high for support staff to investigate effectively. However, 
the active element of the AgNIS is automated and would therefore be capable 
of rapid interrogation of each of these passively detected alerts. Only detections 
confirmed by the response to the active element are output as alerts. In this 
way the sensitivity of the AgNIS is increased, by moving the operating point on 
the passive element ROC curve to the right and using two-stage detection to 
reduce the overall false alarm rate to an acceptable level. 
The selectivity of the AgNIS can be increased over the use of passive 
techniques, by choosing active probes specifically in response to the signatures 
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triggered in the passive element. For example consider the situation in which a 
set of signatures have been triggered for a given connection between network 
devices. The probability vector with unity entries for the triggered signatures 
could be used calculate the distance to specific intrusion event types in the 
selectivity matrix. If there is uncertainty about which intrusion event type 
should be declared, for example by the distances being closer than a threshold 
value, specific active probes could be dispatched to improve the discrimination. 
Further probes could also be used if the initial selection failed to provide 
sufficient discrimination between the possible intrusion event types. 
As a specific example of selectivity improvements consider the situation where 
the passive element detects activity from a specific host that could be 
interpreted as attempts to force a network switch into hub mode. The active 
element could be instructed to use probes to determine if the host NIC was in 
promiscuous mode. If this is confirmed, it is logical to deduce that network 
sniffing is being attempted and issue a specific alert for action by the network 
support team. If the host is not in promiscuous mode, further probes may be 
sent to other hosts on the segment to see if a coordinated attack is underway, 
involving multiple attackers.  Other probes could be considered to provide more 
selective information on the type of attack underway.  
The principal advantage of the ITC architecture is its simplicity. Once the 
passive part has detected a potential intrusion, the type and parameters of 
active probes can be selected and initiated against the suspect network device. 
As the responses from the initial probes are received and interpreted, further 
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probes can be sent to address any remaining uncertainty. No communication 
difficulties are present between the active and passive elements due to their co-
location on the same host. Thus tight integration of the active and passive parts 
can be achieved. Additional advantages include: 
 Fast response – the tight coupling minimises the communications delays 
and allows the active element to be responsive to the threat. Alerts are 
likely to be declared more quickly with a tightly coupled architecture; and 
 Resource Efficient - Network resources are used only when the network 
threat level has increased due to potential intrusions being found by the 
passive element. 
The principal disadvantage of this approach is the vulnerability of the intrusion 
system to attack. Again, the active probes will identify the host running the 
intrusion system providing valuable information to an intruder. 
D.2.3. DLC Architecture 
In the DLC architecture the active and passive elements operate independently 
on different hosts, as shown in Figure D-4. In this figure the probes are 
initiated from a host within the same network segment as the suspected 
compromised host. In general this is not necessary, however the active element 
must spoof its IP address to direct probe responses to the network segment 
where the passive element is present.  
Many of the features of the ILC architecture apply including: 
 Sensitivity is improved; 
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 The active element would follow a pre-set sequence of probes at set 
timings, defined by the pre-shared plan; 
 The potential to detect low-observable intrusion events is present; and 
 There is inefficient use of network resources. 
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Figure D-4 Distributed, Loosely Coupled AgNIS 
There is an important difference however, in terms of the vulnerability of the 
intrusion system. If the active element is attacked and disabled, the integrity of 
the intrusion system is not completely lost. The passive element can continue to 
operate, albeit at reduced performance. The active probes no longer identify 
the hosts for the intrusion system and therefore attacks against it would be 
more challenging to initiate. 
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At first sight the need to spoof the addresses of the active element could reveal 
the network segment on which the passive element resides. This would be a 
serious issue, as the passive element provides the executive control of the 
AgNIS, determining when alerts are issued to support staff. There are a number 
of ways of overcoming this, including: 
 The active element could spoof its addresses to multiple network 
segments, in sequence, thereby hiding the actual segment on which the 
passive element resides; 
 Honeynet devices could be placed within the network segment being 
spoofed by the active element. These devices could broadcast alerts 
when subject to penetration attempts or other NIS defeat techniques, as 
this would be confirmation of an on-going attack within the network; 
 Multiple active and passive elements could be deployed, increasing the 
survivability of the AgNIS; and 
 Active element decoys could be deployed, with honeynet features. These 
decoys could generate probes with spoofed addresses that do not 
contain passive elements 
The principal disadvantages of the DLC are its inefficient use of network 
resources, due to its use of network probes when no intruder is present, and 
reduced responsiveness compared with tightly coupled architectures. 
D.2.4. DTC Architecture 
In the DTC architecture the active and passive elements are also separated 
within the network, as shown in Figure D-5.  The control of the active element 
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is determined by messages from the passive element, in much the same way as 
the ITC architecture. Many of the features of the DLC and ITC architectures are 
inherited: 
 The active system responds only to alerts detected by the passive 
element, making the principal benefit that of improved sensitivity and 
selectivity; 
 Multiple active elements can be deployed, directing the responses to 
their probes to the same passive element; 
 Reduced vulnerability and increased survivability compared with 
integrated architectures, due to the redundancy within the AgNIS; and 
 Efficient use of network resources, as probes are only initiated in 
response to a perceived attack. 
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Figure D-5 Distributed, Tightly Coupled AgNIS 
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The key issue in the DTC architecture is the mechanism for achieving 
communications. The simplest method is to allow the passive element to 
communicate with the active element via the monitored network. However, this 
approach would identify the passive element to a potential attacker and is 
therefore not considered appropriate.  It is common practice for a dedicated 
VLAN to be used for network management tasks; however such connections are 
subject to the same security concerns.  IPSec tunnels, whilst securing the 
payload contents, reveal the tunnel end points where the passive and active 
elements reside. 
An alternative communication method could use out-of-band connections, 
effectively a separate network to that which is being monitored by the AgNIS.  
Direct peer-to-peer connections between the active and passive elements can 
be easily achieved. Close physical separation is usually required and likely to be 
available, even within a large global network, mainly from network 
administration considerations. 
In systems where the out-of-band communication is impractical it would be 
necessary to consider special techniques to hide the presence of the 
communication channels on the monitored network. It is proposed to use covert 
channels to convey the selection of an active probe and its parameters (Ahsan 
2002). Such channels are difficult to detect, hiding their presence from 
intruders sniffing the monitored network. Usually the potential for covert 
channels to be present is a significant security concern. However, it is believed 
their use to hide the presence of AgNIS communications to be novel and an 
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appropriate use of this intruder technique.  Covert timing channels are likely to 
be more applicable than covert storage, providing the channel bandwidth can 
be sufficiently high to convey the full message without excessive delay.  
D.2.5. Hybrid Architectures 
Hybrid architectures could also be deployed, in which the active element 
initiates probes according to a pre-agreed plan controlling the sequence and 
timing, unless otherwise directed by the passive system. This approach would 
inherit many of the advantages of the loosely coupled systems as well as 
maintaining the advantages of the tightly coupled systems. It would be able to 
detect low-observable intrusion events, during its loosely coupled operation and 
become highly responsive with a low false alarm rate when operated within its 
tightly coupled mode. In addition, in systems where multiple active elements 
have been deployed, some could be tightly coupled whilst others are loosely 
coupled, achieving the same performance simultaneously. 
Hybrid architectures are versatile, offering many options to the network security 
staff. In loosely coupled mode the active element could be commanded into 
one of many pre-set plans according to the threat perceived by the passive 
element. The threat could be determined by the number of alerts being 
detected by the passive element, the presence of anomalies such as network 
load or even time of day. Network resource intensive techniques could be 
deployed in some plans, when the threat was determined to be high or the 
impact on users could be tolerated. In tightly coupled mode the passive 
element could command multiple active elements to initiate the probes 
necessary for discrimination of intrusion packages. This would give redundancy, 
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improving the survivability of the AgNIS, but it could also be used to obscure 
the presence of the active elements.     
It is likely that hybrid, distributed architectures will offer the most potential for 
future active network intrusion systems. Their potential for attack resilience as 
well as their capacity for detecting low-observable intrusions will be important 
in practical systems. 
In Table D-1 below the advantages and disadvantages of the different 
architectures are summarised and contrasted with a NIS using passive 
techniques only. 
Architecture Advantages Disadvantages 
Passive Only 
 Simple 
 Minimal hardware 
requirements 
 Difficult to detect the 
deployment of NIS 
 Limited sensitivity  
 Poor false alarm rate 
 Unable to detect low-
observable intrusion events 
 Poor NIS survivability 
Integrated, Loosely 
Coupled (ILC) 
 Simple 
 Minimal hardware 
requirements 
 Detection of low-observable 
intrusion events 
 Improved sensitivity 
 Vulnerable to direct attack 
 Inefficient use of network 
resources 
 Poor response time (need to 
wait for discriminating probe) 
 Poor NIS survivability 
Integrated, Tightly 
Coupled (ILC) 
 Simple communications 
 Improved sensitivity 
 Improved selectivity 
 Efficient use of network 
resources 
 Fast response 
 Detection of low-observable 
intrusion events is not 
improved 
 Host is vulnerable to attack 
 Poor NIS survivability 
Distributed, Loosely 
Coupled (DLC) 
 Detection of low-observable 
intrusion events 
 Improved sensitivity 
 More hardware required 
 Inefficient use of network 
resources 
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 Reduced vulnerability to 
direct attack 
 Increased NIS survivability 
 Multiple active elements can 
be used with a single passive 
element 
 Poor response time (need to 
wait for discriminating probe) 
Distributed, Tightly 
Coupled (DTC) 
 Efficient use of network 
resources 
 Improved sensitivity 
 Improved selectivity 
 Fast response 
 Reduced vulnerability to 
direct attack 
 Increased NIS survivability 
 Multiple active elements can 
be used with a single passive 
element 
 Covert communications 
required 
 More hardware required 
 Detection of low-observable 
intrusion events is not 
improved 
Hybrid 
 Efficient use of network 
resources 
 Detection of low-observable 
events 
 Fast response 
 Improved sensitivity 
 Improved selectivity 
 Reduced vulnerability to 
direct attack 
 Increased NIS survivability 
 Multiple active elements can 
be used with a single passive 
element 
 More hardware required 
 Covert communications 
required 
Table D-1 The Advantages and Disadvantages of AgNIS Architectures 
D.3. AgNIS Considerations 
There are some important issues associated with active probing that need to be 
considered before inclusion within deployed intrusion systems. This section 
describes many of these considerations. 
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D.3.1. Batch Processing 
Lindqvist considered the integration of active probes into EMERALD and he 
concluded that the intrusion engine must operate in real-time rather than batch 
mode (Lindqvist 2001).  This is true for an intrusion system with tightly coupled 
active and passive elements, including hybrid approaches. However this is not 
generally true as architectures can be proposed in which batch processing can 
also be a potential operating mode. Both the ILC and DLC architectures 
discussed above can be operated in batch mode. Such architectures may 
therefore become important in networks where forensic analysis of events is 
essential. 
D.3.2. Network Security and AgNIS Protection 
Intrusio systems are generally vulnerable to attack or evasion techniques and it 
is therefore important that the integration of active probing does not degrade 
this situation further. Specific techniques will need to be included to protect the 
NIS against existing and specially developed attacks against AgNIS. For 
example, in the loosely coupled architectures, the intrusion system could be 
vulnerable to an attacker injecting a background of false probe responses. This 
could be addressed by time synchronising the active and passive elements. The 
passive element would then only include probe responses within a narrow time 
window. Time synchronisation could be achieved by a covert channel from the 
active to the passive elements, at the cost of increasing the coupling between 
them.  
Of particular concern is the potential for an attacker to initiate a large number 
of alerts within the passive part of an AgNIS using tight coupling, using tools 
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such as STICK (Patton, Yurcik et al. 2001). The resulting number of probes that 
could be generated would overload the network resources, creating a self-
induced denial of service. It is therefore necessary to include features to limit 
the resources consumed by the active probes. Although this will offer the 
potential for an attacker to overload the intrusion system with spoofed attacks 
before initiating an attack on the real target, the presence of an intruder within 
the network would be obvious. This discussion indicates that care in the 
selection of security measures and countermeasures is required. It is hoped 
that this will be subject of future research. 
The location of the active elements relative to the passive elements needs 
careful consideration. It is not necessary for the active element to be on the 
same subnet as the passive element, nor on the subnet that includes the 
monitored devices. The active element could spoof its addresses to direct 
responses at individual passive elements. This is a useful capability and offers 
the potential for cooperation between multiple passive elements, further 
improving the survivability of the intrusion system when under attack.  
D.3.3. Personal Firewalls 
Many organisations deploy personal firewalls on network hosts, either as part of 
the operating system or as a dedicated security tool. These have the ability to 
limit the information that can be gathered from network probes and can 
potentially increase the workload of support staff as they respond to queries 
raised by network users. At first sight this might appear to limit the applicability 
of active techniques; however the following approach can be taken: 
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 Active probes can be used to monitor changes to the open ports and 
available services on protected hosts, to confirm that such changes are 
in line with the network security policy; 
 Not all the network devices have personal firewalls. Routers, switches, 
firewalls (low security connections) and servers generally do not. Probes 
will need to be able to extract the maximum of available information 
from such devices; 
 The personal firewalls are authorised by the network security staff and 
subject to policy settings. The security team could allow the personal 
firewalls to respond to specific probes, so as to confirm the status of the 
host; and 
 Many probe types are designed to illicit a response from the IP stack of 
the host rather than to penetrate it. Application layer firewalls should not 
affect the responses from lower levels in the stack. 
D.3.4. Efficiency 
Aggressive NIS have a much improved efficiency compared with passive 
systems alone. In passive NIS the ratio of frames that are capable of correctly 
asserting the status of a network or network device may be greater than 
1:50,000, as discussed in section 4.5. However, probe responses are designed 
specifically for this task and by increasing their frequency this ratio can be 
significantly reduced. The exact reduction depends on the design parameters of 
the AgNIS, but for a design goal of no more than one active response frame for 
every 100 normal user frames, to minimise the impact on network bandwidth, 
this ratio could reduce to 1:100.  
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The two-stage alerting process, that is inherent in AgNIS architectures that 
exploit tight coupling, changes the design requirements for the passive 
element. The goal of the passive element is now to make sure that intrusions 
are alerted in the first stage, not to reduce the false alarms through the use of 
sophisticated discrimination techniques. Discrimination is now undertaken in the 
second stage, where the responses to specific probes provide data that simplify 
this process. The first stage, passive processing may be achieved with less 
computationally demanding techniques than in conventional NIS. This further 
improves efficiency of a NIS as the majority of the NIS measurements are 
undertaken with simplified processing. 
D.4. Summary and Conclusions 
Four discrete architectures for integrating active probes with a passive NIS have 
been investigated and their properties determined. It is clear that an AgNIS 
approach can offer both sensitivity and selectivity improvements compared with 
a passive only approach, depending on the implemented architecture. The 
selection of a particular architecture depends on the detailed requirements 
including the need for real-time operation, the implications on the network 
bandwidth and the security concerns of the network owner. 
The most attractive approach for real-time operation is a hybrid architecture 
consisting of multiple distributed active and passive elements communicating is 
a discreet way. This approach appears to offer the potential to achieve all the 
benefits of AgNIS architectures whilst minimising their disadvantages.  
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The security implications of deploying an AgNIS have been reviewed, with the 
potential for communications between the active and passive elements to 
reveal their locations identified as a prime concern for distributed systems. 
Ideally this issue can be resolved with out-of-band connections but when this is 
not possible the novel approach of using covert channels to achieve discreet 
communications between the AgNIS elements has been proposed.  
The application of AgNIS requires more research to establish how far sensitivity 
and selectivity can be improved. In particular the discrimination offered by 
different active probe types needs to be established. 
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Appendix E. SNORT Configuration 
The following SNORT configuration file was used to produce the results 
reported in Chapter 5. The comments have been removed to reduce the size of 
this appendix. 
var HOME_NET [192.168.1.0/24,172.16.0.0/16] 
var EXTERNAL_NET any 
var DNS_SERVERS $HOME_NET 
var SMTP_SERVERS $HOME_NET 
var HTTP_SERVERS $HOME_NET  
var SQL_SERVERS $HOME_NET 
var TELNET_SERVERS $HOME_NET 
 
portvar HTTP_PORTS  
[80,2301,3128,7777,7779,8000,8008,8028,8080,8180,8888,9999] 
portvar SHELLCODE_PORTS !80 
portvar ORACLE_PORTS 1521 
 
var AIM_SERVERS 
[64.12.24.0/23,64.12.28.0/23,64.12.161.0/24,64.12.163.0/24,64.12.200.0/24,2
05.188.3.0/24,205.188.5.0/24,205.188.7.0/24,205.188.9.0/24,205.188.153.0/2
4,205.188.179.0/24,205.188.248.0/24] 
 
var RULE_PATH /home/christ/Desktop/PhD/rules 
var SO_RULE_PATH /home/christ/Desktop/PhD/rules/so_rules 
var PREPROC_RULE_PATH /home/christ/Desktop/PhD/rules/preproc_rules 
 
config disable_decode_alerts 
config disable_tcpopt_experimental_alerts 
config disable_tcpopt_obsolete_alerts 
config disable_tcpopt_ttcp_alerts 
config disable_tcpopt_alerts 
config disable_ipopt_alerts 
config checksum_mode: all 
 
config pcre_match_limit: 1500 
config pcre_match_limit_recursion: 1500 
config detection: search-method ac-bnfa max_queue_events 5 
config event_queue: max_queue 8 log 3 order_events content_length 
 
dynamicpreprocessor directory /usr/local/lib/snort_dynamicpreprocessor/ 
dynamicengine /usr/local/lib/snort_dynamicengine/libsf_engine.so 
dynamicdetection directory /usr/local/lib/snort_dynamicrules 
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preprocessor frag3_global: max_frags 65536 
preprocessor frag3_engine: policy windows timeout 180 
 
preprocessor stream5_global: max_tcp 8192, track_tcp yes, track_udp no 
preprocessor stream5_tcp: policy windows, use_static_footprint_sizes, ports 
client 21 22 23 25 42 53 79 80 109 110 111 113 119 135 136 137 139 143 110 
111 161 445 513 514 691 1433 1521 2100 2301 3128 3306 6665 6666 6667 
6668 6669 7000 8000 8080 8180 8888 32770 32771 32772 32773 32774 32775 
32776 32777 32778 32779, ports both 443 465 563 636 989 992 993 994 995 
7801 7702 7900 7901 7902 7903 7904 7905 7906 6907 7908 7909 7910 7911 
7912 7913 7914 7915 7916 7917 7918 7919 7920 
preprocessor perfmonitor: time 300 file /home/christ/Desktop/PhD/snort.stats 
pktcnt 10000 
preprocessor http_inspect: global iis_unicode_map unicode.map 1252  
preprocessor http_inspect_server: server default \ 
    apache_whitespace no \ 
    ascii no \ 
 bare_byte no \ 
 chunk_length 500000 \ 
 flow_depth 1460 \ 
 directory no \ 
 double_decode no \ 
 iis_backslash no \ 
 iis_delimiter no \ 
 iis_unicode no \ 
 multi_slash no \ 
 non_strict \ 
 oversize_dir_length 500 \ 
 ports { 80 2301 3128 7777 7779 8000 8008 8028 8080 8180 8888 9999 
} \ 
 u_encode yes \ 
 non_rfc_char { 0x00 0x01 0x02 0x03 0x04 0x05 0x06 0x07 } \ 
 webroot no 
 
preprocessor rpc_decode: 111 32770 32771 32772 32773 32774 32775 32776 
32777 32778 32779 no_alert_multiple_requests no_alert_large_fragments 
no_alert_incomplete 
 
preprocessor bo 
 
preprocessor ftp_telnet: global encrypted_traffic yes check_encrypted  
inspection_type stateful  
preprocessor ftp_telnet_protocol: telnet \ 
    ayt_attack_thresh 20 \ 
    normalize ports { 23 } \ 
    detect_anomalies 
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preprocessor ftp_telnet_protocol: ftp server default \ 
    def_max_param_len 100 \ 
    ports { 21 2100 } \ 
    ftp_cmds { USER PASS ACCT CWD SDUP SMNT QUIT REIN PORT PASV TYPE 
STRU MODE } \ 
    ftp_cmds { RETR STOR STOU APPE ALLO REST RNFR RNTO ABOR DELE 
RMD MKD PWD } \ 
    ftp_cmds { LIST NLST SITE SYST STAT HELP NOOP } \ 
    ftp_cmds { AUTH ADAT PROT PBSZ CONF ENC } \ 
    ftp_cmds { FEAT OPTS CEL CMD MACB } \ 
    ftp_cmds { MDTM REST SIZE MLST MLSD } \ 
    ftp_cmds { XPWD XCWD XCUP XMKD XRMD TEST CLNT } \ 
    alt_max_param_len 0 { CDUP QUIT REIN PASV STOU ABOR PWD SYST 
NOOP } \ 
    alt_max_param_len 100 { MDTM CEL XCWD SITE USER PASS REST DELE 
RMD SYST TEST STAT MACB EPSV CLNT LPRT } \ 
    alt_max_param_len 200 { XMKD NLST ALLO STOU APPE RETR STOR CMD 
RNFR HELP } \ 
    alt_max_param_len 256 { RNTO CWD } \  
    alt_max_param_len 400 (Portokalidis and Bos) \ 
    alt_max_param_len 512 { SIZE } \ 
    chk_str_fmt { USER PASS ACCT CWD SDUP SMNT PORT TYPE STRU MODE } 
\ 
    chk_str_fmt { RETR STOR STOU APPE ALLO REST RNFR RNTO DELE RMD 
MKD } \ 
    chk_str_fmt { LIST NLST SITE SYST STAT HELP } \ 
    chk_str_fmt { AUTH ADAT PROT PBSZ CONF ENC } \ 
    chk_str_fmt { FEAT OPTS CEL CMD } \ 
    chk_str_fmt { MDTM REST SIZE MLST MLSD } \ 
    chk_str_fmt { XPWD XCWD XCUP XMKD XRMD TEST CLNT } \ 
    cmd_validity MODE < char ASBCZ > \ 
    cmd_validity STRU < char FRP > \ 
    cmd_validity ALLO < int [ char R int ] > \ 
    cmd_validity TYPE < { char AE [ char NTC ] | char I | char L [ number ] } > 
\ 
    cmd_validity MDTM < [ date nnnnnnnnnnnnnn[.n[n[n]]] ] string > \ 
    cmd_validity PORT < host_port > 
preprocessor ftp_telnet_protocol: ftp client default \ 
    max_resp_len 256 \ 
    bounce yes \ 
    telnet_cmds no 
 
preprocessor smtp: ports { 25 587 691 } \ 
  inspection_type stateful \ 
  normalize cmds \ 
  normalize_cmds { EXPN VRFY RCPT } \ 
  alt_max_command_line_len 260 (Esmaili, Safavi-Naini et al.) \ 
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  alt_max_command_line_len 300 { RCPT } \ 
  alt_max_command_line_len 500 { HELP HELO ETRN } \ 
  alt_max_command_line_len 255 { EXPN VRFY } 
 
preprocessor ssh: server_ports { 22 } \ 
                  max_client_bytes 19600 \ 
                  max_encrypted_packets 20 \ 
                  enable_respoverflow enable_ssh1crc32 \ 
                  enable_srvoverflow enable_protomismatch 
 
preprocessor dcerpc2: memcap 102400, events [co ] 
preprocessor dcerpc2_server: default, policy WinXP, \ 
    detect [smb [139,445], tcp 135, udp 135, rpc-over-http-server 593], \ 
    autodetect [tcp 1025:, udp 1025:, rpc-over-http-server 1025:], \ 
    smb_max_chain 3 
 
preprocessor dns: ports { 53 } enable_rdata_overflow 
 
preprocessor ssl: ports { 443 465 563 636 989 992 993 994 995 7801 7702 
7900 7901 7902 7903 7904 7905 7906 6907 7908 7909 7910 7911 7912 7913 
7914 7915 7916 7917 7918 7919 7920 }, trustservers, noinspect_encrypted 
 
output alert_csv: /home/christ/Desktop/alerts.csv default 
output alert_full: alert 
 
include /home/christ/Desktop/PhD/config/classification.config 
include /home/christ/Desktop/PhD/config/reference.config 
 
include $RULE_PATH/local.rules 
 
include $RULE_PATH/exploit.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/ftp.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/telnet.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/rpc.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/rservices.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/dos.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/ddos.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/dns.rules 
 
include $RULE_PATH/web-cgi.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/web-coldfusion.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/web-iis.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/web-frontpage.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/web-misc.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/web-client.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/web-php.rules 
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include $RULE_PATH/sql.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/x11.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/netbios.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/misc.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/attack-responses.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/oracle.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/mysql.rules 
 
include $RULE_PATH/smtp.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/imap.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/pop2.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/pop3.rules 
 
include $RULE_PATH/nntp.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/backdoor.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/snmp.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/icmp.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/tftp.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/scan.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/finger.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/web-attacks.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/shellcode.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/policy.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/info.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/icmp-info.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/virus.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/chat.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/multimedia.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/p2p.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/spyware-put.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/specific-threats.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/voip.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/other-ids.rules 
include $RULE_PATH/bad-traffic.rules 
 
include /home/christ/Desktop/PhD/config/threshold.conf 
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Appendix F. Professional Review 
 
In order to gauge the view of other professionals it was decided to obtain 
independent review of the body of this thesis. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 were 
supplied to two consulting security architects to gain their views on the 
practicality of the proposed taxonomy and metrics. Specifically four questions 
were posed, as follows: 
1) Do you agree with the premise that comparison of intrusion systems is 
difficult? 
2) Does the taxonomy go some way towards addressing this difficulty? 
3) Does the two new metrics help compare intrusion systems? and 
4) Has the experimental program shown that the metrics are useful for 
comparing intrusion systems? 
Unfortunately only one security architect could respond in time (Prowse 2013), 
the full content of which is repeated below: 
“After reviewing the paper of Mr Chris Tucker and having worked as a 
professional security consultant and technical security architect with successful 
delivery of IDS and IPS systems for various clients my view of the paper is that 
it describes very well the issues that we see in day to day use and 
implementation of IDS and IPS systems and the difficulty that is often placed 
on the security professional when assisting clients with the choices for intrusion 
systems.  Allied with the current crop of advanced persistent threats the paper 
demonstrates very clearly that the current approach to the way in which these 
system types are compared is not straight forward and requires to be 
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updated.  The new taxonomy takes that step forward and brings with it known 
and demonstrable approaches and metrics for the measurement of these 
systems utilising techniques that have been widely used and are well 
understood from the radio and telegraphy sphere. 
The proposed taxonomy allows for a greater comparison of systems and clearly 
demonstrates the difficulty in selection and use of the systems in a real world 
environment through the testing that was carried out in support of the 
paper.  Given that the approach to security is never static and that in the 
current climate where customers and clients are expecting the “maximum bang 
for buck” taking this approach allows for the threat to be married more closely 
to the appropriate device type when the suggested new taxonomy model is 
used. 
The adoption of the two new metrics should be seriously considered by 
suppliers of detection systems (used in the context of the paper to also include 
anti-virus systems) as a way of not only assisting in product improvement but 
one that also will allow for a client to make a more informed choice over the 
potential product or products that they may choose to apply to their 
environments.  As stated previously experience has shown that clients typically 
now only rely on one type of IDS or IPS system within their environment so 
choice and demonstrable evidence in threat capture and analysis based on the 
updated matrix would allow for a more informed decision to be made. 
The experimental program used in the paper would be useful for the 
comparison of intrusion systems and could be used in a wider context within 
the industry to compare product (possibly by SANs or similar), which would 
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allow for independent testing using the program to adopt and continue to 
expand the use of the new taxonomy and metrics. 
Overall, the paper is well laid out and easy to read and understand for a 
professional in the information security field which a background in detection 
systems and poses some new and additional research options for the 
future.  From a personal perspective the adoption of the updated taxonomy by 
the security industry should be seriously considered as it allows for a greater 
match to a wider threat profile and could if adopted allow a greater and more 
accurate choice of product and implementation of intrusion systems.”
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Appendix G. Research Papers 
The following papers have been produced as part of the PhD research 
activities: 
C. J. Tucker, S. M. Furnell, B. V. Ghita, and P. J. Brooke, "A new taxonomy for 
intrusion detection," in International Networking Conference INC'06. Plymouth, 
2006 (Attached to this thesis); 
C. J. Tucker, S. M. Furnell, B. V. Ghita, and P. J. Brooke, "A new taxonomy for 
comparing intrusion detection systems," Internet Research, vol. 17, pp. 88-98, 
2007; (Attached to this thesis); and 
C. J. Tucker, S. M. Furnell, B. V. Ghita, and P. J. Brooke, "The aggressive 
detection of network intrusions”, submitted to Computers & Security. 
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